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ABSTRACT 
My dissertation consists of three empirical essays where I analyze animal products 
consumption and marketing. First using cross-sectional household data, I investigate the 
importance of consumption from home produce (self-provisioning) and conclude that 
studying food consumption decisions in isolation from production is not warranted for 
Turkey. I develop a testing procedure incorporated into linear approximation of the 
almost ideal demand system (LA/AIDS) model to formally test the relevance of food 
self-provisioning. Studying consumption in isolation from production leads significant 
overestimation of rural households’ responsiveness to price and income signals especially 
for the dairy and egg products. Second I investigate the contribution of consumption from 
home produce to alleviate vulnerability to undernutrition in rural areas. I find that the 
level, depth and severity of food poverty to be least among rural households who engage 
in food self-provisioning and food self-provisioning reduce vulnerability to 
undernutrition. Moreover, food self-provisioning is concentrated in expensive calories 
from vegetables and dairy so self-provisioning rural households also have a more 
balanced diet. Finally I investigate whether milk processing firms abuse their oligopsony 
 viii 
power to excessively profit themselves to the expense of milk farmers and final 
consumers. I look for evidence whether the speed of adjustment of processed milk price 
is same when farm-gate milk prices increase and decrease. I find no evidence that will 
point out any price gauging on the part of milk processors to benefit themselves. Actually 
I detect a long-term downward trend in processed milk prices coinciding with new major 
entries to milk processing industry. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent literature on the animal husbandry sector in Turkey is motivated 
largely by the potential of EU accession. The general liberalization of international trade 
– symbolized by World Trade Organization and the latest Doha Round of negotiations 
that focus on agricultural products – provides an additional impetus to inquire into the 
likely effects of further integration of agricultural markets in Turkey into world markets. 
 Valuable and insightful works have been undertaken in recent years that address 
different aspects of the issue Eruygur & Çakmak (2008), Grethe (2007), and Çakmak 
(2004) try to answer the question, what will happen at the macro level as a result of 
liberalization of trade? by simulating the impact of market integration on agricultural 
prices, trade and redistribution between producers and consumers. These studies reveal 
that Turkey is already competitive in fruit and vegetable exports, sectors that are 
relatively open and already well-integrated into European markets. However, cereals 
production and livestock sector are not competitive at current EU and world prices. In a 
simulation study of market integration between Turkey and EU as of 2006, Grethe (2007) 
predicts that agricultural prices (especially grain and animal products) in Turkey will 
decline, and that as a result of lower prices, agricultural production will decline and 
consumption will increase. Producer surplus will decline roughly by €1 billion per annum 
and consumer surplus will increase by €1.5 billion per annum (Grethe, 2007: 451).  
If market integration is a result of EU accession, and not merely an extension of 
current customs union, the producers in Turkey will be more than compensated by direct 
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transfer payments from the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) budget. In a more 
recent study assuming integration by 2015, Eruygur & Çakmak (2008) predict an eight 
percent increase in consumer surplus if EU and Turkish markets are fully integrated by 
2015 compared to non-integration, and a 13 percent decline in producer surplus (almost 
two-thirds of this decline due to losses from the livestock sector). Nevertheless, in 
absolute terms the gains in consumer surplus are more than the losses in producer 
surplus. Moreover, if the integration of markets results from EU membership with the 
accompanying CAP payments going to farmers, producers will be compensated for the 
losses. Furthermore, Grethe (2007) claims that if the margins between farm-gate and 
wholesale prices within Turkey are reduced by 10 percent due to increased efficiency in 
the marketing chain, the resultant dynamic welfare gains will be more than the static 
gains from market integration.  
Çakmak, Dudu, & Ocal (2008) approach the issue from a microeconomic 
perspective and try to devise policy proposals on what should happen in rural Turkey to 
increase the effectiveness of agricultural production in order to compete in EU and world 
markets?  Unlike the above-mentioned studies, they employ household level data1 to 
answer this question. Applying the technical input-output efficiency approach to resource 
utilization, they utilize various versions of stochastic frontier production functions to find 
out whether the agricultural factors of production are used effectively. They calculate that 
the effectiveness of Turkish agriculture in utilizing the productive factors was between 33 
and 45 percent during 2002 – 2004. They also find that land has the highest marginal 
                                               
1 Quantitative Household Survey (QHS, 2002) is jointly administered by Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA) and the World Bank prior to the implementation 
of the Agricultural Reform Implementation Program (ARIP) which has been in effect 
since 2001.  
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contribution of all factors, and that the marginal contribution of labor is statistically 
insignificant at the margin. These findings are not surprising for a developing country 
with abundant labor and relatively scarce land resources. Since all potential arable land is 
already under cultivation in Turkey, they propose to increase the utilization of inputs that 
augment land productivity. They also argue that Turkish agriculture should shed labor in 
order to increase labor effectiveness in agricultural production. These twin goals can be 
achieved by modernizing and rationalizing production units (i.e., consolidation and land 
concentration). They conclude by arguing that the most important task for policymakers 
in Turkey is to implement productivity-increasing policies that will move Turkish 
agriculture closer to its technical potential, despite the fact that current economic units 
within the agricultural sector are likely to oppose such policies (Çakmak et al., 2008: 
executive summary).  
Ünal (2008) works with the same data set as Çakmak et al., (2008) and within the 
same household microeconomic framework. Unlike Çakmak et al., (2008), she tries to 
answer the question, why households choose to devote a seemingly ineffective amount of 
labor into agricultural production? That is, Ünal (2008) tries to understand “overall land 
utilization of the available land resource and the related use of labor” (p. 7). She shows that 
the inverse size-yield relationship (IR) – the widely observed phenomenon in developing 
countries where yield per acre gets smaller as farms get larger,– holds for Turkey. Even 
though land heterogeneity and farmer skill (measured by educational attainment) are 
significant variables, the most important variable explaining land productivity is intensive 
labor input use.  
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The IR phenomenon can be viewed as a symptom of rural market imperfections. 
Unal argues that even though imperfections in land, labor, and credit markets are 
abundant in rural areas, labor takes the brunt of the adjustment to all factor market 
imperfections because it has the least bargaining power. In short, peasants compensate for 
imperfections in land and credit markets by working harder on their small plots, thereby 
obtaining higher yields per acre (Sen, 1981). Ünal’s (2008) empirical findings parallel 
Çakmak et al., (2008) conclusion that the marginal contribution of labor is very low. But 
the policy implications she draws from this are vastly different: 
Turkey faces the potential for major socioeconomic change with possible 
accession to the EU… Suggesting land consolidation and concentration as a 
solution to low productivity in agriculture seems to be an ill advised policy for 
Turkish agriculture… Given the inverse productivity-size relationship in 
agriculture, what is needed for increased productivity in agriculture and overall 
growth doesn’t seem to be so called “market-friendly reforms,” but land 
redistribution supported by technical and financial assistance for farmers. (p. 25) 
 
 We are sympathetic to this view. During most of the 2000s official unemployment 
rate was around 10 percent and the labor force participation ratio was below 50 percent 
despite sustained economic growth. By 2009, with the worldwide economic crisis, the 
unemployment rate increased to 14 percent (State Institute of Statistics (SIS), 2010). 
Rural households were engaging in low productivity activities not because they preferred 
backbreaking agricultural work over better paying non-agricultural work, but because 
such non-agricultural work is not available. We think that it is ill-advised to advocate 
rapid consolidation in agriculture under these macroeconomic conditions.  
Many previous studies (an exception is Ünal (2008)) base their policy 
recommendations based on total social welfare. We want to contribute to this literature by 
bringing distributional concerns to the forefront. Even if total social welfare is expected 
 5 
to increase, there are ethical, social and political reasons to be concerned if the increase in 
social welfare is accompanied by redistribution from poor to non-poor. These studies 
consider agriculture primarily as a site of production. In the second and third chapters of 
this dissertation, we focus instead on the consumption behavior of rural households, and 
use the Household Budget Survey from 2003 (SIS, 2003) to promote our arguments. In 
the fourth chapter, we study the milk marketing chain, taking our cue from Grethe (2005) 
and Grethe (2007) and use monthly farm-gate and wholesale milk price data to promote 
our arguments.  
In chapters 2 and 3, we employ household-level data to investigate the importance 
of consumption from home produce (“self-provisioning” for brevity). Calories from food 
self-provisioning constitute 19 percent of all calories consumed by rural households in 
2003. Moreover, self-provisioned calories come primarily from more expensive sources 
such as dairy products and green vegetables. In Chapter 2, in order to measure the 
influence of domestic production factors on food consumption, we employ the budget 
share of self-provisioned food as a proxy for productive factors. We construct an Almost 
Ideal Demand System (AIDS) and show that self-provisioning rural households have a 
statistically significantly different composition of the food basket from other households. 
Specifically, they consume more dairy products, more green vegetables, and more of 
certain cereal products (like bulgur) compared to other rural households and urban 
households. Our explanation is that the price differentials between the shadow prices of 
self-provisioned quickly perishable products and corresponding retail prices – i.e., a type 
of market imperfection – are such that many rural households choose to rely on their own 
production instead of markets.  
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Eruygur & Çakmak (2008), Grethe (2007), and Çakmak (2004) all predict that 
prices for and production of animal products will decline in Turkey as a result of an 
eventual integration with the world market, and that consumers will benefit from this 
integration due to declining prices. On the production side, the overwhelming majority of 
farmers in Turkey engage in dairy production as a secondary activity to crop production. 
(FAO, 2007)2 reports that more than one-third of dairy products are consumed by the 
producing households and another one-third are marketed through informal channels. The 
report concludes that the Turkish dairy sector needs modernization and consolidation of 
farms; substantially larger herd size; and shedding of part-time smallholders in order to 
successfully integrate to EU and world markets (p. 71). In other words, in the case of 
integration of Turkish and EU animal products markets, the likely losers will be small-
scale farmers who engage in animal husbandry as a complementary activity to crop 
production. 
Against this backdrop, in Chapter 3 we explore the implications of food self-
provisioning for poverty and vulnerability to poverty and undernutrition. We show that 
after correcting poverty line calculations for food self-provisioning, and even though 
poverty is more prevalent in rural areas than in urban areas, the self-provisioning rural 
households no longer are poorer than other rural households. Moreover, self-provisioning 
rural households are substantially less vulnerable to undernutrition. In the literature on 
animal husbandry in developing countries, it is well recognized that animals also serve as 
                                               
2 This report is commissioned by Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA) to 
devise a plan in order to prepare the Turkish dairy sector, including dairy farmers and 
dairy processors, to EU Accession. Hence, the authors of the report primarily concern 
themselves with what needs to be done to reduce the discrepancy between EU and 
Turkish dairy sectors. 
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quasi financial assets in addition to being a source of income. Moreover, revenue from 
dairy products and other animal products eases the liquidity constraints of smallholders 
between annual harvests (Dercon, 1998; Fafchamps, Udry, & Czukas, 1998; Rosenzweig 
& Wolpin, 1993). In keeping with these insights, our findings in Chapter 3 also suggest 
that the majority of rural households in Turkey engage in food self-provisioning (of 
which dairy production constitutes a substantial part) in order to reduce their vulnerability 
to undernutrition by reducing their exposure to market price risk. Even if Grethe (2007), 
Çakmak (2004), and Eruygur & Çakmak (2008) assertion that integration to EU and 
world markets will increase the total consumer surplus by reducing animal product 
prices, our findings suggest that the distribution of these welfare gains will not be neutral. 
The chief beneficiaries of lower prices will be urban non-poor. On the other hand, the 
loss of a source of in-kind and cash income will make the current rural poor both poorer 
and more vulnerable to income poverty and undernutrition. 
In Chapter 4, we investigate the fluid milk marketing chain in Turkey from farm-
gate to wholesale prices. Due to data limitations, we are not able to establish whether if 
dairy processing firms operate as a cartel and exercise oligopsony power vis-à-vis dairy 
farmers. Nevertheless, by employing Asymmetric Price Transmission (APT) models we 
show that, even if dairy processing firms are enjoying oligopsony powers vis-à-vis dairy 
farmers, they are passing all of these price concessions and more to their customers. The 
processing firms are able to reduce the real fluid milk prices and expand their business 
during the study period, 1994 – 2006 thanks to the increasing returns to scale they enjoy 
in the growing dairy products sector.  
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In the final chapter, we review the findings of chapters 2 to 4 in detail and draw 
policy conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
TESTING SEPARATION OF CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION 
DECISIONS OF FOOD  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The phenomenon of peasants’/farmers’ production of a great variety of food for 
home consumption violates some of the basic tenets of economics like specialization and 
gains from trade. Also, policy makers in developing countries with large peasantries are 
frustrated that peasants do not appear responsive to price incentives or opportunities to 
modernize (De Janvry, Fafchamps, & Sadoulet, 1991). Economists understand well that 
this unresponsiveness to prices is not because of the traditional mind-set of peasants but 
due to constraints that are not visible to outsiders yet are very real to peasants themselves. 
We discuss some of these constraints below in detail, but it is clear that ignoring the 
constraints facing peasants will lead to misguided policy advice and expectations. 
A potential drawback of recent household food consumption and food demand 
studies pertaining to Turkey (Akbay Boz, & Chern, 2007; Sengul & Tuncer, 2005) is that 
they implicitly assume that households are mere price takers when it comes to food 
consumption. This assumption is implicit in the sense that the food production is not a 
part of empirically estimated models despite the fact that previous studies employ 
nationally representative surveys that cover rural areas. In developed countries, where the 
agricultural labor force is a very small part of the total labor force and the overwhelming 
majority of agricultural production takes place in specialized commercial farms, the 
assumption that all consumers are price takers is reasonable. Using 2003 household 
 10 
budget survey data for Turkey, however, we observe that food consumption from home 
produce (self-provisioning for brevity) supplies almost 19 percent of calories for rural 
households (see Section 2.4). This suggests that self-provisioning is important for rural 
households in Turkey and should not be assumed away.  
Our contribution in this chapter is to develop a formal procedure to test whether 
households are mere price takers or not. We are able to develop this procedure thanks to a 
newly available data on the breakdown of food consumption according to its source. We 
follow the literature on agricultural household models (AHM) which study the 
consumption and production decisions of peasant households. Starting with the 
observation that peasant households supply most of their food themselves and employ 
productive factors from within their own households, AHM advances models where 
households decide what to produce and consume simultaneously.  
We test whether self-provisioning affects the food consumption decisions. We 
find that it does, and conclude that implicit an assumption of separation of consumption 
and production decisions of food is unwarranted. We then re-estimate demand for food, 
incorporating the productive factors into consumption decisions, and find that the 
expenditure and own-price elasticities estimated initially (by disregarding the production 
side) overstate the true elasticities, especially for the dairy and egg food group.  
 In addition to policy makers, the issue of self-provisioning is critical to political 
economists who are concerned with poverty reduction. Griffin, Khan, & Ickowitz, (2002) 
Griffin, Khan, & Ickowitz (2004) and Boyce, Rosset, & Stanton (2007) note that in many 
developing countries, countryside is characterized by market imperfections that go 
beyond transactions costs. According to Griffin et al., (2002) and Griffin et al., (2004) the 
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market failures do not just happen: they are by and large mechanisms of labor control, 
helping to ensure the dependence of peasants on the landlord class. Landlords can exert 
control of the local populace by strategically handing out employment in the form of 
wage labor or sharecropping. Deprived of employment opportunities other than self-
employment, peasant households expend their energy to get the most from their small 
plots. Working with a data set collected in 20023, Ünal (2008) finds overwhelming 
evidence for an inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity for Turkey. 
These findings lead us to suspect that incomplete markets in rural areas are still relevant 
in Turkey, even though De Janvry et al., (1991) and De Janvry, Sadoulet, Fafchamps, & 
Raki (1992) were referring to much poorer countries. Complementing Unal (2008) in this 
study, we look at the consumption side of rural household reality. 
In the rest of the paper we first review the literature on AHM with a special 
emphasis on separable and nonseparable household models. Then, given the limitation of 
the current data set for constructing a proper AHM, we develop a procedure to test for the 
implicit assumption of separation. In the third section we flesh out the empirical model 
for estimation. Section 2.4 presents data on food consumption with a special emphasis on 
self-provisioning. Section 2.5 presents the econometric findings. In Section 2.6 we 
discuss the policy implications of our findings. Section 2.7 recaps and concludes the 
chapter. 
                                               
3 Ministry of Agriculture and World Bank collected the data set before the start of the 
Agricultural Reform Implementation Project (ARIP) in 2002 (QHS 2002 hereafter). 
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2.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Testing Strategy 
2.2.1 Agricultural Household Models  
An agricultural household is one which engages in agricultural production as well 
as being a site of food consumption. Very often the major inputs - land and labor - are 
supplied by the household. If there were no transaction costs that lead to imperfect 
functioning of markets, we could assume that production and consumption decisions are 
made sequentially; first production is decided, and then consumption. Sadoulet and de 
Janvry (1995) put this as follows:  
As is typical when all markets work and there are no transaction costs, it is immaterial 
to whether the household consumes its own products or sells them to buy what it 
needs to consume… Under these conditions, the household behaves as if production 
and consumption/work decisions were made sequentially. …, there is separability 
whenever prices are exogenous and markets are used, even if sale and purchase prices 
are not identical. When a household model is separable it can be solved recursively in 
two steps (p. 145) (italics are added). 
  
The following figure is taken from Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995) and depicts the 
sequential process of production and consumption decisions (p. 146). This does not 
necessarily mean that production and consumption decisions are always sequential; all it 
shows is that production and consumption decisions can be studied separately. 
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Figure 2.1: Causal ordering in the separable household model 
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In the above simplified figure, farmer produces commodity a, which is traded at price pa 
taking into account market wage w , input prices xp and the farm-firm characteristics 
qz  
like fixed capital and farm size. Given exogenous prices, the farmer determines how 
much to produce aq , how much input x to use and how much labor l  to exert in order to 
maximize profits * . Profits are the hinge between production and consumption decisions 
because farm profits are a part of household income and hence affect the consumption 
decision via a budget constraint. Households maximize utility by allocating their full 
income among agricultural goods ac , manufactured goods mc , and leisure lc given the 
household characteristics hz like household size, age, and education, subject to total 
income and time constraints. Mathematically all of this can be expressed as: 
First production problem is solved by the following rule: 
Maximize 
, ,a
a a x
q x l
p q p x wl    . . : ( , , ; ) 0,qas t g q x l z   production function.  (2.1) 
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Second, the consumption/work problem is solved by maximizing utility, u, given the 
level of profit *  achieved in production: 
Maximize
, ,
( , , ; )
a m l
h
a m l
c c c
c c c zu ,           (2.2) 
*. . : ,x m m ls t p x p c wc wE    full income constraint; ,
s
lc l E   time constraint 
 
Yet in practice, incomplete markets are generally the rule rather than the 
exception in rural areas in developing countries. We adopt the definition by Sadoulet & 
de Janvry (1995) for an incomplete market as: “a market may fail for a particular 
household when it faces wide price margins between the low price at which it could sell a 
commodity or the factor and the high price at which it could buy that product or factor” 
(p. 149). Complete self-sufficiency of the idealized peasant is one extreme of incomplete 
markets. In this case peasants produce all of the consumption needs of a household 
employing only the productive factors (land and labor) available within the household.  
According to Sadoulet & de Janvry (1995) the most common reasons for 
incomplete markets are (i) transaction costs due to poor infrastructure, high marketing 
costs due to merchants’ local monopoly power, and supervision costs of hired labor; (ii) 
shallow local markets because of a high covariation between household supply and 
prices4; (iii) due to price risks and risk aversion of farmers, sales prices are discounted 
negatively and purchase prices are revised upward to hedge against risk; (iv) and finally 
limited access to working capital means that the budget balance becomes a constraint, 
and this leads to self sufficiency because actions that require cash outlays like hiring 
outside labor or using fertilizer implicitly carry the cost of financing, while cash-
                                               
4 During the harvest time prices are low because everybody is selling in the locale and 
during the low season prices are high because of low supply. 
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generating activities – even if seemingly unprofitable, like selling milk – become sought 
after to ease the cash constraint especially in the lean season. Under market 
imperfections, exogenous market prices no longer accurately reflect the full opportunity 
cost of goods and services. In the presence of imperfect markets, some goods become 
nontradeable (pp. 149-150). Their prices are determined internally by the household; and 
hence the decisions of production and consumption are no longer separate: they are 
decided jointly. This finding has direct relevance for the policy analysis. In their 
simulation study, de Janvry et al., (1991) show that when the impact of market price 
change on food consumption and production is strongest when market function properly 
imperfections. Whereas if market for food and labor are incomplete than the impact of 
market price changes will be muted. In other words, the food price elasticity is much 
lower when the markets are incomplete. 
In empirical applications using production and consumption equations, an AHM 
should be estimated simultaneously rather than sequentially. However, such a model is 
complex and even the minimum data required are monumental. In the presently 
employed data set, we do not have enough information to construct the production-side 
AHM (more on this in Section 2.6.1). Instead we develop a procedure to test for 
separation of production and consumption decisions. Then we try to gauge the 
significance of ignoring nonseparation in empirical applications for Turkey. 
2.2.2 Test of Separability 
 Studying rural labor markets in Java, Benjamin (1992) uses household 
demographic attributes to identify nonseparation: “… identification of nonseparation 
relies on the observation of a correlation between demographic composition and observed 
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farm employment” (p. 292). If the household exhibits Chayanovian characteristics – that 
is, if all or most of the labor is sourced within the family – then total labor exerted will 
depend on household characteristics like household size and the number of working age 
adults. However, if there is an active labor market then family size is not a binding 
constraint and laborers can be hired as needed5. To test this theory empirically, Benjamin 
(1992) estimates the impact of demographic variables on labor demand after taking into 
account wage, area harvested, inputs used, and controls for soil and climate conditions6.  
We develop a similar procedure using the budget share of self-provisioned food as 
a means to identify nonseparation7. In doing so, we apply a logic akin to that of 
Hoddinott & Haddad (1995), who propose that if household members pool their income 
and spend it to maximize joint household utility, then who controls income within the 
household should not matter. When they estimate the determinants of household spending 
on food, clothing, etc. they include wives’ share of cash income as an explanatory 
variable, in addition to total expenditure and a host of demographic characteristics. They 
find that when women have income independent of their husbands, the household’s 
spending on food and children’s needs increases significantly.  
In our case, we hypothesize that if the households’ consumption and production 
decisions are separable, then the budget share of self-provisioned food should not affect 
the amount of food consumed. In the empirical tests, the coefficient estimate for the 
budget share of self-provisioning should be statistically insignificant. In the case of 
                                               
5 Alternatively family members are not limited by size of agricultural holding for 
employment and can find employment for excess labor. 
6 He finds that they are not statistically significant in rural Java; i.e., the labor market 
functions well in rural Java. 
7 James K. Boyce suggested this solution. 
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separable decisions, observed self-provisioning is merely a case where a household treats 
itself as another supermarket. However, if the production and consumption decisions are 
nonseparable, then the coefficient estimate for budget share of self-provisioning will be 
economically and statistically significant.   
2.3 Empirical Model  
Studies on food demand in Turkey using micro household data are fairly rare. 
Recent examples are the studies by Akbay et al., (2007), Armagan & Akbay (2008), and 
Sengul & Tuncer (2005). The first two of these studies use data sets compiled by the 
State Institute of Statistics (SIS). Sengul and Tuncer (2005) use the 1994 Household 
Budget Survey (SIS 1994) and Akbay et al., (2007) use the survey from 2003 (SIS 2003). 
We also use the SIS 2003 data set. Unlike SIS 1994, the SIS 2003 data set allows us to 
identify the source of food: bought from the market or self-provisioned. Both Sengul and 
Tuncer (2005) and Akbay et al., (2007) use two-step estimating procedures, where in the 
first step they deal with censored data8 issues. Sengul and Tuncer (2005) use the 
methodology developed by Heien & Wessells (1990), whereas Akbay et al., (2007) 
follow a consistent two-step procedure developed by Shonkwiler & Yen (1999), who 
show that Hein & Wessells (1990) methodology yields inconsistent and inefficient 
estimates.  
                                               
8 Many households do not purchase various food items during the survey month. This can 
be either due to they cannot afford or preferences or they deplete their stocks. In other 
words, the survey observations are censored due to the existence of stocks. We want to 
distinguish between the households who cannot afford such food items from the ones 
who simply consume from purchases made prior to survey month. For example, in the 
SIS 2003 data set, one-third of households do not have any purchase in the “other food” 
category – which includes prepared meals, salt, spices, etc.    
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After taking care of censored data issues, in the second step both papers employ 
the linear approximation (LA) of the almost ideal demand (AID) system, i.e. LA/AIDS, 
developed by Deaton & Muellbauer (1980). We utilize the same data set as Akbay et al., 
(2007), and follow their strategy in estimating the benchmark demand system. The rest of 
this section explains the empirical methodology in detail, closely following the exposition 
in section two of Akbay et al., (2007).  
2.3.1 Linearly Approximated Almost Ideal Demand System (LA/AIDS) 
 Deaton & Muellbauer (1980) introduced the workhorse model for estimating 
demand systems:  
 
11 25
*
1 1
log logi i ij j i ij j i i
j j
xw p D S e
P
    
 
       
 
   (2.3) 
 
where iw denotes the budget share of food group i, jp  represents the price of the jth food 
group, x is the total expenditures on food, , , ,i ij i ij    and i are parameters to be 
estimated, *P is the price index approximated by Stone’s index (Equation 2.4), and ie  is 
the disturbance term. Dj are the demographic variables, including household size, a 
dummy variable for households with young children (younger than 14), dummies for age, 
education, marital status and gender of household heads, and employment status of 
housewives and seasonal and regional dummy variables9. S is the budget share of self 
provisioning for each household and it is the only additional variable that we introduce 
                                               
9 Pollak & Wales (1981) test the alternative methods and conclude that using dummy 
variables to account for demographic variables (translating approach) fares better among 
alternatives. 
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apart from those used by Akbay et al., (2007), allowing us to extend their  model in order 
to perform the separability test:  
 
11
* 0
1
log log ,i i
i
P w p

  (2.4) 
where 0iw represents the mean budget share for each food group.  
2.3.2 Estimating a complete demand system with censored variable problems 
Estimating demand systems where a large number of zero purchases exist10 will 
yield biased and inconsistent estimates of demand parameters because of large numbers 
of dependent variables valued at zero. One way to deal with latent variables of this nature 
is to employ a two step-procedure. In the first stage, a probit model is used to determine 
the probability of consumption of the good in question for a given household. In the 
second stage, the regressors are transformed using the information from the initial probit 
model. In this paper, we follow the two-step methodology developed by Shonkwiler & 
Yen (1999).  
In the first step, the decision to consume is modeled as a dichotomous choice 
problem (Hein and Wessells, 1990) with a linear probit model (Equation 2.5): 
*
,( , )i i i iw f x u   
*
i i iw d w  
*
*
1  0
0  0i
if d
d
if d
  
  
  
 * 'i i i id z v   (2.5) 
                                               
10 Table 2.2 shows that for this sample zero purchases are clustered in non-perishable 
food groups: for other food group (33 percent), for non-alcoholic beverage (28 percent), 
for tea and coffee (24 percent), and for vegetable oils (17 percent). The survey period is 
one month and it is very possible that many households continued to consume previously 
purchased goods from storage, like vegetable oils or tea, despite the fact they did not 
make any purchases during the survey month.  
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where i stands for food group, iw and id are the observed dependent variables, and
*
iw and 
*
id  are the corresponding unobserved (latent) variables. Following Akbay et al., (2007), zi 
are the vectors of socio-economic and demographic factors such as age, education, 
gender and marital status of the head of household, and household size. Also we used 
total household spending (which is not used in the second stage), since Jackson (1984) 
showed that variety increases with total spending. i  and i are the vectors of parameters 
to be estimated and ui and vi are the random errors. 
Assuming that for each i, the error terms (ui and vi) are distributed as bivariate 
normal with cov (ui,vi) =  , Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) corrected for inconsistency in 
estimates by defining the second-stage regression: 
 ' '( ) ( , ) ( )i i i i i i i i iw z f x z e          (2.6) 
where    is the univariate standard normal probability density function (PDF) 
and    is the cumulative distribution function calculated by inserting iˆ in place of 
i which are obtained using Equation 2.5 in the first step and ie is the error term. 
Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) suggest estimating the demand system in the second stage 
using either Maximum Likelihood (ML) or Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR)11. 
Equations 2.7 and 2.8 present Equation 2.6 in full detail: 
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 (2.7) 
                                               
11 Akbay et al., (2007) employ iterated SUR.  
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In the above model the error terms are defined as follows: 
 
 ' ' ' 'ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i i i i i i i i i ie u z z f x z z                   (2.8) 
The LA/AIDS is the workhorse model of estimating demand systems, yet the 
issue of how to deal with censored variables is not settled. In a commentary on Akbay et 
al., (2007), Drichoutis, Klonaris, Lazaridis, & Nayga Jr. (2008) point out that error terms 
are heteroskedastic, as Equation 2.8 suggests, and therefore the second step SUR 
estimator will be inefficient (p.95). They suggest using Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares (FGLS), instead of currently popular ML or SUR procedures, after Tauchmann 
(2005). In their response to Drichoutis, et al., (2008), Akbay Boz, & Chern (2008) 
recalculate the own-price elasticities and food expenditure elasticities for whole sample 
with coefficient estimates obtained from the FGLS procedure in the second step. In this 
chapter, we also employ the FGLS approach for the second-stage estimation12. Any 
estimate by Akbay et al. in this chapter are to their most recent elasticity estimates with 
the FGLS results (Akbay et al., 2008), not to their original 2007 paper.  
Demand theory requires the imposition of the following three constraints (adding-
up, symmetry and homogeneity) on the parameters of Equation 2.7:  
Adding up: 1,   0,i ij i ij ii i i i              
Symmetry: ij ji  , 
Homogeneity: 0ijj        (2.9) 
                                               
12 We applied the 3SLS procedure in the STATA package to perform FGLS. 
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Marshallian own and cross-price elasticities and food expenditure elasticities are 
computed from the parameters of the LA/AIDS for the variables at sample means (see 
(Yen, Kan, & Su, 2002)): 
Own-price: 
0 '
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( ) ( ) 1,ii i i i i
i
w z
ii w
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2.4 Self-provisioning 
For the first time, Turkey’s Household Budget Survey for 2003 (SIS 2003) data 
set allows us to distinguish among the sources of food for the household. The SIS 2003 
data set classifies the food available to households as shown in Table 2.1. The amounts in 
the last three categories are trivial, but self-provisioning accounts for 7 percent of total 
available food in Turkey as a whole, and roughly 19 percent of rural consumption 
(calculated in terms of calories).  
The food produced and consumed within the household obviously has no market 
price. In this case, SIS researchers assigned production costs in order to calculate the 
amount spent on each food category13. Due to imputing production costs (instead of retail 
prices) to monetize all consumption, self-provisioned food has a lower share of total food 
spending vis-à-vis its share of calories.  
                                               
13 There is no direct explanation for the pricing of self-provisioned food in the survey 
manual. But in explaining other instances of in-kind payments to individuals, the manual 
explains that they are valued at production cost. For example, see individual section 
manual, question 8.32d. Likewise we verified that wholesale prices are imputed for self-
provisioned food with SIS officials. 
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Table 2.1: Ratio of calorie intake and food liras of household food consumption 
 All sample Urban Rural 
Definition calories 
food 
liras calories 
food 
liras calories 
food 
liras 
1- Purchased 0.91 0.92 0.97 0.96 0.80 0.82 
2- Self-provisioning14 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.15 
3- Produced for market but 
consumed in the household 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
4- Payments in kind by employer 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5- Purchased for the purpose of 
donation 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 
Two characteristics about self-provisioning stand out. First, self-provisioning is 
concentrated in several commodities. On the one hand, there is no self-provisioning of 
some highly processed products like sugar and vegetable oils. On the other hand, 60 
percent of fluid milk, 76 percent of yogurt, 70 percent of butter, 40 percent of cheese, 27 
percent of eggs, 36 percent of other grain products, and roughly 15 percent of fruits and 
vegetables consumed in rural areas are self-provisioned (again percentages are calculated 
in caloric terms). These initial observations suggest that for some rural households the 
production and consumption decisions may not be separable. Second, the retail and 
imputed price differentials vary depending on the product. For dairy products, the 
imputed price is roughly 74 percent of retail price. In the “other grains” category, the 
imputed price is 70 percent of rural retail prices. For fruits and vegetables, the imputed 
prices are roughly 66 percent of retail prices. However, for highly industrialized products 
like, chicken and eggs, the retail prices are lower than imputed prices.  
                                               
14 This category also includes the food donated to relatives etc. from household 
production. However, it is not possible to discern the actual consumption from donations 
from the survey data. So I assumed that all of it consumed in the household. At the very 
least, we can speculate that household members are choosing to donate some of their 
produce with their free will which would imply that donations are as valuable to them at 
the margin as personal consumption. 
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 Table 2.2 shows the percentage of non-zero purchases and summary statistics for 
the food budget share of each food group (the third column presents summary statistics 
for the dependent variables in the demand system). Table 2.3 presents similar statistics 
for the self-provisioned products. In light of the concentration of self-provisioning in 
certain animal products, we grouped the food items slightly differently than did Akbay et 
al., (2007, 2008). In their papers butter belongs to fats and oils, and eggs are classified 
under other foods. In this chapter we classify dairy products, butter and eggs under one 
heading, while the rest are constructed exactly like Akbay et al., (2007). We believe that 
butter and eggs display more common characteristics with cheese and yogurt than with 
vegetable oils or highly processed food products (in the other food category) for rural 
households. 
Table 2.2: Percentage of non-zero purchases, mean food expenditure shares and 
monthly spending by food group 
Food Groups Households 
purchasing 
(%)  
Mean 
exp. 
Share 
(%) 
Mean exp. 
by all 
households 
(TL/month) 
Mean exp by 
purchasing 
households 
(TL/month) 
Bread*           94.9  15.8          27.6  29.1 
Cereals*           94.8  9.1          18.4  19.4 
Meat & meat products*           89.8  13.6          34.3  38.2 
Vegetable oils           83.1  5.7          11.3  13.6 
Vegetables*           99.7  16.9          32.0  32.1 
Fruits*           97.7  9.1          17.8  18.2 
Dairy products and egg           99.3  15.1          28.5  28.7 
Sugar, confectionary and jams*           94.7  7.9          15.9  16.8 
Tea and Coffee*           76.3  3.0            5.6  7.3 
Non-alcoholic beverages*           72.1  2.7            5.3  7.3 
Other food products           66.6  1.2            2.4  3.6 
*: same as Akbay et al., (2007), Table 3. TL: Turkish Lira 
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Table 2.3: Self-provisioning budget share, mean food expenditure shares and 
monthly spending by food group 
 entire sample rural only 
Food Groups* Self-
prov. 
% of 
hhs 
Mean 
exp. 
Share 
(%) 
Mean 
exp. by 
all hhs 
(TL/ 
month) 
Mean exp. 
by self-
prov. hhs 
(TL/ 
month) 
Self-
prov. % 
of rural 
hhs 
Mean 
exp. 
Share 
(%) 
Mean 
exp. by all 
rural hhs 
(TL/ 
month) 
Mean exp. 
by self-
prov. rural 
hhs (TL/ 
month) 
Cereals** 8.2 5.6 2.0 24.4 27.0 18.5 6.6 24.6 
Meat 1.4 0.9 0.6 47.1 4.3 2.9 2.1 48.2 
Vegetables 9.0 3.1 1.3 14.8 26.3 9.2 4.0 15.3 
Fruits 3.9 2.1 0.5 13.2 11.3 6.1 1.4 12.5 
Dairy & egg 14.9 12.0 5.0 33.4 47.2 38.7 16.1 34.2 
Sugar 0.5 0.3 0.1 14.1 1.5 1.0 0.2 14.3 
Tea & Coffee 0.1 0.1 0.0 5.6 0.4 0.4 0.0 5.6 
*: There is no self-provisioning of bread, vegetable oils, non-alcoholic beverages and other food groups. 
**: Cereals includes other grain products which in turn include flour used for making bread at home. 
 
2.5 Empirical Results 
2.5.1 Estimation of the Model 
The SIS 2003 survey is designed to be nationally representative and a stratified 
multi-stage systematic cluster sampling method is used. The survey covered a sample of 
25,76415 households from 12 regions without replacement (to minimize seasonal 
influences on consumption), and was conducted over 12 months from January 1 to 
December 31, 2003. The survey includes detailed demographic characteristics for each 
household that allow us to control for heterogeneity in preferences and some production-
related variables (e.g., land owned and labor, more on these later). Table A1.1 in the 
Appendix presents the summary statistics for all of the variables in the two-step 
procedure. 
As explained in the previous section, we constructed food groups especially 
relating to animal products differently than Akbay et al., (2007). This regrouping caused 
                                               
15 There is no detail of food consumption for 17 households, so we conducted empirical 
tests with 25,747 observations. 
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some drop in the share of non-zero purchases for the fats and oils category (from 86.2 
percent in Akbay et al., (2007) to 83.1 percent in our case); a significant drop in the share 
of non-zero purchases in the other food category (from 95.8 percent to 66.6 percent) and 
an increase in the share of non-zero purchases in dairy and egg category (from 97.7 
percent to 99.3 percent). In other words, in our case the percentages of censored variables 
in these categories are different than Akbay et al., (2008)16. This change may affect the 
results. In order to gauge the effect of regrouping, we construct Table 2.4. Columns 2 and 
4 are taken from Akbay et al., (2008) and columns 3 and 5 are calculated using the same 
regressors as Akbay et al. (2008).  
The comparison in Table 2.4 shows that the calculated elasticities between the 
two studies are close. This gives us confidence that both Akbay et al.’s (2008) and our 
elasticity estimates are robust to alternative groupings of food. Moreover, where the 
difference is largest – the food expenditure elasticity of the “other food” category - the 
change is in the expected direction, since once purchases of eggs (a cheap and widely 
consumed perishable product) are removed from this category, the rest is composed of 
highly processed products like prepared meals or spices, so that the increase in the food 
expenditure elasticity is expected.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
16 Since the content of these three food groups have changed so to the corresponding 
prices. 
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Table 2.4: Comparison of our model to Akbay et al., (2008) without including the 
self-provisioning instrument  
  
Food Expenditure 
elasticities own price elasticities 
All sample Akbay 2008 Tekguc Akbay 2008 Tekguc 
Bread 0.70 0.65 -0.87 -0.89 
Cereals 1.11 1.10 -0.90 -0.84 
Meat & meat products 1.66 1.76 -0.62 -0.75 
Vegetable oils 1.03 1.16 -0.89 -0.93 
Vegetables 0.93 0.87 -0.89 -0.78 
Fruits 0.90 0.82 -0.79 -0.80 
Dairy products and egg 0.82 0.82 -0.81 -0.74 
Sugar, confectionary and jams 0.99 1.08 -0.68 -0.70 
Tea and Coffee 0.67 0.77 -0.75 -0.90 
Non-alcoholic beverages 0.71 0.76 -0.96 -1.09 
Other food products* 0.40 0.92 -0.87 -0.80 
*: Akbay et al. (2008) do not report the elasticities for other food products in 2008 paper so the elasticities 
for other foods are taken from the original 2007 paper. 
 
Table 2.5 presents the uncompensated own-price, and food expenditure 
elasticities estimated from Equation 2.7 (including the share of self-provisioning for each 
household in every equation)17. All estimated own-price and food expenditure elasticities 
are consistent with demand theory. Uncompensated own-price elasticities are between     
-0.7 and -1 except for non-alcoholic beverages which is -1.09. The own-price elasticities 
are highest for tea and coffee and beverage groups, which is not surprising since their 
consumption is relatively discretionary. Nevertheless, own-price elasticities point to high 
responsiveness to price changes. The food expenditure price elasticities are slightly 
greater than unity for cereals18, vegetable oils, and sugar and confectionary. Moreover, 
according to our estimates a one-percent increase in total expenditure on food will 
increase the spending on meat by 1.75 percent. Elasticities calculated for rural and urban 
                                               
17 Table A1.4 in Appendix presents the coefficient estimates for the whole demand 
system. Also see Table A1.5 in Appendix for cross price elasticities. 
18 Cereals group is a relatively heterogeneous food group including home-made bread, 
cookies, and patisserie products.  
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areas show considerable differences. In general, households residing in rural areas are 
more responsive to own-price changes than are urban households, and urban households 
are more responsive to changes in expenditure.  
Table 2.5: Expenditure and own price elasticities for Rural and Urban Areas 
estimated including the self-provisioning instrument. 
 Food Expenditure Own-price 
Food Groups All sample Rural Urban All sample Rural Urban 
Bread 0.67 0.58 0.70 -0.86 -0.99 -0.80 
Cereals 1.09 1.14 1.08 -0.82 -1.02 -0.69 
Meat & meat products 1.75 1.88 1.68 -0.76 -0.74 -0.79 
Vegetable oils 1.17 1.04 1.20 -0.93 -1.21 -0.81 
Vegetables 0.88 0.85 0.90 -0.78 -0.80 -0.77 
Fruits 0.81 0.72 0.86 -0.80 -0.79 -0.80 
Dairy products and egg 0.81 0.87 0.80 -0.74 -0.76 -0.75 
Sugar, confectionary and jams 1.08 1.10 1.07 -0.71 -0.74 -0.69 
Tea and Coffee 0.77 0.59 0.87 -0.90 -0.84 -0.91 
Non-alcoholic beverages 0.76 0.71 0.76 -1.09 -1.07 -1.08 
Other food products 0.90 0.84 0.88 -0.80 -0.84 -0.79 
2.5.2 Testing Separability 
Inspection of Table A1.4 reveals that the budget share of self-provisioning is 
significant in nine out of eleven food groups at the 5 percent significance level or less 
(budget shares of self-provisioning are individually insignificant only for the fruits and 
other food groups). We also test whether addition of the food budget share of self-
provisioning to the demand system is jointly significant. Table 2.6 presents Wald tests for 
various specifications. The null hypothesis is that all of the self-provisioning budget share 
coefficients are equal to zero in the demand system. The results of Wald tests invariably 
show that self-provisioning food budget share coefficients are significant in the demand 
system.  
The first three rows in Table 2.6 employ the self-provisioned food budget share as 
defined above. The fourth row uses the self-provisioning budget share of each food group 
in the respective equation, instead of the average of self-provisioning. In four out of 
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eleven food groups there is no self-provisioning (i.e., bread, vegetable oils, non-alcoholic 
beverages and other foods). See Table 2.3 for details of remaining seven. In the fifth row, 
we broaden the content of self-provisioning and include the categories three and four as 
defined in Table 2.1. The inclusion of in-kind payments by employers; especially 
increased the number of households with non-zero self-provisioning by more than 1,000 
observations (from 4,960 to 5,989 observations or roughly 4 percent of sample, with 882 
of the new additions coming from urban areas). This broadened definition does not fit 
neatly with the theoretical discussion in the Section 2.2 for self-provisioning, but we want 
to double check our results with an alternative definition. The conclusion is still the same: 
the coefficients of self-provisioning are significant.  
As an additional robustness test for the last row, we calculate the predicted values 
for self-provisioning. In the first stage, we estimate the budget share of self-provisioning 
with regressors including the food budget (negative coefficient), a host of production-
related variables (land, labor, grazing areas in the region, (production-side variables 
discussed further in the next section)), and a host of demographic variables like age, 
education, household size that can influence production decisions. The purpose of this 
final exercise is to control for measurement errors. It is possible that many households are 
not reporting self-provisioning, especially if their primary income-generating activity is 
not farming and yet they engage in some amount of self-provisioning via kitchen gardens. 
We believe that women, especially, tend to under-report how long they work19, partly 
due to the fact that the SIS 2003 is designed to elicit the labor force participation as 
conventionally defined. There are 14,095 non-zero observations for the predicted self-
                                               
19 Personal communication with B. Akbulut who is doing field work in rural Central 
Turkey and G. Ünal. 
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provisioning category. The conclusion from the Wald test is still the same: the 
coefficients of the predicted self-provisioning budget share are jointly significant in the 
LA/AIDS20. 
Table 2.6: Wald test whether all of the self-provisioning variables are jointly equal 
to zero 
Wald Test Sample D.F. Chi2 
Critical 
value (0.05) 
Prob 
>Chi2 
Self-provisioning budget share whole  11 5,324.8 19.68 0.00 
Self-provisioning budget share urban 11 505.9 19.68 0.00 
Self-provisioning budget share rural 11 3,261.3 19.68 0.00 
food group self-provisioning* whole 7 969.1 14.07 0.00 
Self-provisioning alternative# whole 11 2,969.1 19.68 0.00 
Self-provisioning predicted variable^ whole 11 1,811.0 19.68 0.00 
*: We use the food budget share of corresponding food groups instead of an overall average. Please see 
Table 2.3 for food groups with non-zero self-provisioning.  
#: We construct an alternative budget share of self-provision variable by combining rows 2, 3 and 4 from 
Table 2.1.  
^: The R-Square of the first stage is 0.55. The result of the first stage is available upon request. 
2.6 Economic and Policy Significance 
2.6.1 Estimation in the Presence of Nonseparability  
In the previous section we showed that the implicit assumption of separation of 
previous studies on food consumption in Turkey is not warranted. However, statistical 
significance does not always translate into economic policy significance, and we may 
wonder whether it is worthwhile the effort to build a more complicated nonseparable 
model (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995; p. 159). In particular, we want to measure the 
potential effect of ignoring versus allowing nonseparation by incorporating production-
side variables into consumption functions and recalculating the food expenditure and 
own-price elasticities.  
                                               
20 Table A1.3 in the Appendix presents results of a likelihood ratio test where we test and 
reject separation. We reach the same conclusion with Wald tests presented in Table 2.6 
for every specification. 
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In case of nonseparation, Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995) suggest a reduced-form 
approach:  
( , , , , )q hq q p z z T K for production,  
and ( , , , , )q hc c p z z T K  for consumption      (2.11) 
 
 
where in Equation 2.11, p stand for prices, zq represents the household’s agricultural 
production-related assets; zh represents household characteristics pertaining for 
consumption decisions; T stands for income transfers; and K stands for credit constraints, 
if any. The important feature of Equation 2.11 is that productive factors are included into 
the consumption equation (and vice versa), in addition to other household characteristics 
that affect consumption decisions.  
Here we focus on estimating the reduced form of the consumption equations 
including productive factors like labor and land for the three food groups with most self-
provisioning: dairy and egg, cereals and vegetables (we pay special attention to dairy and 
egg food group, and use the cereals and vegetables groups for comparison purposes). In 
order to construct even the simplest nonseparable agricultural household model both with 
production and consumption equations, one would need to have information on (for the 
production side): food crop, cash crop, the respective allocation of land, labor and other 
inputs separately for each productive activity. The available data do not provide this level 
of detail. Furthermore, we only have information on total agricultural income, not its 
breakdown across the activities generating this income.21. 
                                               
21 Please refer to de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991) or Taylor & Adelman (2003) 
for such agricultural household models. We are aware of only one data set which 
potentially has rich enough data on agricultural households’ production and consumption 
from Turkey: QHS 2002. Constructing an AHM is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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Given all these caveats, we solely focus on estimating the budget share of selected 
food groups while incorporating production-related variables into the demand equation. 
Our aim is to compare the elasticity estimates obtained from demand model with 
estimates obtained when production-related variables are explicitly included to 
consumption equation. We use Equation 2.12 as the empirical model:  
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  (2.12) 
This is similar to Equation 2.7 except for two changes: since we are no longer 
interested in testing separation, we drop the budget share of self-provisioning from the 
model, and we include seven production-related variables discussed below (represented 
by F in Equation 2.12). Since there is no justification for any specific restrictions in the 
reduced-form equations, we employ the most straightforward model, OLS. As Equation 
2.12 shows, we still transform the explanatory variables by multiplying them by the 
cumulative distribution of the probit model from the first step. The sole purpose of this is 
to make the estimates as comparable as possible to those from the previous section22. 
Then we re-calculate the food expenditure and own-price elasticities in order to compare 
them to the elasticities obtained in the previous section. (We again use the elasticity 
formulas from Equation 2.10).  
                                                                                                                                            
Moreover, QHS 2002 was administered only to rural households, which would not allow 
us to obtain estimates to urban areas. 
22 Table 2 shows that censoring is not a great problem for cereals (95 percent non-zero 
budget shares); vegetables (99.7 percent); and dairy and egg (99.3 percent). 
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2.6.2 Production Variables 
SIS 2003 is a household consumption data set and does not include detailed 
production/income generation-related information but it is possible to obtain farm labor 
(male and female labor separately) and land values from SIS 2003 as productive factors. 
We want to disaggregate labor according to gender because of the potential gendered 
division of labor as an aspect of incomplete markets. We expect to find female labor 
more crucial for the consumption of dairy and egg, other cereals, and vegetables food 
groups (i.e. positive and greater coefficient estimate than the male labor coefficient).  
The values of agricultural land, orchards and greenhouses are the only agricultural 
assets in the SIS 2003 data set. We aggregate all of these land-related assets by value 
instead of acreage. We believe using land values will also incorporate the productivity 
differences of different plots. We also include the squared values of land assets into the 
consumption function, expecting a concave relationship between ownership of land and 
consumption (i.e. we expect to obtain positive coefficients for the land value and negative 
for the squared term). Our focus is especially on dairy and egg consumption, and hence it 
would have been much better to have information on animal ownership but such data are 
not available in SIS 2003. Moreover, in Turkey the petty production of dairy products is 
heavily dependent on public grazing lands, but SIS 2003 does not include public land 
available for farm households for grazing their animals. For these reasons, the value of 
farm land owned may be a poor proxy for productive assets employed in the dairy 
production. In an effort to address the latter problem, we obtained summary statistics23 
from the 2001 General Agricultural Census (SIS 2001) the closest available year, and 
                                               
23 Summary statistics for SIS 2001 is freely available on SIS website: www.tuik.gov.tr 
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calculated the average grazing area for each region of the country. In calculating this, we 
included unused and undeveloped land, permanent meadows, fallow land and pastures. 
Then we divided the total grazing area by the number of farm households in each region. 
The results range from 26 hectares in the Mediterranean region to 222 hectares in the 
northeast region. 
The literature on peasant animal husbandry stresses the importance of animals as 
quasi-saving assets to be liquidated in times of hardship (Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993). 
To account for this insurance function of animal husbandry, we created a health insurance 
dummy for households to indicate if any member of the household has health insurance. 
We expect that households with access to formal health insurance will have less incentive 
to keep animals for insurance purposes.  
Finally, literature on income, wealth, and power inequality Boyce (2002) suggests 
that in regions where poverty and inequality are prevalent, poor rural households will rely 
more on non-market sources of income like public lands to meet their basic needs like 
firewood or fodder for their animals, because they less access to both formal employment 
and public services. Since income inequality is a strong proxy for wealth and power gaps, 
Boyce (2002) uses the share of lowest quintile in total expenditure (“poor share” in the 
following tables) as a proxy for ill distribution of political power24. We expect a positive 
coefficient for this variable: as the share of the poorest quintile in total expenditure 
increases, so does the share of budget devoted to dairy and egg.  
We took the logarithm of labor, land values and grazing area variables before 
using them in the regression analysis because all other continuous variables in the model 
                                               
24 The share of each quintile in total regional spending is also available from SIS web-
site: www.tuik.gov.tr 
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(prices and food budget) are already in log form. Health insurance is a dummy and poor 
share is in percentages. Table A1.2 presents the summary statistics for non-zero 
observations. 
Table 2.7 presents the results of OLS regressions when the dependent variable is 
food budget share of dairy and egg food group for the whole sample, and for urban and 
rural areas25. The second, four and sixth columns contain only the variables traditionally 
associated with consumption. Columns three, five and seven also include the above-
mentioned production-related variables.  
First, most of the production-related variables are individually significant at a 5 
percent significance level or less. Second, all of the variables except for value of land, 
significant or not, have the expected signs. Third, production variables are jointly 
significant in each specification26. Fourth, the coefficient estimate for female farm labor 
is greater than the coefficient estimate for male farm labor in each case, and the 
difference is statistically significant at 5 percent significance level for the whole sample. 
Collectively, these findings support our previous conclusion of nonseparation: 
consumption decisions rely not only on the conventional consumption-relevant household 
characteristics but also on productive factors available to the households. 
 
 
 
                                               
25 Similar tables for cereals and vegetables food groups are available from the author 
upon request. 
26 For cereals food group, the production variables are also jointly significant for all 
specifications and have the expected signs except for poor share and grazing area. 
However, in the case of vegetables they are jointly significant only for rural areas and the 
coefficients of field and field-squared have the opposite of expected signs. 
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Table 2.7: OLS regressions for Share of Dairy and Egg Food Group in the Food 
Basket  
 Total Urban Rural 
Constant -0.1031** -0.2511*** -0.2235*** -0.3178*** 0.3523*** 0.0032 
Bread price 0.0077*** 0.0056*** 0.0031 0.0023 0.0109*** 0.0091*** 
Cereal price -0.0076*** -0.0056*** -0.0042*** -0.0039*** -0.0164*** -0.0113*** 
Meat price -0.0045*** -0.0040*** -0.0030** -0.0027** -0.0087*** -0.0071*** 
Veg. oil pr. 0.0035* 0.0050*** 0.0078*** 0.0076*** -0.006 -0.0022 
Vegetable pr. -0.0018 -0.0001 0.0027 0.0036* -0.0121*** -0.0096** 
Fruit price -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.001 0.0003 
Dairy & egg p 0.0384*** 0.0385*** 0.0354*** 0.0352*** 0.0417*** 0.0419*** 
Sugar pr -0.0021** -0.0012 -0.0022** -0.0020* -0.002 0.0001 
Tea & coffee -0.001 -0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0054* -0.0044 
beverage pr -0.0027*** -0.0027*** -0.0021** -0.0021** -0.0047* -0.0056** 
Other food pr -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0005 0.0003 0.0006 
Food expen. -0.0336*** -0.0368*** -0.0348*** -0.0353*** -0.0321*** -0.0384*** 
Hh size 0.0022*** 0.0008** 0.0001 0.0000 0.0047*** 0.0024*** 
Child dummy 0.0103*** 0.0113*** 0.0146*** 0.0148*** 0.0037 0.0046 
Male head -0.001 -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0013 -0.0027 -0.005 
Married -0.0048* -0.0003 0.0000 0.0005 -0.0144*** -0.0028 
Education 2 0.0006 0.0023** 0.0025** 0.0028** -0.0063** -0.0013 
Education 3 0.0046*** 0.0082*** 0.0064*** 0.0073*** -0.0026 0.0072 
Age 2 -0.0054*** -0.0035* -0.0035 -0.0035 -0.0062 -0.0015 
Age 3 -0.0075*** -0.0065*** -0.0067*** -0.0069*** -0.0068 -0.0049 
Age 4 0.0059*** 0.0036* 0.0077*** 0.0068*** -0.0008 -0.0034 
Wife empl. 0.0276*** 0.0028 0.0048*** 0.0008 0.0432*** 0.0068* 
Urban -0.0113*** 0.0035**     
Quintile 2 -0.0041** -0.0021 0.0083*** 0.0085*** -0.0146*** -0.0123*** 
Quintile 3 -0.0049** -0.0011 0.0121*** 0.0127*** -0.0231*** -0.0190*** 
Quintile 4 -0.0033 0.0014 0.0135*** 0.0141*** -0.0181*** -0.0128*** 
Quintile 5 -0.0051* 0.0012 0.0122*** 0.0134*** -0.0251*** -0.0179*** 
Quarter 2 0.0086*** 0.0090*** 0.0055*** 0.0057*** 0.0163*** 0.0163*** 
Quarter 3 0.0067*** 0.0073*** 0.0057*** 0.0060*** 0.0096*** 0.0097*** 
Quarter 4 -0.0018 -0.0008 -0.0037** -0.0034** 0.003 0.0044 
Istanbul 0.0063*** 0.0183*** 0.0031 0.0182*** 0.0255*** 0.0528*** 
Marmara -0.0065*** -0.0026 -0.0101*** -0.0078*** 0.0153*** 0.0250*** 
Aegean & 
West -0.0037* 0.0028 -0.0039* 0.0061* 0.0042 0.0169** 
Mediterranean -0.0044* 0.0048 -0.0057** 0.0044 0.0100* 0.0303*** 
Cent. Anatolia 0.0024 -0.0026 -0.0088*** -0.0166*** 0.0355*** 0.0207** 
Black Sea -0.0078*** -0.0053* -0.0169*** -0.0138*** 0.0132** 0.0253*** 
NE & C East -0.0025 -0.0066** -0.0127*** -0.0145*** 0.0275*** 0.0098 
PDF 0.0563 0.0583 0.2139** 0.2082** 0.0004 -0.0001 
F. farm labor  0.0093***   0.0047***   0.0087*** 
M. farm labor  0.0062***   0.0012   0.0073*** 
Field  0.0017*   -0.0021   0.001 
Field Squared  -0.0002*   0.0002   -0.0001 
Health ins.  -0.0019*   -0.0016   -0.0003 
continued 
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Table 2.7, continued 
 Total Urban Rural 
Average 
grazing area  0.0052***   0.0033   0.0175*** 
Poor share   0.4382**   0.7153***   0.6541** 
F Production  
(7, n)^  73.08  6.53  36.08 
   0.00  0.00  0.00 
F (1, n) 
ffarm=mfarm  6.31  2.38  0.88 
  0.012  0.1226  0.3489 
Observations     25,747      25,747      18,267      18,267        7,480        7,480  
R-squared 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.77 0.78 
^: Joint F test for production variables. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(evaluated with robust standard errors).  
2.6.3 Elasticity estimates 
Finally, we want to evaluate the difference in the elasticity estimates calculated 
when the production-related variables are taken into account. Table 2.8 summarizes our 
findings for the three food groups in which self-provisioning plays a significant role. We 
should stress that the purpose here is not to pin down exact elasticity estimates when 
productive factors are taken into account. As explained in Section 2.2, once 
nonseparation is accepted, the production and consumption decisions take place 
simultaneously and should be estimated as such. In this section we were only able to 
extend the consumption function by adding production-related variables. Given these 
caveats, nevertheless we proceed with this following exercise:  
Table 2.8 presents three alternative calculations of food expenditure and own 
price elasticities. The ‘demand system’ columns are obtained from estimation of demand 
systems after dropping self-provisioning from the demand system27. The ‘OLS’ columns 
are calculated using coefficient estimates from Table 2.7, columns two, four and six for 
                                               
27 These estimates are almost identical to estimates in Tables 2.7. In calculating Tables 
2.7, we obtained the coefficient estimates from a demand system which included the self-
provisioning variable. 
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the dairy and egg food group to ensure that the differences between elasticity estimates 
are not due to employing OLS instead of FGLS estimation but rather due to the addition 
of new variables. A quick inspection of Table 2.8 reveals that elasticities calculated using 
the coefficient estimates from the demand system and single equation OLS regressions 
are close. Finally, the “OLS with production” columns are calculated from columns three, 
five and seven from Table 2.7. The comparison of columns ‘demand system’ and ‘OLS 
with production’ reveals that the elasticity estimates for cereals and vegetables are almost 
identical in both specifications. The situation is different for the dairy and egg food 
group, especially for rural areas. The food expenditure elasticity estimate without 
including the production-related variables is 0.80, whereas when the production-related 
variables are introduced the elasticity estimate is 0.76 for rural areas. We infer that 
demand system overestimates both the food expenditure and the own-price elasticities for 
the dairy and egg food group. The difference in estimates is greatest for expenditure 
elasticity in rural areas.  
Table 2.8: Comparison of elasticities calculated when production side variables 
excluded and included 
Food expenditure elasticity own-price elasticity 
 
Demand 
system OLS 
OLS with 
production 
Demand 
system OLS 
OLS with 
production 
Total 1.09 1.14 1.10 -0.82 -0.87 -0.84 
Urban 1.08 1.10 1.09 -0.69 -0.71 -0.70 Cereal 
Rural 1.14 1.21 1.16 -1.02 -1.14 -1.10 
Total 0.88 0.90 0.90 -0.78 -0.79 -0.79 
Urban 0.90 0.90 0.90 -0.77 -0.80 -0.79 Vegetable 
Rural 0.85 0.89 0.89 -0.80 -0.80 -0.79 
Total 0.81 0.78 0.76 -0.74 -0.71 -0.71 
Urban 0.80 0.76 0.76 -0.75 -0.73 -0.73 Dairy & Egg 
Rural 0.87 0.80 0.76 -0.76 -0.71 -0.70 
 
 In this last exercise, we find no evidence that elasticity estimates would have been 
different if nonseparation was not ignored for the cereals and vegetables food groups. 
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However, this is not the case for dairy and egg consumption. Ignoring nonseparation of 
consumption and production decisions of dairy and egg products leads overestimation of 
expenditure and own-price elasticities. The direction of change is parallel to the findings 
of de Janvry et al., (1991) for Morocco. In the presence of market failures, households are 
less responsive to incentives through market mechanisms (e.g., price changes) than the 
perfect-markets case would predict.  
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
 In this chapter we present evidence that self-provisioning of certain food groups 
accounts for a significant portion of rural household food baskets. Especially, the self-
provisioning of more than 50 percent of dairy products is a tell-tale sign of incomplete 
markets in the production and consumption of dairy products.  
We test for separation of production and consumption decisions using the SIS 
2003 data set. Following the framework outlined by Benjamin (1992), we test and reject 
the null hypothesis of separation, and conclude that the production and consumption 
decisions are nonseparable. Inspired by the technique used by Hoddinott & Haddad 
(1995) to test for different effects of male and female incomes on household 
consumption, in these tests we employ the budget share of self-provisioning (and 
alternative versions) as means to test separation. If decisions to produce and consume are 
indeed separable, then the budget share of self-provisioning should not influence the 
consumption decision. In the case of well-functioning markets and separation of 
production and consumption decisions, the household treats itself as any other retail 
outlet. The existence of an in-house supermarket should not affect the decisions about the 
budget share of food groups. The tests reveal that separation is not the case for Turkey.  
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Next we shift our attention to the policy relevance of nonseparation. Due to data 
limitations we are unable to construct models for both production and consumption and 
solve them simultaneously. Instead, we simply extend the consumption model to include 
some production-related variables. For cereals and vegetables, the inclusion of 
production-related variables in the food consumption model does not change the 
elasticity estimates. However, the conclusion is different for the dairy and egg food 
group. We find that ignoring nonseparation leads to significant over-estimation of own-
price and expenditure elasticities in this group.  
Consumption of animal products is especially important for Turkish policy 
makers. On the one hand, independent researchers like FAO (2001), Pekcan & 
Karaağaoğlu (2000), Sengul and Tuncer (2005), and Akbay et al., (2007) all agree that 
there is no shortage of food in Turkey; the nutrition problem is mal distribution of food. 
On the other hand, the panel put together by State Planning Institute (OIK, 2006) 
concludes that Turkey is short of animal products and that Turkish consumers are at risk 
of under-consuming animal-sourced calories and proteins, and strongly advocates 
reforms to modernize the animal husbandry sector to boost domestic supply. Leaving 
aside the issue of whether plant-sourced calories and proteins are good substitutes for 
animal-sourced calories and proteins, if the policy goal is to ensure the availability of 
enough animal calories then ignoring the nonseparation of production and consumption 
decisions in rural households is a more serious matter than just the over-estimation of 
elasticities. In Turkey, fifteen percent of the food budget is devoted to dairy products and 
eggs (and an additional 13.6 percent is devoted to meat and meat products). Since self-
provisioning of animal products is especially crucial for these rural areas where poverty 
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is more severe (Sengul and Tuncer, 2005), ignoring the nonseparation of consumption 
and production decisions is an especially costly mistake from a nutrition perspective. 
Policies that discourage small-scale animal husbandry in the name of modernization and 
efficiency can have the unintended effect of reducing animal-sourced food consumption 
among poor rural households. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF FOOD SELF-PROVISIONING FOR POVERTY 
MEASUREMENT IN TURKEY 
 
3.1 Introduction, Motivation and Hypothesis Formulation 
In this chapter we show that poverty lines and the corresponding poverty 
measures that are conventionally calculated suffer from being not grounded in economic 
theory appropriate to rural areas. When constructing poverty lines and the corresponding 
poverty measures, all rural households routinely are lumped together. However, in the 
previous chapter we have shown that self-provisioning rural households face different 
prices for the food items produced and consumed within households, and as a result have 
significantly different food consumption baskets vis-à-vis other rural and urban 
households. We observed that food self-provisioning forms a significant portion of total 
consumption, especially for dairy products, vegetables and some cereal products. These 
observed differences in the food basket were shown to be statistically significant in an 
almost ideal demand system that includes the share of self-provisioned food as an 
instrumental variable.   
Statistical significance does not always mean economic or policy significance. 
Assessing economic and policy significance is one of the chief goals of this dissertation. 
In this chapter, we recalculate poverty lines by taking into account food self-provisioning 
among rural households and show that corresponding poverty measures differ 
significantly. The composition and the cost of food basket is a key determinant of the 
poverty line. Food self-provisioning affects both the composition of the food basket (as 
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shown in previous chapter) and the corresponding cost. Hence it should affect the 
estimation of poverty line, the corresponding poverty measures and the resulting poverty 
profile.  
3.1.1 Background  
Sadoulet & De Janvry (1995) explain the existence of food self-provisioning in 
terms of incomplete markets: “a market may fail for a particular household when it faces 
wide price margins between the low price at which it could sell a commodity or the factor 
and the high price at which it could buy that product or factor” (p. 149). They cite as the 
most common causes of incomplete markets transaction costs due to poor infrastructure, 
local merchants’ monopoly and monopsony power, shallow local markets because of 
high covariation between local supply and prices, risk aversion of farmers who are wary 
of price risk of products and household needs, and limited access to credit that leads to 
substitution of cash outlays with home grown food (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995; pp. 
149-150). In other words, food self-provisioning is regarded as a symptom of limited 
integration into national and global markets. As a result, self-provisioning rural 
households are regularly considered to be backward and poor. In this chapter, we show 
that, on the contrary, self-provisioning households in rural Turkey are not poorer than 
other rural households, and that they are much more secure nutritionally. 
3.1.2 Motivation and Hypothesis Formulation  
Poverty lines are regularly calculated separately for urban and rural households, 
as long as the sample size is large enough and the sampling method is appropriate to 
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allow representation. For example, Haughton & Khandker (2009) note the following 
while discussing the approach taken for Cambodia in 1999: 
Separate poverty lines were constructed for each of three major regions [Phnom 
Penh, other urban, rural], based on the prices prevailing in those areas; whether a 
household in any given region is poor is then determined by comparing its 
expenditure per capita with the appropriate regional poverty line. (p. 42) 
 
When the prevailing prices differ between regions, it is common sense to take this 
difference into account in poverty line calculation. We have shown in the previous 
chapter that the average food basket of self-provisioning rural households in Turkey is 
statistically significantly different than that of other rural households who are exclusively 
dependent on retail purchases, because they face different prices (i.e. shadow prices for 
some food items instead of retail prices). If so, calculating separate poverty lines for rural 
households according to whether or not they consume home produce is also common 
sense and the theoretically correct approach. Rural households who self-provision decide 
on what to produce and consume simultaneously, taking into account not only the market 
prices for factors and products but also the shadow prices for internally supplied factors 
of production, notably land and labor. Since self-provisioning rural households do not 
decide which food items to consume solely on retail food prices, it follows that the 
corresponding food basket for the calculation of the poverty line applied to them should 
not be based solely on the basis of retail prices.  
We find that the rate of poverty for self-provisioning rural households declines 
when we reconstruct the poverty line according to the theoretically correct approach. This 
is because of the way that self-provisioned food is treated in the Turkish survey data. 
Since there is no observed price for food consumed in-kind, researchers at State Institute 
of Statistics (hereafter SIS) decided to impute regional wholesale prices to self-
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provisioned food. As a result, when we compare two similar households – the only 
difference being one of the households produces and consumes some of its own food – 
who consume exactly the same quantities of food and non-food items, we will incorrectly 
conclude that self-provisioning household is poorer than the one that relies solely on 
retail purchases, because retail prices are higher than wholesale prices28. In other words, 
the total consumption of the self-provisioning household is undervalued. At the same 
time, because the SIS uses compared to a poverty line which is constructed using a 
weighted average of in-kind and retail food prices, poverty among rural households that 
rely entirely on retail purchases is underestimated because these households have no 
access to in-kind food which is cheaper. In other words, a one-size-fits-all rural poverty 
line that ignores this distinction is higher than correct the self-provisioning rural poverty 
line and lower than the poverty line for other rural households who buy food exclusively 
from retail outlets. 
3.1.3 Extension: Vulnerability to Poverty 
From year to year, some households are likely to move into and out of poverty. 
Many households who are just above the poverty line are very likely to move below the 
poverty line in the event of a negative shock like unemployment, unfavorable weather, or 
                                               
28 Instead of calculating separate poverty lines for self-provisioning and other rural 
households we could have imputed the regional retail prices of substitute food products. 
Unfortunately this is easier said than done. SIS 2003 includes almost 300 food items 
where on average households report consuming 66 different items. Imputing average 
regional retail prices of so many items is a very arduous process. More importantly, food 
self-provisioning is not evenly distributed among regions or food items. Rather it is very 
concentrated in certain commodities (especially dairy, leafy greens and certain cereals) 
and regions. In practice this means that for regions and food items that self-provisioning 
is especially important, e.g. fluid milk in Eastern Black sea region, there are not many 
observation of retail prices to obtain reliable estimates.  
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a sudden illness. Among the poor, some households are likely to be chronically poor due 
to lack of assets, education or debilitating illness, while others are transitionally poor due 
to unfavorable weather or life-cycle characteristics (e.g., they are just about to graduate 
from college). From a policy perspective, it is important to identify not only who is 
currently poor but also who is vulnerable to poverty. 
Poor and potentially poor households are exposed to many risks that can push 
them to poverty. As a result, households try to mitigate their exposure to risks by 
diversifying their production and income sources. Households use their assets and 
endowments to derive incomes in different forms (including in-kind income), which in 
turn entitles them to goods and services that allow them to obtain different levels of well-
being (Dercon, 2001: 16-17). Households face risks at every stage of this process: the 
security of assets, converting household’s endowments to income, securing desired goods 
and services with income, and converting goods and services to well-being. We propose 
that food self-provisioning is a risk-mitigating strategy that allows households to 
eliminate food price risk to which they are exposed while converting income to desired 
goods and services. By consuming from home produce, households ensure that they will 
have access to some food no matter what happens in product markets.  
Studying food self-provisioning allows us to contribute to the literature on 
vulnerability to poverty by highlighting multiple dimensions of vulnerability to poverty: 
 First, we find that self-provisioning rural households are much less vulnerable to 
undernutrition than other sub-groups of population.  
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 Second, we find that these households are as vulnerable as other rural households 
to income poverty. Indeed, engaging in low-risk, low-return activities can reduce 
overall income.  
 Third, food self-provisioning can also shed light on the contribution of the 
commons in reducing vulnerability to poverty and undernutrition. In Turkey, the 
most common self-provisioned food group is dairy products. The small-scale 
farmers who are most likely to raise farm animals for home consumption as a 
secondary activity29 rely heavily on the surrounding grazing commons.  
 Fourth, studying food self-provisioning illuminates the usefulness of livestock as 
quasi-financial assets in time of macro shocks. Dercon (2001) notes that 
“Livestock [is] in many areas the favored source of savings for (not so) rainy day” 
(p. 44). However, livestock cannot fulfill its function of a rainy day fund as 
effectively when the negative shock is a macro shock (sometimes also called 
common, systemic, aggregate shock, or covariate risk) where the whole region is 
affected and many households in the region try to sell their animals 
simultaneously substantially depressing prices.  
This chapter focuses on the first two dimensions, presenting a detailed picture of 
vulnerability to undernutrition and income poverty broken down to subgroups. Data 
limitations prevent a comparable in-depth treatment of the availability of commons and 
vulnerability to negative shocks.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We explain the construction of 
poverty lines and poverty measures in detail in Section 3.2.1. In the remainder of Section 
                                               
29 The overwhelming majority of small-scale farmers in Turkey are crop producers. 
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3.2 we present and discuss our findings. Section 3.3 opens with a more detailed 
discussion of vulnerability to poverty. We then explain the methodology used in our 
vulnerability analysis, discuss the explanatory variables in the models, and present the 
results. Section 3.4 concludes by tying together and recapping the findings of this 
chapter. 
3.2 Poverty Measures  
In this chapter, we employ Turkey’s Household Budget Survey from 2003 
(hereafter SIS 2003). This is a cross-section data set with 25,764 households, of whom 
7,486 reside in rural areas. The State Institute of Statistics classifies 4,154 of those rural 
households as consuming to some extent from home produce (hereafter “self-
provisioning rural”) and the rest, 3,332 rural households, as relying entirely on market 
purchases for food (hereafter “other rural”)30.  
In Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, we calculate poverty lines according to two different 
approaches that exist in the poverty literature for Turkey. In Section 3.2.2 we follow the 
more common approach, known as basic needs, where the poverty line is constructed 
based on the observed consumption patterns of sample households. This methodology is 
also called the “welfare approach” because the starting point is the observed decisions of 
sampled households. The second approach calculates poverty lines based on a pre-
conceived food basket that is deemed to be well-balanced and nutritious by nutrition 
experts. This food basket – taken from Baysal (1995) – is priced at median prices paid by 
second quintile households. This approach ignores non-food consumption, and defines 
                                               
30 There are 656 urban households who consume some amount of home produce but the 
share of self-provisioned food is so small that we ignore them in this study. 
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poverty in terms of whether the actual monthly spending on food is enough to afford the 
well-balanced and nutritious food basket31. Since the starting point is not actual 
consumption behavior of sample households but a pre-conceived food basket, this 
approach is sometimes called the “non-welfare approach”.  
In calculating the welfare and non-welfare poverty lines, it is conventional to 
calculate separate lines for rural and urban areas. We follow this convention and then 
expand it by calculating two poverty lines (both in the case of basic needs and non-
welfare approaches) for rural households according to whether or not they engage in food 
self-provisioning. In Section 3.2.2 we present and compare poverty measures that are 
calculated both by a single poverty line for all rural households and alternatively poverty 
measures calculated by employing differing poverty lines for self-provisioning rural 
households and other rural households. In Section 3.2.3 we present a parallel analysis of 
the non-welfare poverty line. Finally, in Section 3.2.4 we sum up what we have 
discovered by calculating these alternative poverty measures. 
                                               
31 It is always possible for a household to spend a lot on food and still not have a proper 
diet because of consuming unhealthy food, etc. In this study, like the previous one, we 
ignore all the issues relating to utilization of food; for example proper preparation and 
cooking; waste; buying nutritious food and instead we focus on access to food. That is 
whether the observed food budget is enough to cover the food needs of household. 
Likewise, we also ignore all the issues that are likely to arise during the allocation of food 
between household members. Even though all the analysis in this paper is presented in 
per capita terms the actual observations are at household level and hence we do not 
observe individual’s actual consumption. 
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3.2.1 Constructing the Basic Needs Poverty Line 
We closely follow the methodology of the Turkey Joint Poverty Assessment 
Report (WB & SIS, 2005)32 to construct the welfare poverty line for Turkey, except with 
one major improvement. The Joint Report calculates one poverty line for all Turkey 
because it uses a smaller sample collected during 2002. We employ the much larger and 
more nationally representative SIS 2003 and calculate separate poverty lines for urban 
and rural areas as the reference case33. Then we further split the rural households into two 
groups - self-provisioning and non-self provisioning – calculate separate poverty lines for 
both groups, and compare the corresponding poverty profiles to the reference case.  
The first step in determining the welfare poverty line is to sort the households into 
quintiles according to their total per capita monthly food spending. Once the households 
in the sample are sorted into quintiles, we use the consumption behavior of the second 
quintile to determine the calorie share of each food group in the food basket.  
The second step is to make sure that the representative food basket contains 
enough calories. We choose a level of 2,100 calories per capita per day34. By determining 
the total calorie amount independent of sampled observations, we assure that the poverty 
line will ensure access to adequate calories. At the same time, by determining the calorie 
share of food basket by observing second-quintile households, we ensure that the food 
                                               
32 The report was jointly prepared by World Bank’s Human Development Sector Unit, 
Europe and Central Asian Region and Turkey State Institute of Statistics (SIS); hereafter 
Joint Report.  
33 Calculating the poverty line separately for rural and urban areas is the default approach 
for many other World Bank studies. Please see Chapter 3 of World Bank’s Handbook on 
Poverty and Inequality (Haughton & Khandker, 2009) for examples from Cambodia, 
Vietnam, and Indonesia etc.  
34 SIS also bases their calculations on 2,100 calories per day. The Joint Report calculates 
poverty line based on both 2,100 and 2,450 calories per day. The poverty lines satisfying 
2,450 calories a day is simply 16.7 percent higher than poverty line for 2,100 calories. 
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basket represents the consumption habits of poor and near-poor. Third, we price the 
representative food budget. To do so, we consider three groups one-by-one and determine 
the mean price paid by second-quintile households in each group. 
 The urban representative food basket is priced by the mean prices second quintile 
urban households pay.  
 The representative food basket of self-provisioning rural households is priced 
with the mean price second quintile self-provisioning rural households face. Since 
the wholesale prices are imputed for shadow prices, in practice the mean prices 
paid by self-provisioning rural households are a weighted average retail and 
imputed prices. The weights differ for food groups. For example, 42 percent of all 
cereals consumed by self-provisioning rural households in the second quintile are 
from home produce, compared to 83 percent of yogurt, 66 percent of fluid milk 
and zero percent of sugar.  
 Other rural households’ food basket is also priced by the mean price second-
quintile other rural households pay. Since these households rely on market 
purchases, the corresponding prices are rural retail prices.  
At the fourth step, we multiply the food basket by a constant to account for the 
non-food needs of households. SIS reports that in 2003 on average food accounts for 40.3 
percent of total spending for the households just above poverty line35. Hence we multiply 
                                               
35 The food share of each sub-group is significantly different than the 40.3 percent. 
However, multiplying each sub-group with the inverse of corresponding food share in the 
total expenditures would add one more dimension to the difference in poverty lines. By 
multiplying all sub-groups with the inverse of 40.3 percent we ensure that the 
corresponding differences in poverty lines is surely due to corresponding prices and 
differences in food baskets. 
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representative food basket by 2.48 to obtain the poverty line for each corresponding 
group.  
The final step is to convert the per capita household expenditure to adult 
equivalents. There is no consensus in the literature about how to convert the raw family 
size to adult equivalents (Deaton & Zaidi, 2002). In practice, there are as many 
equivalence scale formulae as there are international organizations: for example, different 
formulae are used by the World Bank, OECD, FAO, etc. We choose to follow SIS’s 
methodology in the Joint Report (2005) with the World Bank for the purpose of 
comparability.  
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          (3.1) 
where AE_ADJ is adjusted adult equivalent; subscript i stands for household 
numbers; 0A is the number of adults in modal household (two); 0C  is the number of 
children in the modal household (two);  is taken as 0.9; and   is taken as 0.6; and 
( )i i iAE A C
  . The modal household in Turkey is the nuclear family with two adults 
and two children. In this formulation the adjusted adult equivalent of the modal 
household is still four. The adjusted equivalent of a one person household is 1.8. Even 
though our observations are household level, every calculation in this chapter – except 
Table A2.1 – is done on adult equivalent per capita basis.  
We report various poverty measures. The headcount rate reports the percentage of 
households that are below the corresponding poverty line. The poverty gap index adds up 
the percentage by which per capita expenditures fall below the poverty line on average 
(averaged over all observations – not only for poor households): 
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where z is the poverty line, N is the total sample size and iy is the adult equivalent per 
capita expenditure. Intuitively, multiplying poverty gap index by poverty line will yield 
the minimum necessary amount of money to lift all poor people above poverty line. Both 
the headcount poverty rate and poverty gap index violate the transfer principle for a good 
measure of welfare formulated by (Dalton, 1920). Dalton’s transfer principle states that 
transfers from a poorer to a richer person should increase the poverty measure. For 
example, the headcount rate will decline by transferring income from a person at the 
bottom of the scale to push a person just below the poverty line over it. An alterative 
poverty measure that satisfies Dalton’s transfer principle is the poverty severity index, 
where poverty gaps of the poor households are squared, which effectively gives greater 
weight to the gaps of the poorest:  
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A general formula that encompasses headcount rate, poverty gap index, and poverty 
severity index is proposed by (Foster, Greer, & Thorbecke, 1984): 
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When  is equal to zero, the FGT measure is simply equal to headcount rate. When  is 
equal to one the FGT measure is equal to the poverty gap index. When  is greater than 
one, the FGT measure captures the severity of poverty36.  
                                               
36 For measuring the severity of poverty,  equaling two is the usual rule of thumb, 
although there is no a priori theoretical basis for preferring this to other values for . 
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3.2.2 Consumption Poverty in Turkey, 2003 
Table 3.1 presents the poverty lines calculated according to the basic needs 
approach. All four food baskets add up to 2,100 calories a day. The bread and cereals 
food groups account for slightly more than half of calories in every specification. As can 
be seen from the Table 3.1, the distribution of consumption indeed varies due to urban / 
rural differences and depending on whether rural households are self-provisioning or not. 
The first notable difference in cereals consumption between self-provisioning rural 
households and the rest is due to home-grown grains for bulgur and flour for home-made 
bread. The second notable difference is in the consumption of vegetables: tomatoes and 
cucumbers account for almost all of the rural-urban difference, there is not much 
difference in the availability of leafy greens. Third, consistent with our discussion in the 
previous chapter, the self-provisioning households consume substantially more dairy 
products (210 grams versus 130 grams) yet the corresponding difference in expenditure 
on dairy products is much smaller. Second quintile self-provisioning rural households on 
the one hand consume more cereals –the cheapest source of calories – vis-à-vis other 
groups, and on the other hand more dairy products, a relatively expensive source of 
calories (even when sourced from home produce). The net result is monthly food budget 
of 64 Turkish Lira (TL), 17 percent less than urban food budget (77 TL).  
Based on these results, we construct two sets of poverty lines: the base case 
includes only the urban and rural distinction and ignores self-provisioning; in the second 
set, rural households are further differentiated according to whether they self-provision or 
rely solely on retail purchases for food needs. Our aim is to compare the resulting poverty 
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measures to see if the extra computations required for calculating a separate poverty line 
for self-provisioning households are justified by the new insights this can provide. 
 
Table 3.1: Representative food basket satisfying 2,100 calories per day 
  Urban Rural 
Self-provisioning 
Rural Rural other 
Food group kg daily cost kg daily cost kg daily cost kg daily cost 
Bread 0.27 0.33 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.09 0.18 0.24 
Cereals 0.12 0.16 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.25 0.18 0.22 
Meat 0.03 0.15 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.13 
Fats and oils 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.09 
Vegetables 0.34 0.33 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.30 0.30 
Fruits 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.14 
Dairy & egg 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.13 0.16 
Sugar, Jam & Honey 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.11 
Tea and coffee 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Beverage 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Other food 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 1.16 1.55 1.07 1.27 1.06 1.17 1.08 1.41 
days in a month  30.417  30.417  30.417  30.417 
adult equivalent*  1.80  1.80  1.80  1.80 
food poverty line, TL  85  69  64  77 
food share  40.3%  40.3%  40.3%  40.3% 
Basic needs monthly 
poverty line, TL  210  172  159  191 
Mean expenditure, TL  272  174  159  187 
sample size  18,278  7,486  4,154  3,332 
*: see Equation 1 for the formula for the calculation of adult equivalence scales. The average exchange rate 
for 2003 is 1.5 TL for $1 at current prices, and 0.732 TL for $1 at PPP. 
 
Table 3.2 presents the poverty measures,37 calculated using ADEPT software 
released by the World Bank. The left half of the table presents the poverty measures 
calculated using the reference poverty lines for urban and rural areas, and the right half of 
the table shows the poverty measures calculated using the three poverty lines: urban, rural 
self-provisioning, and rural other. Since the poverty line for urban areas is the same in 
                                               
37 Other poverty measures like Sen Index etc. are also available upon request. They yield 
results similar to the squared poverty gap. 
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both calculations, the calculated urban poverty measures are identical. Furthermore, the 
overall poverty measures for rural areas are very close.38  
 
Table 3.2: Overall Basic Needs Poverty 
  urban and rural poverty line  Urban, self-provisioning, and other rural poverty lines 
 Headcount Rate (P0) 
Poverty 
Gap (P1) 
Squared 
Poverty 
Gap (P2) 
Headcount 
Rate (P0) 
Poverty Gap 
(P1) 
Squared 
Poverty Gap 
(P2) 
Urban 0.22 0.07 0.03 0.22 0.07 0.03 
Rural 0.31 0.10 0.04 0.31 0.10 0.04 
Rural self-provisioning            0.34            0.11            0.05            0.30                0.09                  0.04 
Rural other            0.27            0.09            0.04            0.32                0.11                  0.05 
Total 0.25 0.08 0.04 0.26 0.08 0.04 
 
However, when we calculate the poverty measures separately for each rural sub-
group, it becomes clear that selection of poverty lines does make a difference for 
identifying the rural poor: with separate poverty lines, measured poverty for self-
provisioning households goes down, while measured poverty for other rural households 
goes up. Figure 3.1 illustrates the point. In Figure 3.1, three vertical lines represent 
alternative poverty lines. The middle poverty line is the rural poverty line (at 172 TL) 
obtained when rural households are not differentiated according to whether they self-
provision for food or not. The vertical line on the left represents the poverty line for self-
provisioning rural households (at 159 TL) and the vertical line on the right is the poverty 
line for other rural households (at 191 TL). The curved lines represent the cumulative 
percentage of self-provisioning and other rural households at every monthly spending 
                                               
38 Because of rounding the overall rural poverty measures looks identical both on the left 
and right half of Table 2, they are not nevertheless the differences are statistically 
insignificant. SIS reports overall poverty rate for 2003 as 28.1 percent for Turkey; 22.3 
percent for urban areas and 37.1 percent for rural areas. SIS’s findings are somewhat 
higher than our findings both for urban and rural areas. 
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level39. The fact that the solid line (representing the self-provisioning rural households) is 
above the dashed line (which represents the other rural households) at every spending 
level means that the self-provisioning rural households are relatively concentrated at the 
lower spending levels. 
Figure 3.1: Poverty incidence curves for rural households 
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When the rural households are not differentiated according to whether they self-
provision or not, the corresponding poverty line is the middle vertical line and as can be 
seen from Figure 3.1, the corresponding headcount rate for self-provisioning rural 
households is significantly higher (at 34 percent) than headcount rate for other rural 
                                               
39 We truncate the data set at 400 TL monthly spending because a couple of observations 
at the top of income scale stretch the x-axis towards 30,000 TL and make the lower level 
spending unreadable. As Figure 1 shows roughly 80 percent of all rural households in our 
data set spends less than 400 TL per month. 
overestimated 
underestimated 
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households (at 27 percent). However, when rural households are compared to the 
differentiated poverty lines, the headcount rate is 30 percent for self-provisioning rural 
households and 32 percent for other rural households. In other words, not differentiating 
rural households according to whether they self-provision overstates the headcount rate 
for self-provisioning rural households by four percent and understates the headcount rate 
for other rural households by five percent. The change is in the expected direction.  
As we mentioned earlier, theoretically it is appropriate to compare self-
provisioning rural households to the self-provisioning poverty line because these rural 
households effectively face different prices (the shadow price that they face when 
allocating household resources between food products destined to market and home 
consumption). These different prices in turn lead to different food consumption baskets 
as is evident in Table 3.1. In principle, comparing rural households to different poverty 
lines according to whether they self-provision or not is the correct approach. In practice, 
it makes a significant difference in our diagnosis of rural poverty. Hence we conclude 
that the additional burden required to follow the differentiated approach is justified.  
3.2.3 Non-welfare Food Poverty in Turkey, 2003 
We repeat a similar comparison of food poverty with the “non-welfare” poverty 
measurement method. This was the preferred methodology of SIS before 2002. Sengul & 
Tuncer (2005) apply this methodology to calculate various poverty measures for SIS 
1994, providing a reference point to compare our findings for SIS 2003. For this purpose, 
we use the Hacettepe University Basket (named after the home institution of the 
researchers who developed the food basket) which is deemed to be a nutritious and 
balanced diet taken from a nutrition book (Baysal, 1995). The Hacettepe University 
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Basket is much richer in total and animal calories than the representative baskets obtained 
from sampled households (Joint Report, 2005: 5-6). Table A2.1 in Appendix shows the 
composition (second column) and the least cost of the monthly balanced and nutritious 
food basket for a four-person household (two adults and two children). The observed 
differences between food basket costs are solely due to the difference in median prices 
facing different sub-groups of the population40. The self-provisioning rural households’ 
food basket is the cheapest, primarily due to the differences in the cost of dairy products: 
the same monthly basket of dairy products costs 34.7 TL for urban households and 26.5 
for self-provisioning rural households.  
 The least-cost food budgets from Table A2.1 are not directly comparable with the 
food basket in Table 3.1 because i) the Hacettepe food budget is constructed for a two-
adult, two-child household, whereas the welfare method food basket is calculated for one 
adult equivalent; and ii) the non-welfare food poverty line is intended to measure whether 
actual food spending is enough to meet the least cost of a balanced and nutritious food 
basket, so it has no provision for non-food basic needs. We follow Sengul and Tuncer 
(2005) and compare the least-cost food basket41 to actual food budget of sample 
households to determine the food poverty rate, ignoring spending on non-food items. 
Sengul & Tuncer (2005) report the headcount food poverty rate for all Turkey as 46.8 
                                               
40 The categories in Hacettepe food basket is too broad compare to the SIS 2003 food 
consumption data and we are still required to decide on the exact proportion of narrowly 
defined food groups. For example the food basket calls for consumption of six kg of meat 
products monthly but does not specify how much of six kg should sourced from chicken, 
fish, lamb or beef. We resorted to use the observed share of actual consumption of second 
quintile of all sample to determine these sub-group shares to ensure that all of the baskets 
are exactly equal and only difference is due to prices. 
41 We us median prices instead of mean prices paid by second quintile households in 
order to reach the least-cost food basket since median prices are somewhat lower than 
mean prices. 
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percent, for urban areas 48.3 percent and for rural areas 44.2 percent (they did not 
distinguish within rural households) while employing 1994 Household Budget Survey 
data from SIS (SIS, 1994). These estimates are very close to ours, which suggests that 
food poverty calculated with the non-welfare method has changed little from 1994 to 
2003. The minimal change is expected. The Joint Report (2005) calculates a 28.3 percent 
headcount poverty rate for 1994 data set, based on the welfare methodology developed 
for 2002 and beyond (after some slight adjustments due to the more limited nature of 
available data in the 1994 survey). Thus, the poverty rate calculated with the basic needs 
approach declined only slightly from 28.3 to 28.1 percent between 1994 and 2003.  
Table 3.3 presents the food poverty rates in Turkey for 2003 for self-provisioning 
rural households and other rural households according to the non-welfare method42. 
Again comparing these to the poverty measures that are obtained when rural households 
are not differentiated, we find that the conventional approach overstates poverty for self-
provisioning rural households and understates poverty for other rural households. 
Irrespective of how the non-welfare rural poverty line is constructed, it is evident that 
food insecurity by this measure is much more prevalent and deep for other rural 
households43.  
 
 
                                               
42 For the interested reader, we present the food poverty using the food baskets from 
Table 1 in Table A2. The poverty profile is broadly similar to Hacettepe food basket’s 
presented in Table 3. 
43 Joint Report (2005) concludes that rural diet is lower quality because on average rural 
households eats more bread than urban households. We now know that the real picture is 
more complicated and lower quality of diet is especially common among other rural 
households. 
 61 
Table 3.3: Non-welfare food poverty 
  Urban and rural poverty line  Urban, self-provisioning, and other rural poverty lines 
 Headcount Rate(P0) 
Poverty 
Gap(P1) 
Squared 
Poverty 
Gap(P2) 
Headcount 
Rate(P0) 
Poverty 
Gap(P1) 
Squared 
Poverty 
Gap(P2) 
Urban 0.46 0.14 0.06 0.46 0.14 0.07 
Rural 0.43 0.14 0.06 0.43 0.14 0.07 
Rural self-provisioning 0.37 0.11 0.04 0.34 0.10 0.04 
Rural other 0.48 0.17 0.08 0.51 0.18 0.09 
Total 0.45 0.14 0.06 0.45 0.14 0.07 
 
Furthermore, when we differentiate among rural households, we discover that the 
severity of food poverty is less among self-provisioning rural households even compared 
to urban households. This finding is not entirely surprising because the Hacettepe Basket 
is rich in animal calories, vegetables,44 and fruits compared to the actual consumption of 
the sampled households, and self-provisioning is concentrated in dairy products, leafy 
greens and some cereals. In other words, self-provisioning is concentrated in the more 
expensive calories that Hacettepe nutritionists recommend to consume. 
3.2.4 Discussion of Results  
 The last row of Table 3.1 shows that self-provisioning rural households have 
lower per capita monthly spending levels than other rural households and urban 
households. Also, Figure 3.1 shows that self-provisioning rural households’ median 
monthly spending is less than other rural households’ spending. Furthermore, household 
heads of self-provisioning rural households on average are older (50.2 versus 47.4 for 
other rural and 45.8 for urban) and less educated (4.7 years, 6.4 years and 7.5 years, 
                                               
44 For example Table 3.1 shows that urban households consume roughly 0.39 kg per day 
of vegetables (or roughly 21.3 kg per adult equivalent per month) whereas Hacettepe 
basket includes 34 kg of vegetables. 
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respectively) than both other groups. Moreover, as we show in the next section, self-
provisioning is associated with poverty: the higher the budget share of self-provisioned 
food, the more likely the household is to be under poverty line. Despite these 
disadvantages, the incidence, depth and severity of poverty among self-provisioning rural 
households is not higher than that of other rural households according to basic needs 
approach. Moreover, all measures of food poverty with the non-welfare method are lower 
for self-provisioning rural households compared to both other rural households and the 
urban households. We can conclude that even if the self-provisioning of food is no cure 
for poverty in its many dimensions, at least self-provisioning can be a substantial remedy 
in attaining adequate calories, including the relatively expensive calories from dairy 
products.  
The poverty line in the non-welfare approach is based on a food basket that is rich 
in expensive calories. Comparing these results to the basic needs approach, we can 
conclude that food self-provisioning in Turkey is not simply a strategy employed by the 
poorest households to scrape by. On the contrary, as will become clearer in the analysis 
of vulnerability to income poverty and undernutrition in the next section, the depth and 
severity of poverty are worst among the other rural households who cannot self-provision 
for food. In other words, households who can self-provision for food because they have 
control over requisite factors of production like land, labor and access to grazing 
commons (in the case of dairy consumption) can escape the deepest rungs of poverty.   
Since the rural poverty line constructed according to whether rural households 
self-provision or not is the proper approach in theory and yields significantly different 
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results in practice, we will use these poverty lines in the subsequent vulnerability 
analysis. 
3.3 Vulnerability to Poverty   
Section 3.3 is devoted to studying vulnerability to poverty in Turkey, again using 
the SIS 2003 data set. We follow Haughton & Khandker (2009) and adopt the outcome-
based definition of vulnerability to poverty: “the propensity to suffer a significant welfare 
shock, bringing the household below a socially defined minimum level,” (p. 234) which 
is adapted from Alwang, Siegel, & Jorgensen (2001). We study two dimensions of 
vulnerability to poverty: vulnerability to income poverty and undernutrition. We use the 
poverty line calculated with the basic needs approach as the absolute measure of well-
being for vulnerability to income poverty, and the poverty line calculated with the non-
welfare approach to analyze vulnerability to undernutrition.  
 Vulnerability to poverty is rarely studied empirically, because of methodological 
difficulties that will become clearer as we proceed. Vulnerability to poverty is ideally 
studied using panel data sets that allow researchers to identify households who move into 
and out of poverty (or remain permanently poor). Panel data sets would allow us to 
observe changes in income and nutrition from one period to next, to model the impact of 
specific shocks. Unfortunately, the 2003 Household Budget Survey (like most household 
expenditure surveys) is only a cross-section data set. Despite the resulting methodological 
problems, we make a first attempt to calculate vulnerability to poverty in Turkey. 
In his framework for analyzing vulnerability to poverty, Dercon (2001: 17) points 
out that households have control over labor (human capital), land (physical capital), 
family networks (social capital), and common and public goods (like surrounding grazing 
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areas) that they can employ or sell to derive income and increase or sustain their well-
being. Households are faced with numerous risks to the realization of well-being: death 
and illness can limit employment and returns to labor; the harvest can decline due to 
climatic shocks; governments can decide to reduce public provision of certain services 
like health, etc. Nevertheless, households are not totally powerless against vulnerabilities 
and they try to reduce exposure to risks and/or mitigate risks. Food self-provisioning is 
one of the risk-reduction strategies.  
Following our findings in Section 3.2, we present the results of our vulnerability 
analysis not only for the sample as a whole but also for urban, self-provisioning rural and 
other rural sub-groups. This allows us to observe whether the control over productive 
farm assets (land, labor, and surrounding grazing areas) that self-provisioning households 
enjoy makes a difference vis-à-vis vulnerability to income poverty and undernutrition. By 
supplying some of the food needs within a household, self-provisioning reduces the 
exposure to price risk in food markets. It may also be an avenue for creating income from 
otherwise dormant productive factors like common grazing lands, whose exploitation is 
governed by informal institutional arrangements.  
3.3.1 Empirical Model  
We choose consumption per capita for income poverty and monthly spending on 
food for undernutrition45 as the outcome-based definition of vulnerability. We adopt the 
absolute poverty lines calculated in Section 3.2 as the ‘socially defined minimum levels.’ 
We follow the empirical model developed by Chaudhuri, Jalan, & Suryahadi (2002) to 
                                               
45 Vulnerability can be studied for different dimensions like income, undernutrition, 
health or education. 
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study vulnerability to poverty when only cross-section data for one year is available, 
assuming that there will not be any significant change in the following year in any of the 
household characteristics. The vulnerability to experience negative shocks probably 
increases as the time horizon lengthens beyond a year, so studying vulnerability only for 
the following year probably will give us a conservative estimate of real vulnerability46. 
 Formally, the problem can be stated as follows: if the household’s current 
consumption is ,h tc  and if the poverty line is z, then a household is classified as poor if 
,h tc z and vulnerability to poverty in the next year can be defined as: 
, , 1Pr( )h t h tv c z              (3.5) 
where , 1h tc   is the expected consumption level of household in the next period, which is 
unobservable with a cross-section data set. In order to determine , 1h tc  , ideally we should 
have information about the assets the household could sell for consumption smoothing 
and the risks-associated probabilities that each household faces during the next year, like 
potential droughts, illnesses etc. And we also need information about the support systems 
that each household can rely on in case of a negative welfare shock. In other words, the 
ideal model would be: 
, ( , , , )h t h t h htc c X e             (3.6) 
where hX are observable household characteristics like education or assets owned; t  are 
common shocks like financial instability; h are unobserved, time-invariant household 
                                               
46 Pritchett, Suryahadi, & Sumarto (2000) study the vulnerability for next few years. 
Dercon (2005) estimates that during 1994-7 in Ethiopia 78 percent of rural households 
have experienced at least once harvest failure, 40 percent labor problems (illness, death), 
39 percent oxen problems (death, illness) (p. 9). 
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characteristics like family networks; and ,h te is the error term that is supposed to account 
for idiosyncratic shocks that can affect one household but not necessarily other ones, for 
example, a non-communicable illness afflicting household member.  
Obviously these are insurmountable data requirements especially from a cross-
section data set. Chaudhuri et al., (2002) simplify the data requirements by the following 
methodology: if we know the expected level of per capita consumption in the next period, 
1( )tE c   the variance of expected per capita consumption in the next period,
2  and the 
poverty line, z, and if we assume that the expected consumption per capita follows a 
known distribution (such as the normal distribution) then we can estimate vulnerability to 
poverty for the next period. For example, if the expected value of per capita consumption 
for a household for the next period is 272 TL, variance is 2500, the poverty line is 207, 
and if we assume that welfare shocks are normally distributed, then the probability of 
being poor is 9.6 percent47.  
,ln *
    (0, )
h t h h
h h
c X b e
where e N X 
 

           (3.7) 
 
Equation 3.7 is a simplified version of Equation 3.6 given the data availability from a 
single cross-section data set. We have to assume away the macro level shocks, and we 
cannot control for unobservable household characteristics like family networks that a 
household can rely upon in times of need.  
The dependent variable in the simplified model (Equation 3.7) is the natural 
logarithm of adult equivalent per capita monthly consumption (or adult equivalent per 
                                               
47 In excel by typing =normdist(207, 272, 50, 1) one can obtain 9.6 percent for the normal 
cumulative distribution. 
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capita monthly food spending)48. The variance of the error term is not constant but 
assumed to depend on household characteristics; hence in the second step, we regress 
squared values of he on the same independent variables from step one to obtain the 
estimates for 

, so that we can estimate the idiosyncratic variance ( 2 hX 

 ) for each 
household.  
Once we obtain these variables we can estimate the vulnerability to poverty for 
each household ( hv

) with Equation 3.8, where   is the cumulative density function of 
the standard normal distribution:  
lnPr(ln ln ) hh hh
h
z X bc z X
X
v




 
     
 
 
         (3.8) 
 
Pritchett et al., (2000) point out that the dependent variable, consumption, is measured 
with substantial error in household surveys. As a result of measurement error, they argue 
that the movement into and out of poverty is overstated and as a related matter the 
estimated variance, 2 , is overstated too. Consequently, they revise their estimates of 
variance downward by 30 percent. We share their concern as to the impact of 
measurement errors on the estimated variance. They estimate measurement error with the 
following method: they estimate a bivariate Engel Curve where the dependent variable is 
food share in total expenditures and the explanatory variable is the natural logarithm of 
                                               
48 Taking the natural logarithm of per capita consumption unfortunately did not ensure 
the normality of dependent variable in our sample. Nevertheless, we proceed with 
normality assumption in this draft. Alternatively, Kamanou & Morduch, (2004) and Kühl 
(2003)  rely on actually observed distribution of errors of the consumption equation using 
bootstrapping.  
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expenditure per capita. They estimate the bivariate relationship first with OLS and then 
with instrumental variable (IV) approaches. Then they define the measurement error as 
one minus the ratio of coefficient estimates of OLS to IV:  1 /OLS IV  .  We estimate 
OLS as -0.0905 and IV as -0.1374 where we use variables in Table 3.4, column three as 
instruments. Following Pritchett et al., (2000) measurement error in our sample is 35 
percent. Hence, we revise our estimates of variance downward by 35 percent before 
utilizing them in Equation 3.849. 
3.3.2 Data 
We start our empirical analysis by estimating the probit model where the 
dependent variables are dummy variables denoting being poor or non-poor. Such probit 
models are customary in the poverty literature where their purpose is not to explain 
cause-and-effect relationship for poverty but to determine which of the easily observed 
characteristics of households (like location of residence, household size, education level, 
occupational categories and so on) associate most strongly with being poor. The goal is to 
form guidelines to use in subsequent anti-poverty campaigns for effective targeting of 
limited resources. The choice of explanatory variables heavily depends on common sense 
and data availability.  
In choosing which independent variables to include to Equation 3.7, we start with 
the multivariate analysis in the Joint Report (2005: 40). The variables in common in the 
Joint Report and our study include: the number of children in the household; age, 
                                               
49 The results are broadly similar even without the correction of variance due to 
measurement error. Correcting the variance for measurement error only led roughly 1-2 
percent shift from highly vulnerable category to low vulnerable category. 
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education level, and gender of household head; whether the household resides in a rural 
or urban area; dummy variables for the occupational category (employer, self-employed, 
salaried, day laborer) of employed member of household (we consider not only 
household head but all members of household); and whether any member of the 
household is covered by the social security system that gives access to free health care 
and eventual retirement benefits. Because we employ a much larger data set compared to 
the Joint Report (2005), that allows us to draw conclusions not only at the national level 
but at the regional level, we add dummy variables for regions (Istanbul is the omitted 
region). Also, the 2003 household budget survey has information on assets, so we include 
the natural logarithm of land value to the model, to control somewhat for assets on which 
households can rely to smooth consumption in case of a negative shock. 
Following our findings in the previous chapter and sections, we include the 
budget share of self-provisioned food as a proxy to account for one of the mitigating 
strategies that the poor and vulnerable can use to reduce food insecurity. We also add the 
natural logarithm of average size of grazing areas in every region, as a very rough proxy 
for commons from which rural households may extract resources.  
Table 3.4 presents the results of this exercise. The estimated coefficients in the 
first two columns show the change in probability of being poor when the independent 
variable changes infinitesimally for continuous variables and by one for dummy variables 
(i.e. these are not ordinary coefficient estimates from the probit model but marginal 
effects). For example, having a female household head increases the chance of being poor 
by 5.7 percent, and every additional year (age variable) decreases the probability of being 
poor by 0.47 percent. The dependent variable in the first column is whether the household 
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is poor or not according to basic needs approach. The second column is a similar 
analysis, in which the dependent variable is whether the household is poor or non-poor 
according to the non-welfare approach. Most explanatory variables have the same sign 
and significance both in the welfare and non-welfare approaches. The major exceptions 
are adult equivalent of household size and the dummy variable for female household 
heads (positive in the welfare approach and negative in non-welfare approach).  
In an effort to investigate whether access to common resources have any effect on 
poverty, we employ average size of grazing areas in a region as a proxy for availability of 
environmental commons. This turns out statistically significant only at 10 percent in the 
probit model for non-welfare approach. Recall that in Chapter 2 Section 2.6.2, the 
average size of grazing area in a region is a significant and positive variable when we 
investigate dairy consumption. However, access to common grazing lands is associated 
with more poverty. One potential reason for counter-intuitive result in this model is the 
high level of aggregation in this variable; we obtain it not from SIS 2003 but construct it 
using the General Agricultural Survey of 2001 (SIS 2001) and impute it to regions. 
Hence we do not have a great deal of variation at the household level in this variable. The 
estimated coefficient on the budget share of self-provisioned food is positive and 
statistically significant: it is associated with a higher probability of poverty. This finding 
reinforces our conclusion from Section 3.2 that self-provisioning of food is a strategy 
used by rural poor – when it is available – to escape the deepest rungs of poverty (i.e., 
depth and severity of poverty is less prevalent among self-provisioning poor) but that it is 
not a cure to income poverty. 
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Table 3.4: Probit estimates of being poor and OLS estimations of determinants of 
expenditure per capita and food consumption per capita 
 Probit Probit OLS OLS 
Dependent Variable  
(1 poor; 0 non-poor): welfare poor 
Non-welfare 
poor 
log expenditure 
pc 
log food 
spending pc 
any member of hh, health insurance dv -0.1568*** -0.0741*** 0.2740*** -0.0062 
hh size, adult equivalent 0.0139*** -0.1888*** -0.0522*** -0.0157*** 
dummy variable for female hh head  0.0577*** -0.0464*** -0.1258*** 0.0668*** 
age of hh head -0.0051*** -0.0075*** 0.0109*** 0.0056*** 
Dummy variable for urban location -0.0129 0.0108 0.1503*** -0.0205* 
number of children in the hh 0.0574*** 0.0375*** -0.0855*** -0.0068 
hh head, literate dummy variable -0.0504*** -0.0466* 0.1338*** 0.0624*** 
hh head, primary dummy variable -0.1738*** -0.1204*** 0.3464*** 0.0780*** 
hh head, secondary dummy variable -0.1724*** -0.1763*** 0.5267*** 0.0968*** 
hh head, high school dummy variable -0.2160*** -0.2440*** 0.7146*** 0.1205*** 
hh head, higher education dummy variable -0.2300*** -0.3511*** 1.1639*** 0.1623*** 
any member of hh, salaried dummy variable -0.1155*** -0.0632*** 0.1610*** 0.0003 
any member of hh, wage dummy variable 0.0046 -0.0085 -0.0452** -0.0073 
any member of hh, employer dv -0.1482*** -0.1520*** 0.6148*** -0.018 
any member of hh, self-employed dv -0.0605*** -0.0470*** 0.1722*** -0.0008 
any member of hh, unpaid dummy variable -0.0523*** -0.0635*** 0.0463** 0.0654*** 
any member of hh, physical dummy variable 0.1308*** 0.0933*** -0.1332*** -0.0538*** 
East Marmara dummy variable 0.1803*** 0.1993*** -0.3249*** -0.1057*** 
Aegean dummy variable 0.2291*** 0.2047*** -0.3290*** -0.1157*** 
West Marmara dummy variable 0.1672*** 0.1304*** -0.2918*** -0.0655*** 
Central dummy variable 0.1823*** 0.1274*** -0.3065*** -0.0631*** 
Mediterranean dummy variable 0.2418*** 0.1577*** -0.3326*** -0.0690*** 
Central East dummy variable 0.2724*** 0.0825*** -0.4786*** 0.0430* 
Western Black sea dummy variable 0.3532*** 0.1892*** -0.5211*** -0.0430** 
Eastern Black sea dummy variable 0.2156*** 0.1286*** -0.3927*** -0.0254 
North East dummy variable 0.2640*** 0.1173*** -0.4953*** 0.0305 
North Central dummy variable 0.2371*** 0.0899*** -0.4726*** 0.0085 
South East dummy variable 0.4193*** 0.0902*** -0.5551*** 0.0696*** 
logarithm of land value -0.0077*** -0.0111*** 0.0153*** 0.0067*** 
logarithm of average grazing areas 0.0217** 0.0234* 0.009 -0.0249** 
budget percentage of self-provisioning 0.1540*** 0.2315*** -0.4133*** -0.2327*** 
logarithm of monthly expenditure    0.3081*** 
Constant   4.5173*** 2.0995*** 
Observations 25747 25747 25745 25745 
R-squared     0.47 0.29 
Robust z statistics; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; dv= dummy variable  
 
The third and fourth columns of Table 3.4 are the estimation results of Equation 
3.7. We present and discuss the estimation of Equation 3.7 side-by-side with the probit 
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estimations, even though they serve different purposes, because it is interesting to note 
the change in the statistical significance of certain variables once the dependent variable 
changes from discrete to continuous. The independent variables are observed household 
characteristics50. Some of the variables which are highly influential (for example, the 
health insurance dummy and the number of children) in the non-welfare probit model 
turn out to be insignificant when the dependent variable is continuous.  
The share of self-provisioning in the household food budget has negative signs 
both in columns three and four. In column three, where the dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of total spending per capita, the negative sign means that the larger the 
share of food from self-provisioning, the lower the total per capita monthly spending. The 
more time household members devote to self-provisioning, the less time they work off-
farm earning higher wages. We think that this interpretation is plausible, but the causal 
order may be reversed: when household members cannot find gainful employment off-
farm, they devote their energy to grow their food for own consumption. In the fourth 
column, the dependent variable is the per capita monthly food budget. Here the negative 
coefficient on the self-provisioned food budget share is likely due to the fact that when 
converting in-kind consumption into monetary values, SIS officials impute regional 
wholesale prices; hence if a larger share of household food consumption is obtained in-
kind, a larger share is priced at relatively low prices. Hence the total spending on food 
will be lower when a larger share is sourced within household. As we show in Table 3.3, 
when the self-provisioning rural households are evaluated with a poverty line that takes 
                                               
50 The only extra variable we include to column four in addition to column two is the 
natural logarithm of per capita monthly spending. We included monthly per capita 
spending as a control variable in order to get a better estimate for other variables.  
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into account that self-provisioned food items have substantially lower prices, the self-
provisioning rural households’ food consumption poverty is substantially less than that of 
any other sub-group in our sample despite the lower total spending on food.  
3.3.3 Vulnerability according to Basic Needs Approach 
After we obtain coefficient estimates for Equation 3.7, as reported in column three 
in Table 3.4, we perform the additional steps described in Section 3.3.1 to obtain 
vulnerability to poverty, hv

, as shown in Equation 3.8. Table 3.5 summarizes the results. 
We label the households whose probability of being poor is more than 50 percent as 
highly vulnerable; households whose probability of being poor is less than 26 percent 
(which correspond to the overall poverty rate from Table 3.2) as not vulnerable, and 
households whose probability of being poor is between 26 percent and 50 percent as 
moderately vulnerable. These lines are arbitrary; as even households labeled as not 
vulnerable have a positive chance of falling into poverty during the next period. On the 
other hand, the labels help us to see if vulnerability is concentrated among any sub-
groups of population.  
Unsurprisingly, the poor are more likely to be poor in the next period (in the 
whole sample, 0.12 out of 0.26). Likewise, seven out of ten (or 0.55 out of 0.74) of the 
current non-poor are unlikely to swing into poverty in the next period. In urban areas, 
only 15 percent of households are highly vulnerable to income poverty, compared to 
roughly 20 to 25 percent of rural households. When we compare self-provisioning rural 
households with other rural households we find that other rural households are slightly 
more probable to be highly vulnerable to income poverty in the next period. 
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Table 3.5: Vulnerability to Income Poverty in Turkey, 2003 
  Whole sample 
 Criterion Poor non-poor 
poor and 
non-poor 
not vulnerable vh<=.26 0.06 0.55 0.61 
low vulnerable 0.5>= vh >.26 0.07 0.14 0.22 
highly vulnerable vh >0.5 0.12 0.05 0.18 
All groups   0.26 0.74 1.00 
   Urban 
 Criterion Poor non-poor 
Poor and 
non-poor 
not vulnerable vh <=.26 0.05 0.61 0.66 
low vulnerable 0.5>= vh >.26 0.07 0.12 0.19 
highly vulnerable vh >0.5 0.11 0.04 0.15 
Urban   0.22 0.78 1.00 
   Rural self-provisioning  
 Criterion Poor non-poor 
poor and 
non-poor 
not vulnerable vh <=.26 0.07 0.43 0.51 
low vulnerable 0.5>= vh >.26 0.10 0.20 0.29 
highly vulnerable vh >0.5 0.13 0.07 0.20 
rural self-provisioning 0.30 0.70 1.00 
   Rural other 
 Criterion Poor non-poor 
poor and 
non-poor 
not vulnerable vh <=.26 0.06 0.44 0.51 
low vulnerable 0.5>= vh >.26 0.08 0.16 0.24 
highly vulnerable vh >0.5 0.18 0.07 0.25 
rural other   0.32 0.68 1.00 
 
3.3.4 Vulnerability according to the non-welfare method 
 We perform a similar analysis for vulnerability when the poverty line is calculated 
with the non-welfare method, that is, when the poverty line is defined by the least-cost 
budget for the balanced and nutritious food basket51. Since the overall food poverty rate, 
45 percent, is very close to the cut-off for highly vulnerable (50 percent), we separate the 
sampled households only according to whether their vulnerability is high (more than 50 
                                               
51 We present the vulnerability to nutrition poverty when the reference basket is the basic 
needs food basket instead of the non-welfare food basket in Table A2.3. The results are 
broadly similar, both urban and other rural households are more often highly face 
nutrition vulnerability than self-provisioning rural households. 
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percent) or not. The results are presented in Table 3.6. 70 percent of current food poor are 
vulnerable to undernutrition in the next period. Moreover, 25 percent of current food non-
poor (0.14 out of 0.55) are highly vulnerable to undernutrition as defined by the non-
welfare approach. Among rural households, we find that vulnerability to undernutrition 
differs greatly between self-provisioning and other rural households. Not only is food 
poverty is much more prevalent among other rural households, but also that three-fourths 
of these poor households are highly vulnerable to poverty in the next period. Moreover, 
roughly 40 percent (0.18 out of 0.48) of currently non-poor among other rural households 
are highly vulnerable to undernutrition. Overall, 56 percent of all other rural households 
(poor and non-poor combined) are highly vulnerable to falling below the non-welfare 
poverty line irrespective of their current classification, compared to 29 percent of self-
provisioning rural households. These findings lend support to our hypothesis that control 
over productive assets allows some rural households not only to escape deepest rungs of 
food poverty but also to reduce the risk of experiencing undernutrition in the subsequent 
periods due to idiosyncratic shocks. 
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Table 3.6: Vulnerability to Non-welfare Food Poverty in Turkey, 2003 
 
 
3.3.5 Discussion of Results  
 Alwang et al., (2001) argue that a structural model that allows for simulation of 
specific shocks is necessary to predict how the household vulnerability is affected by 
ownership of land, access to common lands, market prices, etc. In order to observe actual 
response of households to such shocks we need a panel data set that covers long enough 
periods. We do not have a panel data set for Turkey; even if one were available, panel 
data sets rarely have sufficient details or sample size to estimate a structural model. In the 
absence of panel data, in this section we explored vulnerability to poverty using the 
methodology developed by (Chaudhuri et al., 2002). Our findings are subject to the 
caveats that result from using a cross-section data set and the inherent difficulty of trying 
to estimate vulnerability ex-ante. Nevertheless, by separating rural households into self-
  Whole sample 
 criterion poor non-poor 
poor and 
non-poor 
moderately vulnerable 0.5 >= vh 0.14 0.41 0.55 
highly vulnerable vh > 0.5 0.31 0.14 0.45 
All groups   0.45 0.55 1.00 
  Urban 
 criterion poor non-poor 
poor and 
non-poor 
moderately  vulnerable 0.5 >= vh 0.13 0.40 0.54 
highly vulnerable vh > 0.5 0.33 0.13 0.46 
Urban   0.46 0.54 1.00 
  Rural self-provisioning  
 Criterion poor non-poor 
poor and 
non-poor 
moderately  vulnerable 0.5 >= vh 0.16 0.55 0.71 
highly vulnerable vh > 0.5 0.18 0.11 0.29 
rural self-provisioning 0.34 0.66 1.00 
  Rural other 
 criterion Poor non-poor 
poor and 
non-poor 
moderately vulnerable 0.5 >= vh 0.14 0.30 0.44 
highly vulnerable vh > 0.5 0.38 0.18 0.56 
rural other   0.52 0.48 1.00 
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provisioning and other sub-groups; we are able to shed light on one of the risk-reducing 
strategies that is available to some rural households. On average the self-provisioning 
rural households spend less per capita, and are less educated and older. The one asset that 
self-provisioning rural households have in abundance is land (relative to other rural 
households). The difference in vulnerability to poverty between self-provisioning and 
other rural households is striking, both for the current poor and non-poor, especially if we 
concentrate on food poverty (undernutrition). But even if we concentrate on income 
poverty, using the poverty line determined according to basic needs approach, high 
vulnerability is more common among other rural households.  
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
 It is possible to partition the SIS 2003 data set in many different ways in order to 
test for pockets of poverty. One obvious way is to look for regional poverty measures. 
For example, South East Turkey has a headcount poverty rate of almost 64 percent with 
the basic needs approach, two and a half times the national average. Or we can 
investigate the poverty rates according to age, education, or profession of household 
head. The ADEPT software released by the World Bank generates these interesting tables 
effortlessly once the poverty line is calculated. However, our primary goal is not to find a 
novel way of partitioning data set to discover pockets of poverty. Instead we focus on 
recalculating the poverty line by taking into account self-provisioning among rural 
households, on the grounds that self-provisioning households face different prices and 
therefore consume different food baskets. Since the composition and cost of the food 
basket is crucial for poverty line calculation, a theoretically correct poverty line in 
settings where many rural households self-provision should take into account this fact. 
 78 
We are fortunate to have a data set that allows us to observe self-provisioning. We 
demonstrate that once self-provisioning is properly accounted in the calculation of 
poverty line, the poverty profile of rural areas indeed does change.  
 We then proceed to utilize the distinction between self-provisioning and other 
rural households to study vulnerability to income poverty and undernutrition. The 
empirical literature on vulnerability to poverty is plagued by methodological problems, 
and our analysis is not immune to them. We employ a cross-section data set that does not 
allow us to test hypotheses derived from a structural model. Only a panel data set which 
covers periods long enough to include macro shocks, like a major drought or financial 
crisis, would allow formal hypothesis testing from a structural model. Nevertheless, we 
are able to present quantitative evidence on some long-standing issues in the literature on 
vulnerability to poverty. The existing studies on poverty in Turkey employ either the 
basic needs approach or the non-welfare approach. The basic needs approach takes into 
account non-food expenses in addition to food, and the food basket in non-welfare 
approach is rich in relatively expensive calories from animal products. We take 
advantage of this existing literature and use the poverty line from basic needs approach as 
the measure of income poverty, and the poverty line from the non-welfare approach as 
the measure of undernutrition.  
We show that households may have different levels of vulnerability to these 
different dimensions of poverty. We show that self-provisioning households are roughly 
as vulnerable to income poverty as other rural households, but they are much less 
vulnerable to undernutrition. Our evidence is in accord with the long-held view that some 
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strategies that households adapt to mitigate certain risks – in our case self-provisioning 
mitigates the market price risk for food – can themselves be a source of income poverty.  
 Policymakers attuned to the modern agriculture of developed countries are 
sometimes puzzled by the lack of specialization and seeming failure to realize gains by 
trade where peasant farmers produce a great variety of food for home consumption in 
developing countries. Development economists recognize that this lack of specialization 
is the result of incomplete markets in product and factor markets, including lack of 
financial services, insurance, and social security from state. In the previous chapter, we 
established that food self-provisioning by majority of rural households is statistically 
significant in a demand system regression analysis. In this chapter, we investigated the 
welfare implications. We recalculated poverty lines with grounding in economic theory 
that takes into account the realities of developing countries. We used these newly 
constructed poverty lines to present evidence that food self-provisioning is a viable 
strategy to mitigate vulnerability to undernutrition.  
This finding has important implications for agricultural policies. Since the early 
2000s, Turkey’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs has been pushing for 
modernization in the livestock sector, especially in dairy farming, to phase out traditional 
small-scale production in the name of increasing domestic supply to reduce prices and 
benefit consumers at large (OIK, 2006). We show that, contrary to perceived wisdom in 
policy making circles in Turkey, some of the households who are most vulnerable to 
income poverty in rural Turkey are able to avoid nutrition poverty by consuming home 
produce. Policies that discourage self-provisioning may have significant adverse impacts 
on the well-being of these households – impacts that are hidden view by conventional 
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poverty measures that fail to account for price differences between self-provisioning and 
other rural households. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
OLIGOPOLY AND PRICE TRANSMISSION IN TURKEY’S FLUID MILK 
MARKET  
4.1 Introduction 
Two complaints are commonly heard in Turkey regarding milk markets, one 
among milk farmers and other among milk processors. On the one hand, milk farmers in 
Turkey point out that farm-gate milk price in Turkey is relatively low compared to the 
EU while the retail price of fluid milk remains among the highest (Section 4.2). The 
Cattle Breeders Central Association (CBCA) complains that milk processors collude in 
order not to bid against each other in quarterly auctions where milk prices are set 
(Güngör, 2006). Their biggest complaints are low and volatile milk prices. Producing 
milk suitable for delivery to milk processors with modern technology requires hefty 
investment in milking machines, cold storage and high yielding cow breeds. In order to 
assess one’s ability to recoup the costly investment, one needs to foresee more than the 
immediate quarter.  
Currently there is no national policy in Turkey that protects milk farmers from 
price fluctuations, whether this is the result of ordinary market forces or is engineered by 
oligopolistic buyers. On the other hand, milk processors in Turkey complain about the 
low quality of milk produced in Turkey (i.e. very high bacteria count). They point out 
that, unlike many EU member countries, the milk farmers in Turkey are very small sized, 
where 60 percent of households engaged in livestock farming own 1-4 animals (Uzmay, 
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2007) and this small size increases milk collection costs52. More importantly, this 
hampers the milk farmers’ ability to modernize their operations.  
Several sources estimate that only 30 to 35 percent of total milk production is 
processed by modern enterprises (FAO, 2007; Voorbergen, 2004). The rest of the output 
is of such low quality that they would not qualify for support under the current EU 
Common Agricultural Policy regulations53. Seasonal fluctuations in supply are pointed 
out as evidence of the traditional nature of milk production in Turkey which relies 
substantially on grazing. As a result, milk processing firms complain that they cannot 
find enough suitable quality milk to process and are forced to operate below full capacity. 
In this paper we try to sort out these competing claims and propose an alternative 
scenario that weaves together all the seemingly competing facts. We observe that the 
cumulative effect of price transmission from farm-gate to retailers is indeed asymmetric. 
However, the asymmetry is the opposite of what we would expect from the empirical 
literature on price transmission in agricultural markets54. Over time, the vertical distance 
between farm-gate and wholesale milk prices is shrinking in Turkey. Following 
                                               
52 FAO (2007) report on Turkish dairy sector reports “Turkish dairy industrialists 
estimate that poor quality milk makes them incur additional costs of between 10-15 
percent of the milk price” (p. 69).  
53 The retail sector trade journal report on the dairy industry (January 2007) can be 
reached at: http://www.perakende.org/haber.php?hid=1197885349 
54 Peltzman (2000) studies a wide variety of industries for the U.S. where a primary input 
costs at least 20 percent of output price and concludes that more often than not producers 
pass thru the reductions in input costs slower than increases and he suspects abuse of 
oligopoly market power. The abuse of oligopoly power is well documented for the U.S. 
dairy sector (Capps & Sherwell, 2007; Carman & Sexton, 2005; Chidmi, Lopez, & 
Cotterill, 2005; Cotterill, 2005; Lass, 2005; Li, 2008). von Cramon-Taubadel (1998) is 
one of the first papers that deal with a European market while taking into account the unit 
root characteristics of time-series variables. Meyer & Cramon-Taubadel (2004) is an 
excellent review of the theoretical basis of asymmetric price transmission, time series 
econometrics and the empirical studies.  
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McCorriston, Morgan, & Rayner (2001), we propose that the most proximate explanation 
of the functioning of the fluid milk production and the processing chain is the one where 
milk processors enjoy oligopsony power and hence can extract price concessions from 
the farmers. However, processing firms pass price concessions and more to retailers55 
because they also enjoy increasing returns to scale. Increasing returns to scale allow dairy 
firms to preserve their net profit rates even though the gross margin between farm-gate 
milk price (chief input) and Ultra High Temperature milk (major fluid milk output, UHT) 
is narrowing. We show that the capacity utilization ratio in the modern dairy industry in 
Turkey rose during the study period (1994-2006), but it still remains low. We suggest that 
the availability of excess capacity makes it evident that increasing returns to scale is 
achievable in the short run. We show that UHT milk is gaining market share against the 
open milk – milk sold by the street traders without treatment – suggesting  that there are 
potentially increasing returns to scale in the medium and the long-run due to the 
expansion of the market. We also find more direct evidence for increasing returns to 
scale: there is a structural break in unit root tests for the hourly labor productivity index 
in the dairy sector (hereafter labor productivity index) coinciding with the entry of two 
major competitors (Danone and Ülker) into the dairy market in 1997. We also detect a 
gradual but consistent decline in UHT milk price from 1998 onwards, which coincides 
with the structural break in labor productivity index. The long-term decline in UHT milk 
prices is accompanied by no major change in farm-gate milk prices. 
                                               
55 We assume that reductions in wholesale milk prices are passed to final consumers. 
Çelen, Erdoğan, & Taymaz (2005) assert that supermarkets are generally competitive in 
Turkey. 
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Finally, we employ Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) tests, Moment Threshold 
Autoregressive (M-TAR) tests, and an Asymmetric Price Transmission (APT) model to 
look for evidence of abuse of market power by milk processing firms. The APT model 
(explained in detail in Section 4.3) cannot prove the abuse of market power by 
intermediaries, because there are other possible explanations for the differing speed of 
transmission of input price increases and decreases to output prices. However, if we can 
detect quicker transmission of input price increases to retailers than input price decreases, 
then we at least have grounds for suspecting abuse of market power by intermediaries. 
We do not find much evidence for asymmetry, and the little evidence we get for 
asymmetry supports the contrary conclusion that milk processing firms in Turkey in the 
study period transmit input price decreases quicker to retailers than input price increases.  
In Section 4.2, we describe the dairy sector in Turkey and justify the choice of 
fluid milk as the object of analysis. Section 4.3 presents the APT as the model to study 
the price transmission mechanism in fluid milk market. Section 4.4 presents an analysis 
of unit root characteristics of variables. Section 4.5.1 presents the cointegration analysis. 
Because the Johansen’s trace test is known to perform poorly in the presence of 
asymmetric price transmission, in Section 4.5.2 we employ TAR and M-TAR 
cointegration tests that are developed specifically for cases exhibiting potential 
asymmetric relationships. Section 4.6 is devoted to the estimation and discussion of the 
APT model. Section 4.7 recaps the empirical findings and concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Dairy Sector in Turkey 
In Turkey animal production systems differ depending on the animal product. At 
one end stands the broiler chicken industry where industrial farms dominate. At the other 
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end stands sheep and goat husbandry which is dominated by scattered traditional 
producers. Dairy products lie in the intermediate terrain between these extremes, with a 
mix of large and small scale processors. Dairy products are the source of 50 percent of 
the total animal protein in the Turkish diet and 60 percent of animal calories56. The dairy 
sector has a very diverse product spread. In Turkey the most consumed (in terms of fluid 
milk equivalent) dairy product is cheese, followed by yogurt, butter and fluid milk 
(MARA, 2004; Voorbergen, 2004). 
Even though it is not the primarily consumed dairy product, in this paper we focus 
on fluid milk consumption and, specifically, on UHT milk consumption in Turkey owing 
to the distinctive features of the UHT market. UHT is the partial sterilization of milk by 
heating it for a short time, 1-2 seconds, at a very high temperature (exceeding 135 °C, 
compared to heating at 72 °C for 15 seconds for pasteurization). In all primary dairy 
products except UHT milk, modern large scale enterprises (i.e., potential oligopolies) 
compete with ‘mandra’ (traditional, small-scale producers and semi-modern enterprises) 
and street vendors. As Voorbergen (2004: 12) puts it, “Processors operate in different 
worlds… At one pole, [stand] the big food conglomerates and foreign companies; at the 
other pole, [stand] the small-scale mandras”. Studying UHT milk will allow us to focus 
on the one product where mandras do not participate. UHT milk production requires 
costly initial investment in UHT machinery. (FAO, 2007) reports that Turkey’s ten 
largest dairies – five of them with nationwide presence – dominate UHT milk production 
(p. 69). Hence, by concentrating on the UHT milk market, we can most easily analyze 
whether big food conglomerates manipulate prices for their benefit. 
                                               
56 We calculate these estimates from the State Institute of Statistics (SIS) Household 
Budget Survey of 2003. 
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The retail price of fluid milk in Turkey is higher than that in most EU member 
countries. At the same time, the farm-gate price is among the lowest. In other words, the 
retail/ farm-gate price ratio is higher in Turkey compared to many EU members. 
Furthermore the farm-gate-milk-price to milk-feed-price57 ratio is around 1.1-1.2 in 
Turkey in recent years. Koç, Bayaner, Tan, Ertürk, & Fuller (2001) estimate that for a 
profitable farm, the milk price/feed ratio should not be lower than 1.5 and preferably 
around 258.  
Table 4.1 shows that the retail-to-farm-gate price ratio has been decreasing in 
Turkey but is still above the retail-to-farm-gate ratio for the United Kingdom. On the one 
hand, farmer associations claim that the reason for the high retail/farm-gate ratio is the 
cartel power of milk processors (Güngör, 2006). On the other hand, dairy processors put 
the blame of the high retail-to-farm-gate ratio squarely on the dispersed and traditional 
nature of farmers (see footnotes 51 and 52). In other words, since the farms are small-
sized and dispersed, milk collection costs are higher than they would be if the farmers 
had modern and large milk farms. Also, most of the Turkish farmers do not have 
refrigerated storage tanks for milk and, hence, once the milk is collected it needs to be 
treated extensively in order to reduce the bacteria count to acceptable levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
57 Modern farms, which primarily rely on milk feed – the special mixture of animal feed 
for milk production – feed costs can account for 63.7 percent of expenses in Turkey (Koç 
et al., 2001: 26).  
58 Cow Breeders Association report “Producers face the prices dictated by Industrialists” 
(Güngör, 2006: 2); Agricultural Engineers Association of Turkey report (TZOB, 2005: 
11). 
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Table 4.1: Comparison of retail and farm-gate prices and ratios in England and 
Turkey 
 2002 2003 2004 
UK Retail Milk 0.74 € 0.78 € 0.79 € 
Turkey Retail Milk 0.80 € 0.81 € 0.86 € 
UK Farm-gate Milk 0.29 € 0.30 € 0.31 € 
Turkey Farm-gate Milk 0.22 € 0.24 € 0.27 € 
UK Milk Feed 0.25 € 0.26 € 0.28 € 
Turkey Milk Feed 0.18 € 0.21 € 0.20 € 
UK retail / farm-gate 2.55 2.60 2.55 
Turkey retail / farm-gate 3.64 3.37 3.19 
UK farm-gate / feed 1.16 1.15 1.11 
Turkey farm-gate / feed 1.22 1.14 1.35 
Note: The feed conversion ratio, on average, is higher in Turkey, which means that for every kg of feed less 
milk is obtained in Turkey. 
Source: Reproduced from (TZOB, 2005) report, p.10 
 
A third group, the board for the 9th Development Plan for Food Processing 
Industry, takes a position somewhere in between these two (Ataman, 2006). It 
acknowledges the parceling of milk supply among milk processors, and affirms that most 
farmers lack the means necessary to participate in modern markets. As a result, the 
authors of the report make a case for public institutions to regulate the market, implicitly 
acknowledging the institutional externalities arising from the quickly perishable nature of 
the product59. There is some evidence of concentration for the Turkish dairy processing 
industry indicating that it is indeed high. (Top four firms controlled between 50 to 60 
percent during 1990s60). However, it is prudent to regard these statistics with skepticism. 
The coverage of the informal sector by State Institute of Statistics (SIS) is at best 
inadequate. For example, Voorbergen reports that only 19 percent of total raw milk in 
Turkey is processed by modern firms; 35 percent is processed by medium and small-scale 
firms; roughly 10 percent is sold by street vendors as open milk; and roughly one third is 
consumed/ processed on the farm itself (Voorbergen, 2004: 10). 
                                               
59 This report relies on expert opinion instead of empirical scrutiny. 
60 Personal communication with SIS staff. 
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The existence of oligopolies does not necessarily imply the exercise of oligopoly 
power at the expense of social welfare. Sometimes the benefits of oligopolies outweigh 
their potential costs. For example, oligopolies may enjoy “super profits” (in comparison 
to the perfect competition case) yet deliver lower prices to consumers because they can 
enjoy economies of scale, or they can overcome the double marginalization that exists 
between companies dealing with each other at arm’s length61. If barriers to entry are 
sufficiently low, the threat of entry can force existing monopolies or oligopolies to 
behave as if they are operating in competitive markets. Hence, in order to determine the 
welfare effects of oligopolistic market structure, it is not enough to show the market share 
of larger firms. Indeed, McCorriston et al., (2001) provide a theoretical framework where 
increasing returns to scale in oligopolistic markets can lead to even greater price 
transmission than a perfect competition case: 
Specifically, whereas market power will reduce the level of price transmission 
(relative to perfectly competitive case), if the industry is characterized by 
increasing returns to scale, the level of price transmission will increase. Under 
reasonable conditions, the degree of price transmission may be greater than in the 
constant returns, perfectly competitive case. (p. 146) 
 
An inspection of figures relating to inflation-adjusted prices in Section 4.4.1 
suggests that the farm-gate and UHT milk real prices are not moving together in the sense 
that there is no visible pattern in farm-gate milk real prices while UHT milk real prices 
are in a gradual long term decline. Formal cointegration analysis of farm-gate and UHT 
                                               
61 When final consumer products firms (like food processors or supermarkets) deal with 
their suppliers at arm’s length, the resultant production is less than their profit 
maximizing optimum production level. Given supermarkets’ demand, the profit 
maximizing optimum for their suppliers is less than consumer products firms' optimum. 
Double marginalization can be avoided if upstream or downstream activities are 
vertically integrated. 
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milk real prices rejects cointegration between these two variables and confirms the visual 
inspection. In Section 4.4 we show that the sustained increase in labor productivity in the 
post-1997 period in the dairy sector coincides with the entry of two major producers and 
with the start of a long-term decline in UHT milk prices. In Section 4.5, we show that 
when we consider the farm-gate and UHT milk real prices, and labor productivity index 
together they are indeed cointegrated, which stands as further evidence that dairy sector 
labor productivity has a significant role in explaining the movements in prices. We regard 
the upward trend in dairy sector productivity as an indicator of increasing returns to scale 
and as a clear structural break from the past in the post-1997 period.  
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present additional evidence that point to increasing returns to 
scale in the dairy industry. Table 4.2 shows that only seven percent of fluid milk 
consumption in 1994 was from the formal sector (pasteurized and UHT milk). By 2003 
the formal sector raised its market share relative to open source milk (street milk) to 18 
percent and at the same time per capita fluid milk consumption kept increasing. Almost 
all of the increase in total consumption can be attributed to the formal sector. Potentially, 
UHT and pasteurized milk products are becoming normal goods consumed by the middle 
class rather than luxury products as they evidently were in the mid-1990s. Thus the 
decline in the wholesale-to-farm-gate price ratio may point towards the evolution of a 
novel/luxury product into a mass consumer good. At the same time the oligopolistic 
nature of the dairy industry be accompanied by dairy firms’ efforts to introduce the better 
quality (more hygienic, healthy and with longer shelf life) products to the consumer 
basket. 
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Table 4.2: Source of fluid milk consumed 1994 and 2003 
 Rural Urban Total 
Years Open Packed 
Pc daily, 
lt Open Packed 
Pc daily, 
lt Open Packed 
Pc 
daily, lt 
1994 99 % 1 % 0.085 90% 10 % 0.081 93% 7% 0.082 
2003 96 % 4 % 0.113 74 % 26 % 0.086 82 % 18 % 0.094 
Our calculations are based on the SIS 1994 and 2003 Household Budget Surveys.  
 
Table 4.3 shows that total fluid milk output and capacity utilization in the formal 
sector have been increasing62 in Turkey for the years where data are available. We take 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 as evidence for potential increasing returns to scale in both the short- 
and long-run. The gradual decline in excess capacity also suggests the potential for 
existence of increasing returns to scale even in the short run. In the long-run the UHT and 
pasteurized milk are gaining market share, allowing for continuous upgrade and 
expansion of existing factories. During this process, excess capacity can lead to price 
wars among dairy processors to gain market share. 
Table 4.3: Formal sector capacity, production and utilization 
UHT 
Years # of units Capacity Production Capacity utilization 
1994 8 242,794 85,789 35% 
1996 13 280,383 15,917 6% 
1998 15 299,783 221,635 74% 
2000 10 415,372 181,821 44% 
2002 35 231,728 91,126 39% 
Pasteurized 
Years # of units Capacity Production Capacity utilization 
1994 42 612,545 106,430 17% 
1996 46 542,907 130,837 24% 
1998 52 414,722 126,186 30% 
2000 37 1,792,497* 142,181 8% 
2002 48 286,629 170,645 60% 
*: The significant increase from 1998 to 2000 and the subsequent substantial decline are probably due to a 
classification mistake: the buttermilk capacity has a reverse swing during the same period.  
Source: Industry surveys by SIS originally reported by Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA, 
2004). 
                                               
62 There is no import of fluid milk to Turkey, so all of the increase in consumption is 
sourced domestically. 
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4.3 Asymmetric Price Transmission63 
A likely avenue leading to higher profits for oligopolistic food processors is the 
manipulation of prices. As a result, one way of studying the competitiveness of 
agricultural markets is to study the price transmission from farmers (primary producers) 
to final consumers. Standard economic models assume that positive and negative price 
changes in input costs are equally transferred to output prices. However, empirical studies 
challenge this assumption. Peltzman (2000) – analyzing a wide range of industries – finds 
that output prices rise concurrently with input price increases (i.e., without lag), but 
respond with a lag when input prices decline. The differing transmission of input price 
changes to output prices is called asymmetric price transmission (APT).  
The APT model cannot explain the causation for price transmission; instead the 
model serves the role of detecting the asymmetry in price transmission. According to 
Meyer and von Cramon-Taubel (2004) two main views that explain the observation of 
APT are: (i) the abuse of market power, and (ii) adjustment costs (e.g., menu costs64 in 
the presence of inflation).  
Farmers and consumers - at the beginning and end of the marketing chain, 
respectively - often suspect the abuse of market power as the explanation for APT. 
Increases in input prices are passed on to output prices more quickly because such 
                                               
63 This section is largely based on Li (2008) and Meyer & Cramon-Taubadel (2004). 
64 Menu costs refer to transaction costs related to updating of price tags. In an inflationary 
environment firms will adjust their prices downward less often and in lesser amounts 
simply because the inflation reduces the real prices over time. Hence using nominal price 
time-series in the analysis of price transmission will reveal that the prices are sticky 
downward. In other words, in an inflationary environment the analysis of price 
transmission can spuriously detect abuse of market power even when the firms are simply 
avoiding the menu costs with the knowledge that inflation will soon render any price 
reduction unnecessary. 
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increases squeeze the gross margin for processing firms (the middlemen). On the other 
hand, the existence of asymmetry could also be explained by the fact that inflation eats 
into the retail price of goods; input price declines are not immediately followed by output 
price declines because the latter result in the re-establishment of the usual gross margin 
that was eroding under inflationary pressures. 
4.3.1 Different Ways of Classifying APT 
4.3.1.1 Positive versus Negative APT: 
Peltzman (2000) suggests dividing APT into two cases: positive and negative. 
Positive APT occurs when price increases in input prices translate into output prices 
immediately, but price decreases do not. Negative APT is the opposite case65. Meyer and 
von Cramon-Taubadel (2004) suggest the following definition: 
We propose that positive APT be defined as a set of reactions according to which 
any price movement that squeezes the margin (i.e., an increase in pin or a fall in 
pout) is transmitted more rapidly and/or completely (to pout or pin, respectively) 
than the equivalent movement that stretches the margin. Conversely, APT is 
negative when price movements that stretch the margin are transmitted more 
rapidly and/or completely than movements that squeeze it (p. 586). 
4.3.1.2 Magnitude versus Speed of Adjustment 
Another way of looking at APT is to check whether (i) the positive and negative 
changes in input prices and output prices cancel each other or not (magnitude of 
adjustment) and (ii) positive and negative changes in input prices are reflected to output 
prices at the same speed.  
                                               
65 In the case of APT, the meanings of “positive” and “negative” can be misleading. In 
this case positive APT is bad for consumers and negative APT is good for consumers. 
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The solid lines in Fig. 4.1 represent the price increases (input and output); the 
dashed lines represent price declines, and shaded areas the welfare effects. In the first 
graph the input price increases fully and is immediately reflected on the output price, but 
the input price decline is reflected on the output price immediately but not fully (i.e., the 
gross margin of middlemen has increased permanently). In the second graph, the decline 
in the input price is reflected on the output price with a lag (a temporary super profit for 
middlemen). The third graph is the combination of the first two. The decline in the input 
price is transmitted to the consumers neither immediately nor to its full extent66. 
Figure 4.1: Different forms of positive APT, reproduced from Meyer and Von 
Cramon-Taubel (2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
66 For ease of explanation assume that the price changes do not lead to a change in 
quantity consumed. Also, we are not going to discuss spatial APT because we are not 
going to explore such a situation. 
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4.3.2 Modeling Asymmetric Price Transmission67 
 Standard symmetric and linear price transmission can be represented by the 
following equation: 
 t
in
t
out
t pp    (4.1) 
where outtp is the price of output (wholesale milk price in our case), 
in
tp  is the price of 
primary input (farm-gate milk price in our case), α and β are coefficients to be estimated 
and t are the error term. The insight of APT model is to split changes in input prices into 
input price increases, intp
 , and input price decreases, outtp
 , in order to investigate their 
effects separately on output (i.e., creating two columns of data from one: when there is an 
input price increase the corresponding input price decrease cell is zero). Houck, (1977) 
made the early formulations of the APT model operationally clearer: 
  t
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t
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t
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t ppp 

 (4.2)  
 If   is equal to   then we can conclude that the magnitude of response to 
positive and negative input price changes is symmetric. Ward (1982) extended Houck’s 
specification to include lags. Lag lengths of input price increases and decreases are 
allowed to differ as indicated by K versus L in Equation 4.3, they are designed to account 
for the speed of adjustment in addition to magnitude of adjustment:  
   t
L
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t ppp jj 
   




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)()(
1 11 1
  (4.3) 
 
 For example, if it turns out that K is two and L is three, then we can conclude that 
input price increases are translated into output prices more speedily. Granger & Newbold 
                                               
67 This section relies heavily on Meyer and v. Cramon-Taubadel (2004: 593-96) and von 
Cramon-Taubadel (1998). 
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(1974) show that if the dependent and independent variables are randomly and 
independently generated non-stationary time series variables then ordinary least squares 
(OLS) will yield a statistically significant relationship in far more cases than expected. 
Such results are referred to as spurious. Since then, econometricians have developed tests 
for non-stationarity (including Dickey-Fuller and KPSS tests) and methods for modeling 
relationships among non-stationary variables e.g., error correction models (ECM). An 
ECM incorporates the long-term equilibrium relationship among variables in the 
specification as well as the short-term adjustments to maintain that equilibrium68. In an 
ECM, both the dependent and the independent variables are in first differences. 
Adjustments to the long-term relationship are accounted by error correction terms (ECT), 
which are the lagged error terms arising from the long-term relationship.  
The ECT measures the deviations from the long-run equilibrium between pin and 
pout, so including it in the ECM allows pout not only to respond changes in pin but 
also to ‘correct’ any deviations from the long-run equilibrium that may be left 
over from previous periods. (Meyer and v. Cramon-Taubadel, 2004: 596) 
 
The ECM is a Vector Autoregressive Regression (VAR), which means that lagged 
values of the differenced dependent variable are also added to the right-hand side of the 
equation. In the parlance of cointegration analysis, Equation 4.1 symbolizes the long-term 
relationship. If tests prove that the relationship represented in Equation 4.1 is not 
spurious69, then the lagged error terms from Equation 4.1 represent the deviations from 
long-term equilibrium in period t-1. The coefficient of the ECT is expected to be 
negative. In other words, the deviations from the long-term relationship are corrected 
                                               
68 (Engle & Granger, 1987) have developed the first practical testing strategy for error 
correction models. (Granger & Lee, 1989) present the first application of non-symmetric 
error correction models. 
69 The cointegration tests for the milk data from Turkey are presented in Section 4.5. 
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toward the cointegrated long-term equilibrium. In order to incorporate the ECT into the 
APT model, the ECTs are split into positive and negative components and added to the 
Ward specification. In the modified Ward specification, Equation 4.4, if the φ+ is equal to 
φ- then we can conclude that the responses to positive and negative input price changes 
are symmetric. In other words the speed of adjustment is equal for positive and negative 
deviations from long-term equilibrium:  
   in1 1 1 1
2 1
K L
out out
t i t i j t j t t t
i j
p p p ECT ECT             
 
           (4.4) 
 As shown in the third and fourth terms on the right-hand side of Equation 4.5, it is 
also possible to split the input prices into positive and negative components in order to 
allow the investigation of more complex dynamic relationships. 
     in in1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1
K L M
out out
t i t i j t j j t j t t t
i j j
p p p p ECT ECT                    
  
              
  (4.5) 
   Unfortunately, the cointegration framework of ECM does not allow investigating 
whether the gross margin of middlemen are permanently increasing because the long-
term cointegrated relationship is assumed a priori; in these models there is no room for 
continuous divergence from a long-term relationship (i.e., magnitude of adjustment is 
assumed away). Enders & Siklos (2001) develop cointegration and threshold adjustment 
tests that relax the assumption of symmetric adjustment to the long-run equilibrium (for 
discussion, see Section 4.5.2). 
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4.4 Data  
4.4.1 Exploring the Data Set 
The most publicized price gouging cases are the ones concerning the manipulation 
of retail prices due to the direct link to the pockets of consumers at large. Unfortunately, 
the retail milk price data released by SIS also include the open sourced milk in addition to 
packaged milk without differentiating between the two, and hence do not correspond one-
to-one to the wholesale product (UHT milk) of the modern dairy industry. Hence we will 
concentrate on the relationship between farm-gate (input) and UHT wholesale prices 
(output). Price data for many commodities and products are available monthly starting 
with January 1994 at SIS’s web-site. We use available data up to the end of 200670. 
We want to control for returns to scale while exploring the relationship between 
farm-gate and wholesale milk price after McCorriston et al., (2001). Low capacity 
utilization rates presented in Table 4.3 suggest the potential for increasing returns to scale 
in the short run. Unfortunately, capacity utilization rate data are only available annually. 
Hence we use the labor productivity index as a proxy for returns to scale. This index is 
available as quarterly data on the SIS’s web-site for the period 1994-2006. We convert 
the quarterly index data into monthly data by interpolating.. 
The nominal farm-gate and wholesale UHT prices are presented in Figure 4.2. 
The very high level of inflation prior to 2002 (see Table A3.1 in the Appendix) makes it 
very hard to evaluate price movements visually. To partially ameliorate the inflation 
                                               
70 We end the analysis at the end of 2006 because the labor productivity index for dairy 
sector is available only until the end of 2006. Recently, SIS has released data for indices 
for labor hours and total dairy production for post 2006 but the base year has changed to 
2005 from 1997 and the data frequency for total production is monthly.  
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problem, we converted nominal prices to logarithms (Figure 4.3). Broadly speaking, the 
log prices suggest that farm-gate and UHT milk prices move together.  
Figure 4.2: Farm-gate and UHT (wholesale) nominal milk prices, TL 
 
Figure 4.3: Logarithm of farm-gate and UHT (wholesale) nominal milk prices 
      
 
 Alternatively we convert the nominal prices to real prices (using monthly 
wholesale price index) in Figure 4.4. The gross margin between indexed farm-gate milk 
price and indexed wholesale UHT price are narrowing in Figure 4.4. In other words, 
indexed prices suggest that the two series may not be cointegrated since the relationship 
between the two series is not constant. Due to the discrepancy of the intuitive 
 99 
observations from Figures 4.3 and 4.4, we analyze the relationship between wholesale 
UHT price and farm-gate price both for nominal and real inflation indexed prices71.  
Figure 4.4: Inflation-adjusted farm-gate and UHT (wholesale) milk prices, YTL* 
 
*: YTL = 1,000,000 TL 
 
Figure 4.5 presents the time graph of indices of three indexed variables which 
illustrates the fluctuating movement of farm-gate prices, the long-term decline in UHT 
prices and the gradual increase in the productivity index. 
 
Figure 4.5: Indices of inflation-adjusted farm-gate, UHT prices and productivity 
index   
 
 
                                               
71We are presenting only the results for inflation-adjusted prices in the main part of 
chapter. The analysis for log-nominal prices is presented in the Appendix. 
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4.4.2 Unit Root Tests 
 After visual analysis of the time-series data we check for the existence of unit 
roots. We use JMulti software72 for unit root tests and for the Johansen co-integration 
tests. Our testing strategy is to start with an augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) model with 
one lag including the trend variable if a trend is visible in the data. If the final prediction 
error (FPE)73 score indicates a lag length different than the default of one lag, we conduct 
the ADF test with the suggested lag length. In the second step, we use the test developed 
by Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, & Shin (1992). We choose the KPSS test as an 
alternative to the ADF because it tests opposite null hypothesis. In the ADF test the null 
hypothesis is the existence of a unit root. In KPSS the null hypothesis is stationarity. 
While testing for both level stationarity and trend stationarity, we conduct KPSS tests 
with the same lag length as the ADF test. In the last step, we test for the presence of a 
unit root with a structural break. Since the data are monthly, we add monthly dummy 
variables to see if the results change significantly. In the unit root test with a structural 
break, Saikkonen & Lütkepohl (2002) suggest first estimating Equation 4.6 and 
subtracting it from the original series. Then the ADF test is performed on the adjusted 
series.  
 t s ty t D e        (4.6) 
where Ds = 0 if t < T  
           Ds = 1 if t ≥ T and T is the shift date.  
ty is the time series, t stands for time and sD is the dummy variable defined as above. 
                                               
72 www.jmulti.de. JMulti is very user friendly and its main advantage is that it allows unit 
root analysis while testing for structural breaks. 
73 JMulti automatically provides optimal lag length from four alternative information 
criteria: AIC, FPE, Hannan-Quinn, and Schwarz Criterion. We based our decisions on 
FPE. 
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Alternatively, it is possible to experiment with impulse dummy variables (a 
dummy variable equal to one only when t = T, and zero during the rest of time). 
Essentially an impulse dummy variable is a jump in a single period but does not point to 
any structural change in the long-run. We chose to focus on shift dummy variables 
because structural breaks are more relevant from a policy perspective than one-time 
outliers. It is also possible to experiment with exponential shift dummy variables. The 
exponential shift dummy variables allow for a gradual shift to a new level. When we use 
exponential shift variables instead of ordinary shift variables the conclusions of structural 
break tests for all three variables are identical.  
For the sake of brevity, we present only unit root test results with lag lengths 
minimizing the FPE score. For the UHT milk real price and labor productivity index, we 
present unit root tests taking into account the prior information since there are visible 
trends in the time series (Elder & Kennedy, 2001). Table 4.4 shows that both the ADF 
and KPSS tests give the same results for the UHT milk real price: the monthly prices are 
non-stationary. However, the conclusion changes drastically when we conduct the unit 
root test with structural break test. Prior to formal tests, we thought that February 2001 
would be the date for structural break date, due to the severe foreign exchange crisis and 
sudden jump in inflation in that month. However, the structural break test suggests a 
break date as October 1997. Figure 4.6 shows the deterministic time trend with a 
structural break imposed on the inflation-adjusted UHT milk price. The most significant 
developments prior to or during 1997 are the privatization of SEK (the publicly owned 
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dairy company74) and the entrance of new firms into the dairy sector. The privatization of 
SEK was mostly completed during August-September 1995. The French multinational 
Danone bought a local company, Tikvesli, and entered the Turkish market in 1997. 
Moreover, the biggest domestic food company, Ülker, entered the consumer dairy market 
in 1997 (Voorbergen, 2004)75. In other words, the structural break identified in empirical 
analysis coincides with a significant change in industry structure rather than major 
macroeconomic events. 
Table 4.4 also shows that the ADF and KPSS for farm-gate milk real price and 
labor productivity index and supports the unit root null hypothesis in every alternative 
test. Figure 4.7 shows the deterministic time trend with a structural break imposed on the 
farm-gate milk real price. The structural break date is December 2000 and is just prior to 
the February 2001 crisis. Unlike the milk processing firms, there is no sector-level drastic 
change to account for such a break. The sharp drop in real prices during 2001 is the result 
of the fact that the increases in the nominal milk price did not match increases in the 
inflation rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
74 Modern enterprises, private or owned by the state, have never processed majority of 
raw milk in Turkey. However, SEK, due to its presence in every region, was widely 
believed to set the reference price both for farmers (when buying milk from) and for 
processors (when selling their products). 
75 “Ülker is a diversified Turkish food company with sales of around USD 2.5 billion 
[2004] that expanded into the dairy business relatively recently. The company already 
manufactured powdered milk for its own cookie business but moved into the end 
consumer business with the acquisition of Ak Foods in 1997.” (Voorbergen, 2004: 9) 
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Table 4.4: Unit root tests for UHT and farm-gate milk prices and labor productivity 
index 
Variable Test 
Structural 
break date 
trend  
variable Lags 
Test 
score Conclusion 
DF  yes 13 lags -1.5562 FTR Ho of unit root 
KPSS  yes 13 lags 0.2455 Reject Ho of stationarity 
UHT milk 
real price 
Structural break 1997 M10 yes 3 lags -4.0588 Reject Ho of unit root 
ADF   no 1 lag -2.9748 Reject Ho alpha=.05 
ADF  yes 1 lag -2.7427 FTR Ho of unit root 
KPSS  no 1 lag 0.781 Reject Ho of stationarity 
KPSS  yes 1 lag 0.271 Reject Ho of stationarity 
farm-gate 
milk real 
price 
Structural break 2000 M12 yes 1 lag -2.6061 FTR Ho of unit root 
ADF   yes 22 lags -1.1158 FTR Ho of unit root 
KPSS  yes 22 lags 0.1407 Reject Ho of stationarity 
Productivity 
index 
Structural break 1997 M10 yes 22 lags -1.6154 FTR Ho of unit root 
 
Figure 4.6: Inflation-adjusted UHT milk price with shift dummy, break (1997.M10), 
3 lags 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 104 
Figure 4.7: Farm-gate real price with shift dummy, break (2000.M12), 1 lag 
 
In the case of the labor productivity index, the suggested break date is May 1997. 
However, we cannot perform the structural break unit root test occurring during May 
1997 with the suggested 22 lags that emerge from initial analysis of lag length because 
there are not enough prior sample observations. The closest possible date is October 1997 
for a structural break with 22 lags. We felt comfortable using October 1997 instead of 
May 1997 since, as discussed above, major new firms entered the dairy sector during 
1997. Figure 4.8 shows the positive deterministic time trend imposed on the actual 
productivity index data.  
  
Figure 4.8: Labor productivity index with shift dummy, break (1997.M10), 22 lags 
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4.4.3 Concluding Unit Root Section 
 ADF and KPSS tests indicate that all three variables exhibit unit root 
characteristics with appropriate lag lengths (determined according to FPE information 
criteria). When we include a structural break into the analysis, the result changes only for 
UHT milk real price; assuming a structural break during October 1997, UHT milk real 
price is stationary. The suggested structural break dates are intuitively plausible. Both for 
UHT milk real price and the productivity index the break dates are in 1997 which are 
plausible given the corresponding new entries by major actors into the Turkish dairy 
market. The December 2000 structural-break date for inflation-adjusted farm-gate milk 
price is also plausible considering the immediate severe recession and spike in inflation 
rate. Adding monthly dummy variables does not change any of these conclusions. 
4.5 Cointegration Analysis 
4.5.1 Johansen Trace Test and Saikkonen-Lütkepohl Test 
 In order to perform the cointegration analysis, all variables should have unit root 
properties. As we show in the previous section we can confidently claim unit roots for all 
variables in every case except when we introduce a structural break into the unit root 
analysis of the inflation-adjusted UHT milk price. Despite this caveat, we continue with 
the cointegration analysis assuming that all variables are unit-root processes. We do not 
have any a priori expectation of the specific form the cointegrating relationship should 
take; hence we test the cointegration for all the possible variations. We also test for 
cointegration with the Saikkonen & Lütkepohl (2000) which estimates the deterministic 
part first, subtracts it from original observations and then applies a Johansen type test to 
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the remaining adjusted series. Unlike Johansen Trace tests, it is not possible to 
incorporate a structural break into the Saikkonen-Lütkepohl test.  
 We start by considering the cointegrating relationship between inflation-adjusted 
farm-gate and UHT milk prices. After visual inspection of Figure 4.4 we do not expect to 
find a cointegrating relationship between inflation-adjusted farm-gate and UHT milk 
prices. Unsurprisingly, Johansen trace tests, summarized in Table 4.5, confirm our 
intuition that these two series are not cointegrated, i.e. the regression relationship 
between them is spurious. When we introduce two break dates (i.e. shift dummies) for 
October 1997 and December 2000, there is some evidence for cointegration. Likewise, 
when we follow Saikkonen and Lütkepohl (2000)’s methodology and subtract the 
deterministic part from the original observations and test for cointegration in the adjusted 
observations, there is some evidence of cointegration.  
The evidence of cointegration between farm-gate and UHT milk real prices from 
Table 4.5 is not strong and we have evidence for substantial change in industry structure, 
so we proceed by including the labor productivity index to the cointegrating relationship. 
The results in Table 4.5 are more consistent, i.e., less susceptible to specification, to 
choice of lag length or to the existence or absence of structural break dates. Except for 
the case of applying the Johansen trace test with no structural break, cointegration is 
found in every specification. The most consistent finding of cointegration is the 
specification ‘constant and trend’. 
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Table 4.5: Cointegration tests for farm-gate, UHT milk prices and labor 
productivity index 
Johansen Trace test - Constant        
Variables Structural break Lags Conclusion 
Farm-gate and UHT No 2 0 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index No 8 0 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate and UHT 1997 M10 2 0 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index 1997 M10 8 1 cointegrating vector 10 % 
Farm-gate and UHT 1997 M10; 2000 M12 2 1 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index 1997 M10; 2000 M12 8 1 cointegrating vector 
Johansen Trace test - Constant & trend   
Farm-gate and UHT No 2 0 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index No 8 0 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate and UHT 1997 M10 2 0 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index 1997 M10 8 1 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate and UHT 1997 M10; 2000 M12 2 1 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index 1997 M10; 2000 M12 8 2 cointegrating vectors 
Johansen Trace test - orthogonal trend   
Farm-gate and UHT No 2 0 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index No 8 0 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate and UHT 1997 M10 2 0 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index 1997 M10 8 0 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate and UHT 1997 M10; 2000 M12 2 0 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index 1997 M10; 2000 M12 8 1 cointegrating vector 
Saikkonen & Lütkepohl test Test type Lags  
Farm-gate and UHT constant 2 1 cointegrating vector 10 %  
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index constant 8 1 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate and UHT constant & trend 2 1 cointegrating vector 10 %  
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index constant & trend 8 1 cointegrating vector 10 % 
Farm-gate and UHT orthogonal trend 2 1 cointegrating vector 5 %  
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index orthogonal trend 8 1 cointegrating vector 5 % 
*: Breaks are ignored for the ‘trend orthogonal’ case. For constant and constant-and-trend cases, only 
breaks in levels are assumed.  
4.5.2 Threshold Autoregressive and Moment Threshold Autoregressive Tests76 
The Johansen trace test is known to function poorly when applied to problems 
with asymmetric transmission. In order to improve the cointegration test, two alternative 
tests have been developed: threshold autoregressive (TAR) and moment threshold 
autoregressive tests (M-TAR) (Enders & Siklos, 2001). In order to perform these 
                                               
76 This section closely follows the testing strategy of Li (2008) Chapter 2. 
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alternative frameworks, we first need to estimate the long-term relationship to obtain the 
residuals. We include the deterministic components following the results of unit root 
tests. Following the findings in the previous section, we include the productivity index 
(prodt), and the trend term (t) on the right-hand side in Equations 4.7a and 4.7b. 
Furthermore, we add a structural break dummy variable suggested by the findings of 
Section 4.4 correspondingly (a shift dummy variable from October 1997 onwards for 
UHT milk and a shift dummy variable for from December 2000 onwards for farm-gate 
milk real price). 
 1 1 2 3 4 9710t u u t u t u tuht t farm prod DV            (4.7a) 
  1 2 3 4 0012t f f t f t f tfarm t uht prod DV                             (4.7b) 
 
where 1t t t    and 1t t t                                                                              (4.8) 
 
In the threshold autoregressive (TAR) test, the coefficients of the lagged error 
correction term, t , are allowed to take different values across a threshold (Enders and 
Siklos (2001)): 
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 (4.9)  
 
If c is equal to zero, 1t   is simply a negative or a positive deviation from 
equilibrium. We expect ρ1 and ρ2 to be negative so that deviations adjust toward the long-
run equilibrium. If the deviation of UHT price from long-run equilibrium is positive 
(more generally greater than c) in the previous period, then 1 1t    will be eliminated in 
the current period and vice versa. The values of 1 and 2 indicate the relative speed of 
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adjustment. If 1 > 2 , faster convergence is observed when prices are above the 
equilibrium77.  
The second alternative framework accommodating asymmetry is the moment 
threshold autoregressive (M-TAR) test:  
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 (4.10) 
In the case of the M-TAR model, economic agents adjust their behaviors 
according to the trend, or “momentum”, of deviations instead of adjusting their behavior 
according to deviations themselves. In other words, 1 and 2 describe adjustments in 
response to momentums in different directions. If 1 2  , the adjustments are not 
symmetric and show more “momentum” in one direction than in the other. 
 Following Enders and Siklos (2001), we perform a grid search to determine the 
value of the threshold. After sorting all of the estimated t ( t ) from Equation 4.7a in 
ascending order, we consider values between the 15th percentile and 85th percentile as 
possible threshold values. These values are used to estimate Equation 4.9 (4.10). The 
value that yields the least residual sum of squares is deemed to be the appropriate 
threshold value. 
In order to ensure cointegration, 1 and 2 should be negative so that the long-
term relationship between the variables does not deviate or shrink. The negative 
coefficients ensure that the short-term deviations are corrected towards long-term 
                                               
77 If ˆt ty y than t will be positive. In other words, since ˆty is the long-run equilibrium, 
positive t indicates that actual price is above the long-run price. 
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equilibrium. Enders and Siklos (2001) obtained critical values by recording the t statistics 
for the two null hypotheses 1 0   and 2 0  and the F statistic for the joint hypothesis 
ρ1 =ρ2 = 0. In the t tests, the larger of the two t statistics is called t-Max, and the smaller 
is called t-Min. If series are cointegrated, 1 , 2  and the corresponding t statistics should 
be negative (t-Min < t-Max < 0). The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected if t-
Max is smaller than the critical values. t-Min has little power and thus is ignored. In the F 
test, the F statistic for the joint hypothesis of ρ1 =ρ2 = 0 is called   to distinguish from 
the usual F distribution. When only one of 1 and 2  is negative, the   statistic can be 
used to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. According to Enders and Siklos 
(2001) the   statistic has substantially more power than t-Max statistic. Moreover, they 
report that compared to the Engle-Granger methodology, the TAR test has less power78 
but the M-TAR test has more power. 
Table 4.6 shows the test results both for TAR and M-TAR models for Equation 
4.7a. For the TAR model, all coefficient estimates have the expected negative signs for 
both zero and non-zero thresholds. In the case of the TAR model, the threshold is more 
than zero, indicating that milk processors make adjustments in prices when the actual 
wholesale prices are above the long-term equilibrium price. Moreover, the absolute value 
of the coefficient estimate of 1 is larger than that of 2 , suggesting faster convergence in 
response to positive deviations from equilibrium. When the threshold is zero the t-Max 
value for the TAR model is -1.87 (higher than the 10 percent critical value of -1.90) and -
                                               
78 In other words, TAR test rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration correctly less 
often than Engle-Granger methodology in Monte Carlo experiments. Enders and Siklos 
(2001) allude that in the case of the TAR model, the gain from estimating the correctly 
specified model (asymmetric) is outweighed by the estimation of an additional coefficient 
– threshold (p. 171). 
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1.68 for non-zero threshold which is less than 10 percent critical value of -1.61. Hence 
we fail to reject the no-cointegration hypothesis for the zero threshold model and we find 
some evidence (only at 10 percent) for cointegration in the case of non-zero threshold. 
However, when we performed the joint hypothesis with the more powerful   test, we 
reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at a 5 percent significance level. If we 
accept the cointegration result of the joint test, then the next step is to test asymmetry. 
The usual F-test is sufficient in this case (see the last two columns of Table 4.6). For the 
TAR model we fail to reject the symmetry hypothesis in both cases (zero and non-zero 
thresholds).  
For the M-TAR test, coefficient estimates for 1 are negative, but coefficient 
estimates for 2 are positive (and not statistically significant) both in the zero and non-
zero threshold cases. We cannot use t-Max because not all coefficient estimates are 
negative. The sample statistics are 19.49 for zero threshold and 21.89 for non-zero 
threshold. The statistics are greater than the 1 percent significance value of 8.85, so the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected. Given these strong results for 
cointegration we test for asymmetry. The F-test statistics lead to a strong rejection of the 
null hypothesis of symmetry. In the case of the M-TAR model the threshold is also more 
than zero, indicating that milk processors make adjustments in prices when the deviations 
from long-term equilibrium are above the long-term for ‘momentum’. Moreover, the 
absolute value of the coefficient estimate of 1 is larger than that of 2 , suggesting faster 
convergence in response to positive deviations from equilibrium. Therefore, the farm-to-
wholesale price transmission in Turkey is asymmetric, and adjustments are stronger when 
the previous period deviation is positive. That is, when actual wholesale prices are higher 
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than the equilibrium prices, a more rapid adjustment back toward the equilibrium price 
occurs. In other words, dairy firms tend to be quicker in lowering prices. 
 
Table 4.6: Results of TAR and M-TAR for inflation indexed UHT milk price 
 Threshold 1
a  t-value 2
b  t-value 
c  1 2
d   p-value 
TAR         
c=0  (0.217) -3.55 (0.133) -1.87 8.06 0.79 0.38 
c ≠ 0 0.131 (0.253) -3.88 (0.110) -1.68 8.95 2.4 0.12 
         
M-TAR         
c=0  (0.362) -6.20 0.044 0.67 19.44 21.49 0.00 
c ≠ 0 0.058 (0.445) -6.62 0.000 0.00 21.89 25.93 0.00 
a: Coefficients and t-statistics for the null hypothesis ρ1 = 0. 
b: Coefficients and t-statistics for the null hypothesis ρ2 = 0. t-Max critical values: 
when c=0: TAR: 1%: -2.55, 5%: -2.11, 10%: -1.90. M-TAR: 1%: -2.57, 5%: -2.14, 10%: -1.91. 
when 0c  : TAR: 1%: -2.35, 5%: -1.85, 10%: -1.61. M-TAR: 1%: -2.37, 5%: -1.90, 10%: -1.65. 
c: F statistics for the joint hypothesis ρ1= ρ2 = 0.  
when c= 0: TAR: 1%: 8.24, 5%: 5.98; 10%: 5.01; M-TAR: 1%: 8.78, 5%: 6.51, 10%: 5.45. 
when 0c  : TAR: 1%: 9.27, 5%: 6.95; 10%: 5.95; M-TAR: 1%: 9.14, 5%: 6.78, 10%: 5.73. 
d: F statistics for the joint hypothesis ρ1 =ρ2 to test for asymmetric price transmission. 
The test statistics are taken from Enders and Siklos (2001). 
 
We repeat the TAR and M-TAR cointegration analysis with the inflation-adjusted 
farm-gate milk prices as the dependent variable. The results, shown in Table 4.7, are 
significantly different. In the case of TAR, we fail to reject the no co-integration null 
hypothesis both when the threshold is zero and non-zero. In the case of M-TAR, again we 
fail to reject the no cointegration hypothesis in the case of zero threshold. In the case of 
non-zero threshold, we find some evidence for cointegration (but only at a 10 percent 
significance level). Since both of the coefficient estimates are not negative, we cannot use 
the t-Max statistic. The  test score is 5.7, slightly less than the 10 percent critical value 
of 5.73. If we assume the existence of cointegration, then there is evidence for asymmetry 
at the 5 percent significance level (see the last row for the last two columns in Table 4.7). 
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Table 4.7: Results of TAR and M-TAR for inflation indexed farm-gate milk price 
 Threshold 1
a  t-value 2
b  t-value 
c  1 2
d   p-value 
TAR         
C=0*  (0.076) -1.74 (0.091) -1.92 3.35   
C ≠ 0** 0.075 (0.063) -1.34 (0.102) -2.29 3.51   
         
M-TAR         
C=0  (0.025) -0.49 (0.120) -2.92 4.4   
C ≠ 0 0.015 0.023 0.39 (0.127) -3.35 5.7 4.56 0.034 
a, b, c, d: Same as Table 4.6. 
*: Tests reveal that residuals for the TAR model are not white noise. After augmenting to 6 lags we 
obtained white noise residuals. At that point the estimated coefficients became negative. We conclude 
cointegration at the 5 percent level and symmetry. 
**: Tests reveal that residuals for the TAR model are not white noise. After augmenting to 6 lags we 
obtained white noise residuals. At that point the estimated coefficients became negative. We conclude 
cointegration at the 5 percent level and symmetry. 
 
 In the case of the M-TAR model, the threshold is also more than zero, indicating 
that farmers make adjustments in prices when the deviations from long-term equilibrium 
are above the long-term ‘momentum’. Moreover, the absolute value of the coefficient 
estimate of 2 is larger than that of 1 , suggesting faster convergence in response to 
negative deviations from equilibrium. Therefore, the wholesale-to-farm price 
transmission in Turkey is asymmetric, and adjustments are stronger when the previous 
period deviation is negative. That is, when actual farm-gate prices are lower than the 
long-term equilibrium prices, a more rapid adjustment back toward the equilibrium price 
occurs. Nevertheless, evidence is weaker when farm-gate price is the dependent variable. 
4.6 Incorporating Error Correction Model to Asymmetric Price Transmission Tests 
 
Enders and Siklos (2001) point out that Engle-Granger and Johansen 
cointegration tests and all of their variants are misspecified in the presence of asymmetry. 
Instead they proposed TAR and M-TAR tests. However, the TAR and M-TAR tests 
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entail the estimation of one more coefficient79 (in the case where threshold is not equal to 
zero, threshold should be estimated too) which leads to loss of power (especially for the 
TAR model) vis-à-vis Engle Granger methodology.  
Due to the potential loss of power in TAR and M-TAR tests, in this section we 
estimate the APT model described in section 4.3.2 which is based on the Engle-Granger 
cointegration test. In the presence of non-stationary variables, Meyer and v. Cramon-
Taubadel (2004) suggests the following testing strategy (p. 596): 
1) First estimate the long-term relationship and store the residuals (Equation 4.7a).  
2)  Because the Johansen trace tests indicate that the three random variables are 
cointegrated when UHT milk real price is the dependent variable, the long-run 
relationship is not a spurious regression and we can estimate the following error 
correction model (ECM):  
   
8 8
1 1 2 1 1 1
1 1
out
t t t j j t j t t t
j j
uht farm prod ECT ECT             
 
            (4.11) 
where outtuht  is the inflation-adjusted wholesale UHT milk price,  1t jfarm    is the 
inflation-adjusted farm-gate milk price, 1t jprod    is the labor productivity index, and  
1tECT

  and 1tECT

  are positive and negative error terms from the long term 
relationship. This specification is slightly different than earlier error correction 
models in the literature, including the Engle and Granger (1987) representation, and is 
also different from Equation 4.4 where lagged dependent variables are also included 
on the right-hand side. In the following analysis, we estimate symmetric and 
                                               
79 In the second step of the Engle-Granger test only the coefficient of previous period 
error is estimated for the cointegration test. In the asymmetric specification the 
coefficients for both the positive and negative previous period errors should be estimated. 
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asymmetric ECMs both when lagged dependent variables are absent and when they 
are included on the right-hand side. 
The crucial difference of the APT model with an ordinary ECM is that ECT is 
split between positive and negative errors in the APT model. To test the asymmetric price 
transmission an F-test can be used to test the null hypothesis of symmetry; i.e.,    . 
In the above version it is possible only to test for the speed of adjustment. This is because 
by assuming a cointegrating relationship in the long-run (Equation 4.7a), we implicitly 
assume that the magnitude of the difference between inflation-adjusted UHT milk price 
and farm-gate milk price is constant when controlling for labor productivity 
improvements and structural breaks. We have already performed the TAR and M-TAR 
tests that relax the assumption of symmetric adjustment to the long-run equilibrium so in 
the APT test we focus on short-run price adjustments. 
Table 4.8 presents the long-term relationship where we obtain the error correction 
terms to include in the error correction models. The ADF tests show that the differenced 
error correction terms are stationary. Hence OLS is an efficient estimation strategy. In the 
symmetric case, lagged values of the error correction term are included. In the 
asymmetric case, we first split the positive and negative ECT and then include them into 
the asymmetric ECM.  
 
Table 4.8: Long-term relationship for inflation-adjusted UHT milk price 
Dependent: uht milk L-T relationship 
time trend        (0.00795) *** 
Farm-gate         0.40710  ** 
Productivity index         0.00005   
str. break DV (1997 M10)         0.46588  *** 
Constant         5.19804  *** 
Adj. R-Sq 0.7023  
***: 1%; **: 5%; *: 10% 
 116 
 Table 4.9 shows that the coefficient estimate of contemporary change in farm-gate 
milk price (Dfarm) is significant in all alternative specifications. We chose the lag length 
as eight following the results of cointegration tests. Heteroscedasticity is consistently 
detected in every specification. The t-statistics in Table 4.9 are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity. We fail to reject the null hypothesis for no autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (ARCH) effects and for no serial autocorrelation. Furthermore, the 
residuals are non-normal. For the first column, 1 Turkish Lira (TL) increase in farm-gate 
milk price will lead to a 0.619 TL increase in UHT milk price within a month. The 
coefficients of the productivity index are insignificant in every specification. The error 
correction terms have the expected negative sign in every specification. However, the 
error correction term is significant at 10 percent only in the first column. Both in column 
two and four, the coefficient estimates for ECT- are larger than ECT+. In other words 
when the margin is squeezed, the milk processing firms react quicker. However, the error 
correction terms in asymmetric specifications are insignificant and are not statistically 
different from each other. Finally, if the coefficients of ECT and of all of the lagged and 
differenced farm-gate prices are zero then we conclude that changes in farm-gate prices 
do not Granger-cause changes in UHT milk price (Enders, 2004: 338). Given the non-
zero coefficients for the sixth lag (and the third lag in the Engle-Granger specification), 
we can claim that farm-gate prices Granger cause UHT prices. 
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Table 4.9: Error correction models with alternative specifications for UHT 
Meyer v. Cramon-Taubadel 
specification Engle-Granger specification Dependent: 
uht Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric 
Constant (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.007)  
Dfarm 0.619 * 0.613 * 0.744 ** 0.740 ** 
Dprod (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
ect(-1) (0.100) *   (0.064)    
ect_p(-1)   (0.081)    (0.046)  
ect_n(-1)   (0.126)    (0.095)  
Dfarm         
L1. 0.219  0.224  0.207  0.211  
L2. 0.056  0.051  (0.087)  (0.094)  
L3. (0.306)  (0.303)  (0.434) * (0.434) * 
L4. 0.013  0.023  0.060  0.066  
L5. (0.178)  (0.169)  (0.005)  0.001  
L6. (0.541) ** (0.539) ** (0.401) * (0.402) * 
L7. (0.164)  (0.163)  (0.179)  (0.177)  
L8. (0.091)  (0.098)  (0.063)  (0.067)  
Dprod         
L1. 0.000  0.000  0.002  0.002  
L2. 0.002  0.002  (0.000)  (0.000)  
L3. (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  
L4. (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
L5. 0.007  0.007  0.005  0.005  
L6. (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
L7. (0.000)  (0.000)  0.001  0.001  
L8. 0.001  0.001  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Duht         
L1.     (0.044)  (0.045)  
L2.     0.028  0.032  
L3.     0.086  0.091  
L4.     (0.035)  (0.030)  
L5.     0.009  0.013  
L6.     (0.295) *** (0.292) *** 
L7.     0.028  0.030  
L8.     0.037  0.038  
Adj. R-Sq 0.1307  0.1245  0.1675  0.1613  
B-P hett: 23.03 *** 23.92 ***          19.42  ***           20.00  *** 
B-G LM 0.085 ~ χ(1) 0.135 ~ χ(1)  2.073 ~ χ(1)  2.89 ~ χ(1) * 
ARCH(LM) 0.281 ~ χ(1) 0.395 ~ χ(1)  0.003 ~ χ(1)  0.00 ~ χ(1)  
D-W d-stat 2.0198  2.03  1.999  2.002  
Durbin's 
alternative 0.073 ~ χ(1) 0.115 ~ χ(1)  1.688 ~ χ(1)  2.347 ~ χ(1)  
Normality of 
residuals 15.48 *** 14.72 *** 13.33 *** 12.57 *** 
***: 1%; **: 5%; *: 10%   FTR symmetry   FTR symmetry 
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To sum up, when we consider only the short run (i.e. speed of adjustment), we fail 
to detect any statistically significant asymmetry in price transmission. Combining the 
findings of this section and the previous section where dairy firms were quick to lower 
their prices, we can conclude that in the process of price transmission from farm-gate to 
wholesale there is not an immediate concern for policy makers. TAR and M-TAR tests 
indicate that, if anything, the dairy firms are quicker to pass on the price concessions they 
extracted from farmers to retailers. And this section indicates that speed of adjustment is 
symmetric. 
4.7 Concluding Remarks 
Time series variables are beset by non-stationarity. In Section 4.4, we test for the 
presence of a unit root in inflation-adjusted farm-gate milk prices, UHT milk prices, and 
the labor productivity index. In Section 4.5 we test whether these three variables are 
cointegrated. We find evidence for a structural break during October 1997 for the UHT 
milk price and labor productivity index and another one during December 2000 for farm-
gate milk price. Even after accounting for these structural breaks, we find evidence for a 
unit root in most specifications and conclude that these variables are non-stationary. 
Next, we test for cointegration employing the Johansen trace tests and initially conclude 
that inflation-adjusted farm-gate and UHT milk prices are not cointegrated; i.e., the 
detected relationship between the two is spurious. In the next step, we add the labor 
productivity index to inflation-adjusted milk prices and, using the Johansen trace test, 
conclude that these three variables are indeed cointegrated. However, we suspect an 
asymmetric price transmission and the Johansen trace test is known to perform poorly in 
the presence of asymmetry. Hence, we apply TAR and M-TAR procedures to test for 
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cointegration in the case of asymmetry. When the dependent variable is the inflation-
adjusted UHT milk price, we find strong evidence for cointegration both with TAR and 
M-TAR tests.  
A cointegrated model assumes a stable long-run relationship by definition. In the 
case of cointegrated APT, a stable long-run relationship means that we can only test for 
the speed of APT and not the magnitude of APT. When the dependent variable is the 
UHT milk price, we detect asymmetric price transmission in the M-TAR (the more 
powerful test), but not in the TAR. Interestingly, the asymmetry suggested by M-TAR is 
the opposite of what the literature would have predicted. The estimated threshold is 
greater than zero, suggesting that UHT milk producers adjust their prices quicker when 
the difference is above the long-run equilibrium (i.e., when the gross profit margin is 
stretched). In the M-TAR procedure we test whether agents adjust their behavior 
according to the trend of deviations instead of adjusting their behavior according to 
deviations. We find that the absolute value of the 1 (coefficient of deviations that are 
above the threshold) is larger than 2 , meaning that speed of adjustment is faster when 
the deviations are above the long-run relationship. Despite the fact that we find evidence 
for asymmetry for a cointegrated relationship among the three variables in Section 4.5.2, 
we still construct the ECM for APT in Section 4.6 because of loss of power of TAR and 
M-TAR due to estimating one more coefficient. In the ECM, we again find some 
evidence for asymmetry but this evidence is not statistically significant.  
As explained in Section 4.3, the APT model does not prove the exercise of 
monopoly power; it just detects the existence (or absence) of asymmetry. Three possible 
explanations for asymmetry are proposed: oligopolies exerting their muscle to capture 
 120 
some of consumer surplus; the menu-costs argument; and McCorriston et al.’s (2001) 
argument that oligopolies can enjoy both super-profits and can provide lower prices for 
downstream consumers because they enjoy increasing returns to scale. In Section 4.8, we 
have some evidence (yet statistically insignificant) that UHT milk processors react 
quicker if the gross margin is squeezed. However, the evidence (statistically significant) 
from Section 4.7 points to the opposite direction. The TAR test points symmetry, And the 
M-TAR test signals asymmetry but a quicker reaction from UHT milk processors when 
the gross margin is extended. All in all, the weight of evidence discredits the first two 
explanations: we do not detect positive APT which would point to oligopolies abusing 
their market power. On the other hand, we find some evidence (in the M-TAR test) that 
oligopolies are passing cost reductions to retailers quicker than the cost increases. The 
combined evidence from the M-TAR test for the UHT milk price and the auxiliary 
evidence of short- and long-run economies of scale80 support the McCorriston et al. 
framework. We conclude, therefore, that for UHT milk in Turkey, there is both evidence 
of increasing returns to scale and evidence that price reductions are passed to retailers 
quicker than price increases. 
                                               
80 Table 3.2 shows that between 1994 and 2003 the share of packed fluid milk in total 
consumption has increased from 7 to 18 percent implying that UHT milk processors are 
gaining market share from open milk. Table 3.3 shows that there is ample capacity to 
increase the production of UHT and pasteurized milk in the short run. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In Chapter 2 we studied food consumption in conjunction with food self-
provisioning. We used the budget share of self-provisioning as a proxy to account for the 
productive capacity of these rural households and show that self-provisioning rural 
households consume a statistically significantly different food basket than other rural 
households and urban households. The difference is most pronounced for the dairy and 
egg, vegetables, and cereals food groups. We explain this difference by the different 
prices faced by self-provisioning rural households. Unlike other rural and urban 
households, the self-provisioning rural households are not pure price takers. They base 
their decision on how much to consume on the shadow prices resulting from being a site 
of both consumption and production.  
When retail and shadow prices differ substantially, rural households that have 
access to productive factors choose to supply certain food items for themselves. The retail 
and shadow prices can differ substantially because of incomplete labor and credit markets 
or excessive margins in marketing chains. A potential consequence of incomplete 
markets is that participants will be less responsive to signals transmitted through markets. 
When we explicitly include productive factors into consumption function some of the 
consequences of incomplete markets are captured as lower elasticities. We compare the 
food expenditure and own-price elasticities obtained first from the AIDS model implicitly 
assuming that everybody is a price taker, and second from a model that explicitly 
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incorporates some of the productive factors to estimate elasticities. We show that the 
standard AIDS model ignoring food self-provisioning overestimates both the food 
expenditure and own-price elasticities, especially for dairy and egg food group. From a 
policy perspective, the overestimation of elasticities means that reforms that are expected 
to work through the markets will be less effective than predicted. For example, a 
reduction in the price of dairy products that can result from integrating Turkish and EU 
dairy markets under a customs union may increase the consumption of urban and other 
rural households who rely on retail markets. However, the consequence of a retail price 
decline for dairy products is not clear for self-provisioning rural households. If the self-
provisioning rural households are not only self-sufficient in dairy products but also net 
sellers, the decline in price level will also result in lower income and hence will affect 
total consumption through the income effect. Moreover, if the chief reason for self-
provisioning is lack of cash income, then a reduction in retail price may not increase the 
level of consumption in such households.  
In Chapter 3, we build on the findings of Chapter 2 and recalculate the poverty 
lines for rural Turkey. In order to calculate food consumption, SIS researchers impute the 
regional wholesale price to self-provisioned food items. But the shadow price that 
determines the amount of self-provisioned food is theoretically higher than wholesale 
price. Households preferring to consume these food items in-kind rather than sell them at 
wholesale price leads to a significantly different food basket. This is evidence that they 
value these items higher than wholesale price. Also, at the margin cash income should be 
preferred to in-kind income because of money preference. This being said, accounting for 
in-kind income is difficult. Imputing retail prices is theoretically wrong too, because the 
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shadow price is lower than the retail price. Moreover, self-provisioning is not uniformly 
distributed among regions and products but rather concentrated in certain products and 
more common in some regions. Practically speaking this means that there aren’t many 
observations for retail prices where the self-provisioning is most prevalent. On the other 
hand, calculating shadow prices with regression techniques would require not only 
detailed data on consumption (which we have in SIS 2003) but also on productive factors 
and allocation of these factors between various activities in a mixed farm setting (which 
we do not have).  
Once the self-provisioned food is priced at wholesale prices it raises the 
possibility that the true expenditure level of these households is undervalued. The 
undervaluation of expenditures can lead to overstatement of poverty measures and can be 
consequential to the identification of poor. Furthermore, due to the methodology of 
poverty line construction, the poverty among other rural households can be 
underestimated: if we do not differentiate between self-provisioning and other rural 
households, the representative food basket will be priced by the weighted average of 
retail and self-provisioned (i.e., wholesale) prices. In other words, other rural households 
will be assumed to have access to some food items at wholesale prices when they actually 
do not. Since the poverty line is undervalued for these households, the corresponding 
poverty measures are underestimated.  
With these concerns in mind, we first lump all rural households together, calculate 
the poverty line as is conventionally done, and calculate the corresponding poverty 
measures separately for self-provisioning and other rural households. We find that the 
level, depth and intensity of poverty are statistically significantly higher for self-
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provisioning rural households compared to other rural households. Then, in order to 
determine the level of under and overestimation of poverty measures, we calculate 
separate poverty lines for self-provisioning and other rural households. When pricing the 
food basket for other rural households we consider only the prices paid by these 
households which are exclusively retail prices. Likewise, when pricing the food basket 
for self-provisioning rural households we consider the prices paid by those households 
which in effect are a weighted average of imputed wholesale prices and retail prices. In 
the end when we recalculate the poverty measures for rural households we find that initial 
poverty measures were indeed overestimated for self-provisioning rural households and 
underestimated for other rural households.  
We first perform this study with the basic needs poverty line approach where the 
reference group which we use to determine the items in the food basket is second quintile 
households. SIS has been using this methodology since 2002. Before 2002, SIS has been 
calculating the poverty line starting from a pre-conceived food basket (also called the 
non-welfare approach). The previous methodology is criticized because the food basket is 
roughly equivalent to 3000 calories per day per capita and uncharacteristically rich in 
animal proteins for Turkey. Nevertheless, we repeat the same exercise using the 
preconceived food basket and reach similar results: poverty measures are overestimated 
for self-provisioning rural households and underestimated for other rural households 
when the self-provisioning issue ignored. Actually, the over- and underestimation is even 
more stark in the non-welfare approach, because the preconceived food basket is rich in 
animal calories where self-provisioning rural households have a distinct advantage, and 
because the non-welfare approach ignores the non-food basic needs. 
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In the second part of Chapter 3, we study vulnerability to income poverty and 
undernutrition. The study of vulnerability to poverty has garnered increased attention in 
recent years because first many households who currently are non-poor live with the 
constant fear and insecurity that any misfortune (be it an individual tragedy such as 
illness or death to household members or a macro shock affecting all region or the 
country) can tip them below the poverty line, and this insecurity is detrimental to one’s 
well being. Moreover, it is increasingly recognized that because of vulnerability many 
households change their behavior in order to reduce their exposure to risky events. In 
some instances the low-risk, low-return activities can reduce overall income and leave the 
household poorer. In other words, insurance has a cost. We use the basic needs poverty 
lines (calculated separately for self-provisioning and other rural households) as a 
benchmark for vulnerability to income poverty, and the non-welfare poverty lines as a 
benchmark for vulnerability to undernutrition. We show that 20 to 25 percent of both the 
self-provisioning and other rural households are highly vulnerable to income poverty, but 
when we consider the vulnerability to undernutrition the situation is different: overall 29 
percent of self-provisioning rural households are highly vulnerable to undernutrition 
versus 56 percent of other rural households. The share of urban households who are 
highly vulnerable to undernutrition also is higher than self-provisioning rural households 
(49 percent).  
These empirical findings from Turkey support the predictions of the literature on 
vulnerability. Rural households who have access to required productive factors can 
choose to self-provision in order to reduce their exposure to market price risk. These 
findings are also in line with our initial claim that rural areas in Turkey are still beset by 
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incomplete markets. The volatility in the prices of agricultural goods, the high markups 
between wholesale and retail prices, and limited access to credit all force the majority of 
rural households to consider alternative strategies to ensure a steady supply of food even 
if it means eschewing specialization and integration into markets which result in lower 
overall income in the long-run. 
In Chapter 4, we turn our attention to the fluid milk marketing chain. This topic is 
hotly debated not only in academia but also in Turkey’s popular press and dairy industry 
circles. The raw milk price in Turkey is lower than the EU average, while some dairy 
product prices are significantly higher than EU levels (Grethe, 2005). On the one hand, 
the dairy farmers and the consumers at each end of the marketing chain suspect that the 
dairy processors and retailers are cornering the market by forming cartels and acting as 
oligopsonies especially while procuring milk.  On the other hand, milk processing firms 
complain that milk output in Turkey is low quality and because of the dispersion of 
farmers their collection costs account for 15 – 20 percent of the total cost (as opposed to 
3 - 6 percent in EU; FAO, 2007: 57). Moreover, they complain that they cannot find a 
sufficient quantity of suitable milk. In order to sort out these competing claims, we focus 
on the interaction between farm-gate milk and wholesale UHT fluid milk prices. Visual 
inspection of inflation adjusted farm-gate and wholesale UHT milk prices reveals that 
farm-gate prices are fluctuating around a mean whereas UHT milk prices show a 
persistent long-term decline starting late in 1997. Formal cointegration analysis confirms 
the visual inspection and we conclude that these two variables are not cointegrated, 
contrary to what we might expect based on the literature on developed countries’ dairy 
sectors.  
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We observe that there were major entries to Turkey’s diary processing sector 
during the study period, and we have auxiliary evidence that formal sector enterprises are 
gradually gaining market share from an informal sector (The growing size of the formal 
market distinguishes the Turkish dairy sector from its U.S. and European counterparts). 
We suspect that the growing market size for the formal sector and new investments can 
herald increasing returns to scale in the dairy processing, and that this can explain the 
long-run decline in UHT milk prices. We use the sector’s labor productivity index as a 
proxy measure to account for increasing returns to scale. We find that the start of the 
long-run decline in inflation-adjusted UHT wholesale prices coincides with the start of a 
long-run increase in labor productivity. Furthermore, when we conduct formal 
cointegration tests, we show that the inflation adjusted farm-gate price, wholesale fluid 
milk price, and labor productivity index are cointegrated in the long-run.  
Next we investigate whether dairy processing firms exercise their oligopoly 
powers to manipulate milk prices to their benefit. Dairy processors can intervene to 
manipulate the speed or the magnitude of price adjustments (or both) to benefit 
themselves. Manipulating speed of adjustment happens when dairy processing firms 
delay passing reductions in farm-gate milk prices to their customers, while more 
immediately reflecting increases in farm-gate milk prices. Similarly, processing firms can 
pass only a portion of the decline in farm-gate prices to their customers while reflecting 
the full cost of price increases. A combination of both strategies is also possible. We 
employ TAR and M-TAR models to study whether manipulation by dairy processors in 
the form of asymmetric price transmission is taking place as suspected by farmers and 
consumer groups. We find evidence of asymmetry, but its direction is contrary to our 
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initial expectations. The dairy processing firms are quicker to pass price reductions in 
farm-gate prices to their customers than price increases. We repeat the analysis with the 
APT model, and find no evidence of asymmetry in price transmission from farm-gate to 
wholesale milk prices. The weight of the empirical evidence thus does not support the 
initial claim by farmer and consumer groups. Even if the level of dairy product prices in 
Turkey is higher than the EU levels, the long-term trend in the price of these products 
processed by major firms is toward narrowing margins. We conclude that the increasing 
returns to scale and the associated productivity gains enjoyed by these firms allow them 
to increase their market share collectively against the informal sector and still possibly 
enjoy hefty profit margins.   
Finally, an interesting aspect of Chapter 4 is to shed light on the limits of market 
forces in carrying the agricultural transformation forward. Despite a dynamic processing 
sector, the supply response from the dairy farmers has been disappointing both for 
policymakers and for processing firms themselves. The biggest complaint of these firms 
is that it is hard to find good quality milk at desirable quantities and prices. As noted 
before, two-thirds of the raw milk is either processed by households or by informal 
enterprises. Moreover, the dairy farmers who are the suppliers of big dairy firms are not 
increasing their output rapidly enough to meet the demands of the formal sector. The 
larger dairy farmers in Turkey are generally members of marketing cooperatives, and the 
prices concerning them are set in quarterly local auctions. There is no national-level price 
making authority for raw-milk in Turkey, so each local cooperative faces regional cartel-
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like buyers in auctions (Güngör, 2006). The level and volatility of milk prices81 formed at 
these auctions apparently does not instill enough confidence in dairy farmers to invest in 
expensive machinery and to enlarge their herds in order to meet the demand of dairy 
processors. Hence even if we do not unearth any immediate concern for public policy 
while investigating interaction of farm-gate and wholesale prices for fluid milk, there 
might be hidden costs for social welfare in the form of what might be termed as “missing 
milk”.  
On the one hand, Chapters 2 and 3 show that “modernization” strategies are 
misguided in seeking to shift Turkey’s dairy sector towards less self-provisioning and 
more production for the market because self-provisioning plays an important role 
reducing vulnerability to undernutrition. On the other hand, Chapter 4 suggests that 
formal dairy processing sector is efficient but its growth is hindered by lack of supply. 
We believe that the most appropriate policies should try to sustain the advantages of 
small farms (e.g. self-provisioning) while at the same time allowing for the growth of the 
formal dairy industry. When profit-maximizing dairy firms try to obtain lowest farm-gate 
prices in the short-run, this risks undermining the long-run supply of milk. This suggests 
that, at the minimum, there is room for public policy to ensure that farm-gate prices will 
be less volatile and high enough to stimulate increased marketed output of adequate 
quality milk. Previously, prior to its privatization, SEK played this role with its 
procurement prices. Similarly, in many developed countries, the farm-gate prices are set 
by dairy boards which try to balance the interests of all parties. The dairy board in Turkey 
can generate a positive externality by reducing the uncertainty for dairy farmers and 
                                               
81 We show that farm-gate milk prices follow a random walk without much discernable 
trend. 
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stimulating investment in dairy farms. At the same time, extension services targeted to 
the small-scale producers (e.g. by improving physical infrastructure and skills of small-
scale farmers) can further increase the marketed output without hampering the self-
provisioning that makes an important contribution to the nutritional well-being of 
Turkey’s rural population. 
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APPENDIX 1 
CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX 
 
Table A1.1: Summary Statistics for variables used in LA/AIDS model 
Variable 
Mean Stan. 
dev. 
associated 
parameter 
Bread price (TL/kg) 1.32 0.47 γij 
Cereal price (TL/kg) 1.55 1.24  
Meat price (TL/kg) 6.25 4.46  
Vegetable oil price (TL/kg) 2.66 0.73  
Vegetable price (TL/kg) 1.15 0.41  
Fruit price (TL/kg) 1.38 0.87  
Dairy and egg price (TL/kg) 1.73 0.99  
Sugar, jam and confectionery price (TL/kg) 3.39 2.41  
Tea and coffee price (TL/kg) 7.16 4.32  
Non-alcoholic beverage price (TL/kg) 1.44 0.55  
Other food price (TL/kg) 2.40 2.77  
Food expenditure of household (TL/month) 211.63 126.63 βi 
Total monthly spending (TL/month)a 741.31 665.70  
Number of members in the household 4.18 2.04 λi1 
1 if there is children <14 years of age 0.59 0.49 λi2 
1 if the head of the household is male and otherwise 0.90 0.29 λi3 
1 if the head of the household is married and otherwise 0.89 0.31 λi4 
1 if the head of hh is illiterate, literate without diploma  
or finished elementary school and 0 otherwise b 0.63 0.48  
1 if the head of hh finished secondary or high school and 0 
otherwise 0.27 0.45 λi52 
1 if the head of hh has university degree and 0 otherwise 0.09 0.29 λi53 
1 if the head of household is <29 years old and 0 otherwise b 0.08 0.28  
1 if the age of the head of household is between 30 and 39 and 0 
otherwise 0.26 0.44 λi62 
1 if the age of the head of household is between 40 and 49 and 0 
otherwise 0.27 0.44 λi63 
1 if the age of the head of household is <50 and 0 otherwise 0.39 0.49 λi64 
1 if the housewife has employed in full-time job and 0 otherwise 0.20 0.40 λi7 
1 if the household is located in an urban area and 0 otherwise 0.71 0.45 λi8 
1 for the lowest income group and 0 otherwise b 0.20 0.40  
1 for the lowest-to-middle income group and 0 otherwise 0.20 0.40 λi92 
1 for the middle income group and 0 otherwise 0.20 0.40 λi93 
1 for the middle-to-highest income group and 0 otherwise 0.20 0.40 λi94 
1 for highest income group and 0 otherwise 0.20 0.40 λi95 
1 if survey done in the first quarter of the year and 0 otherwise b 0.25 0.43  
1 if survey done in the second quarter of the year and 0 
otherwise 0.25 0.43 λi102 
1 if survey done in the third quarter of the year and 0 otherwise 0.25 0.43 λi103 
1 if survey done in the fourth quarter of the year and 0 otherwise 0.25 0.43 λi104 
continued 
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Table A1.1, continued 
Variable 
Mean Stan. 
dev. 
associated 
parameter 
1 if household lives in Marmara region and 0 otherwise 0.14 0.35 λi112 
1 if household lives in Aegean or West Anatolia region and 0 
otherwise 0.25 0.44 λi113 
1 if household lives in the Mediterranean region and 0 otherwise 0.13 0.34 λi114 
1 if household lives in Central Anatolia region and 0 otherwise 0.07 0.25 λi115 
1 if household lives in the Black Sea region and 0 otherwise 0.14 0.35 λi116 
1 if household lives in northeastern or central eastern Anatolia 
and 0 otherwise 0.06 0.25 λi117 
1 if household lives in southeastern Anatolia region and 0 
otherwise b 0.09 0.28  
PDF for each food group   δi 
Share of self-provisioning (calculated in terms of monetary 
value) 0.05 0.15 ρi 
a: Only included in the first step probit model; b: The dummy variable omitted in the estimation. 
 
Table A1.2: Summary Statistics for the Production Variables 
 all sample Urban rural 
 
# of 
obs. Mean 
St. 
Dev 
# of 
obs. Mean 
St. 
Dev 
# of 
obs. Mean 
St. 
Dev 
F. farm labor 
(hour/week) 4,044 59 49 441 46 34 3,603 60 50 
M. farm labor 
(hour/week) 4,285 63 47 474 49 36 3,811 64 48 
Field (TL) 5,757 31,231 75,407 1,207 32,395 84,042 4,550 30,922 72,952 
Health insurance 25,747 46.5% 50% 18,267 52.3% 50% 7,480 32.2% 47% 
Average grazing 25,747 61 52 18,267 61 52 7,480 61 54 
Poor share 25,747 9.77% 1% 18,267 9.69% 1% 7,480 9.95% 1% 
 
Table A1.3 present the results for likelihood ratio tests. The null hypothesis is 
whether the alternative models - one with and other without the self-provisioning 
variables – are statistically significantly different from each other. The first two rows are 
the test the significance of imposing demand theory restrictions (Equation 2.9). We 
conclude that these restrictions are statistically significant. The rest of the table presents 
test results for the nonseparation assumption. All the specifications have the same result: 
likelihood ratio test statistics reject the separation assumption. Inclusion of self-
provisioning variables statistically significantly changes the demand system for SIS 2003 
sample.  
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Table A1.3: Likelihood Ratio Tests for Separability Test 
Likelihood Ratio Test  Sample D.F. LOGL Chi2  
Critical 
value 
(0.05) 
Prob 
>Chi2 
Demand system without constraints all  501,802    
Demand system with constraints & w/o 
self-provisioning all 94 489,453 24,698.0 117.63 0.00 
Self-provisioning budget share included all 11 491,585 4,265.5 19.68 0.00 
Demand system without self-provisioning urban  361,814 -   
Self-provisioning budget share included urban 11 362,037 446.7 19.68 0.00 
Demand system without self-provisioning rural  137,567 -   
Self-provisioning budget share included rural 11 138,405 1,675.9 19.68 0.00 
Demand system with constraints & w/o 
self-provisioning all  489,453 -   
Self-provisioning alternative# all 11 490,888 2,870.4 19.68 0.00 
Self-provisioning predicted variable* all 11 490,790 2,674.4 19.68 0.00 
*: We used food budget share of corresponding food groups instead of overall average, please see Table 3 
for food groups with non-zero self-provisioning. #: We constructed an alternative budget share of self-
provision variable by combining rows 2, 3 and 4 from Table 1. ^: The R-Square of the first stage is 0.48. 
The result of the first stage is available upon request. 
 
 
In the model including the self-provisioning budget share, 385 coefficients are 
estimated. Of these 275 of those relate to demographic variables (Please refer to Table 
A4). Also, 193 of the demographic coefficients are significant (70 percent) at the 5 
percent significance level or less. All of the coefficients for the urban dummy are 
statistically significant except for fruit budget share. Likewise, all of the coefficients for 
5th quintile dummy are significant except for the sugar budget share. Moreover, when we 
consider the income quintile dummies for food groups, almost all of them have the same 
sign (even when statistically insignificant). For example, all of the coefficients for 
quintile dummies are negative for bread (1st quintile is omitted) and positive for meat 
products. A similar situation is mostly true for education and age dummies: when they 
are significant, they generally have the same signs. For example, as the educational 
attainment of household head increases the budget share of meat products, fruits, non-
alcoholic beverages and other food products also increases. All regional dummies for 
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cereal and tea and coffee food groups are significant and negative relative to the omitted 
region (which is the southeast, the poorest region). 
 
Quality: 
 Drichoutis, et al., (2008) point out that like many other household surveys, the 
SIS 2003 actually does not include price information and Akbay et al., (2007) calculate 
the price by dividing expenditures by quantity purchased. However, such a calculated 
unit price may reflect not only differences in prices but also the differences in quality of 
the commodity. If the quality effects depend on household characteristics (for example, 
wealthier households may prefer higher quality products) then some of the regressors 
may covary. They suggest an instrumental variables approach to adjust for quality 
differences. In their response to the commentary, Akbay et al., (2008) pose the question: 
“What is the good corresponding to that price after quality adjustment?” (p. 101). They 
also point out that existing instrumental variable approaches (using household income 
and demographics as instruments) are ad hoc, and may cause identification problems in 
the second stage. They end up using calculated unit prices. 
 As the discussion in the introduction suggests, there is more to price differences 
than quality, i.e., self-provisioning. Whatever the initial reason, incomplete markets 
reflect themselves as a significant discrepancy between the cost of self-provisioning for 
the household and the alternative retail price. The next section discusses self-provisioning 
for the SIS 2003 survey in detail, and it will be clear to the reader that using this data set 
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for quality adjustment without properly accounting for self-provisioning82 will lead to the 
erroneous conclusion that urban consumers consume higher quality produce since they 
pay higher prices. Hence, we do not adjust for the quality and calculated prices as they 
did. 
                                               
82 Naturally, only quantity information is available for self-provisioned home produce. In 
order to convert quantity to monetary spending, the prices are imputed by SIS. It turns 
out that the imputed prices are roughly 70 percent of corresponding rural retail prices.  
 Table A1.4: Estimated demand parameters of LA/AIDS model including self-provisioning variable 
Variables Bread Cereal Meat Veg. Oils Vegetables Fruit Dairy& Egg Sugar Tea& Coff. Beverage Other food 
Constant 0.3004*** 0.1226*** -0.3586*** 0.0186*** 0.2722*** 0.1612*** 0.2553*** 0.0530*** 0.1184*** 0.0276*** 0.0294*** 
Bread price 0.0143***           
Cereal price 0.0065*** 0.0183***          
Meat price -0.0093*** -0.0055*** 0.0520***         
Vegetable oil price 0.0054*** -0.0026*** -0.0060*** 0.0053***        
Vegetable price -0.0025** -0.0049*** -0.0099*** 0.0089*** 0.0344***       
Fruit price -0.0054*** -0.001 -0.0058*** -0.0002 -0.0116*** 0.0173***      
Dairy & egg price -0.0032*** -0.0061*** -0.0081*** -0.0028*** -0.0064*** -0.0024*** 0.0345***     
Sugar price -0.0052*** -0.0040*** -0.0034*** -0.0061*** -0.0071*** 0.0050*** -0.0050*** 0.0249***    
Tea & coffee price 0.0016*** -0.0008* -0.0012** -0.0005 0.0027*** -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0055*** 0.0039***   
beverage price -0.0026*** 0.0015*** -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0029*** 0.0032*** 0.0001 0.0053*** 0.0007** -0.0035***  
Other food  0.0003 -0.0014*** -0.0026*** -0.0009*** -0.0006* 0.0016*** -0.0001 0.0011*** 0.0003 -0.0011*** 0.0035*** 
Food expenditure -0.0542*** 0.0085*** 0.1145*** 0.0114*** -0.0211*** -0.0172*** -0.0286*** 0.0067*** -0.0093*** -0.0090*** -0.0017*** 
Hh size 0.0075*** 0.0048*** -0.0124*** 0.0004 0.0019*** -0.0026*** -0.0008*** 0.0030*** 0 -0.0016*** -0.0003** 
Child dummy 0.0089*** -0.0046*** -0.0042** -0.0025** -0.0080*** -0.0021** 0.0131*** 0.0018 -0.0023*** 0 0 
Male head 0.0197*** -0.0069** 0.0005 -0.0046** -0.0036 0.0028 -0.0060*** -0.0073*** 0.0032** 0.0029** -0.0006 
Married 0.0057* 0 -0.0094*** 0.0034 0.0046** 0.0026 0.0009 0.0039* -0.0063*** -0.0052*** -0.0002 
Education 2 -0.0096*** -0.0081*** 0.0100*** -0.0062*** 0.0001 0.0086*** 0.0060*** -0.0077*** -0.0005 0.0058*** 0.0015*** 
Education 3 -0.0339*** -0.0013 0.0158*** -0.0131*** -0.0038** 0.0234*** 0.0145*** -0.0075*** -0.0016 0.0063*** 0.0012** 
Age 2 0.0036 -0.0068*** 0.0043 0.0038** -0.0024 0.0047*** -0.0009 0.0014 -0.0005 -0.0044*** -0.0028*** 
Age 3 0.0128*** -0.0063*** -0.0005 0.0050*** 0.0040** 0.0067*** -0.0070*** -0.0037** -0.0006 -0.0076*** -0.0027*** 
Age 4 -0.0031 -0.0064*** 0.0019 0.0084*** 0.0047*** 0.0095*** 0.0047** -0.0036** -0.0019* -0.0110*** -0.0032*** 
Wife employed -0.0125*** 0.0104*** -0.0032 0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0051*** 0.0008 0.0087*** 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0003 
Urban 0.0386*** -0.0305*** 0.0103*** -0.0074*** -0.0102*** -0.0019* 0.0180*** -0.0165*** -0.0053*** 0.0061*** -0.0013*** 
Quintile 2 -0.0029 -0.0085*** 0.0007 0.0032** -0.0183*** 0.0041*** 0.0035** 0.0021 -0.0057*** 0.0182*** 0.0037*** 
Quintile 3 -0.0084*** -0.0189*** 0.0027 0.001 -0.0178*** 0.0130*** 0.0085*** 0.0031* -0.0092*** 0.0230*** 0.0030*** 
Quintile 4 -0.0167*** -0.0228*** 0.0138*** -0.002 -0.0177*** 0.0164*** 0.0121*** -0.0023 -0.0109*** 0.0276*** 0.0025** 
Quintile 5 -0.0362*** -0.0203*** 0.0232*** -0.0054*** -0.0275*** 0.0247*** 0.0123*** -0.0037* -0.0085*** 0.0379*** 0.0037*** 
Quarter 2 0.0044*** -0.0018 -0.0716*** 0.0005 0.0488*** -0.0001 0.0070*** -0.0047*** 0.001 0.0157*** 0.0007 
continued 
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 Table A1.4, continued 
Variables Bread Cereal Meat Veg. Oils Vegetables Fruit Dairy& Egg Sugar Tea& Coff. Beverage Other food 
Quarter 3 0.0030* -0.0015 -0.0697*** 0.0009 0.0646*** -0.0120*** 0.0047*** -0.0063*** 0.0012* 0.0139*** 0.0012** 
Quarter 4 0.0007 0.0038** -0.0417*** -0.0037*** 0.0369*** -0.0008 -0.0047*** 0.0014 -0.0006 0.0064*** 0.0022*** 
Istanbul  0.0593*** -0.0312*** -0.0237*** -0.0091*** -0.0005 0.0013 0.0123*** -0.0150*** -0.0133*** 0.0202*** -0.0004 
Marmara 0.0739*** -0.0352*** -0.0117*** -0.0115*** -0.0053*** 0.0042** -0.0025 -0.0078*** -0.0179*** 0.0138*** -0.0001 
Aegean & West 0.0600*** -0.0325*** -0.0156*** -0.0091*** -0.0029 0.0096*** -0.0043** -0.0075*** -0.0095*** 0.0111*** 0.0007 
Mediterranean  0.0618*** -0.0349*** -0.0195*** -0.0061*** 0.002 0.0021 -0.0061*** -0.0028 -0.0079*** 0.0105*** 0.0011 
Central Anatolia  0.0625*** -0.0450*** -0.0097** -0.0007 -0.0136*** 0.0114*** 0.0042* -0.0028 -0.0142*** 0.0046*** 0.0034*** 
Black Sea  0.0708*** -0.0260*** -0.0164*** 0.002 -0.0022 0.0024 -0.0082*** -0.0084*** -0.0140*** 0.0002 -0.0005 
NE & Central East 0.0630*** -0.0094*** 0.0124*** -0.0106*** -0.0123*** -0.0022 -0.0021 -0.0096*** -0.0163*** -0.0081*** -0.0049*** 
PDF 0.0315*** 0.0200*** 0.1065*** 0.0839*** -0.6965*** 0.009 0.3141*** 0.1208*** -0.0195*** 0.0304*** -0.0001 
Self-provisioning -0.2302*** 0.1203*** -0.0732*** -0.0595*** -0.0257*** 0.0057 0.2766*** -0.0457*** -0.0069*** -0.0090*** -0.0032* 
Observations 25,747 25,747 25,747 25,747 25,747 25,747 25,747 25,747 25,747 25,747 25,747 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table A1.5: Food Expenditure and uncompensated price elasticities for the demand system estimated including the self 
provisioning variable 
 Uncompensated own and cross price elasticities 
Food Groups Bread Cereals Meat 
Veg. 
oils Vegetables Fruits 
Dairy & 
egg Sugar 
Tea & 
Coffee Beverages 
Other 
food 
Expenditure 
Elasticities 
Bread -0.86 0.05 -0.18 0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.08 0.08 -0.03 0.03           0.67  
Cereals 0.07 -0.82 -0.10 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.06 -0.07           1.09  
Meat & meat products -0.01 -0.07 -0.76 -0.11 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.03 -0.13           1.75  
Vegetable oils 0.05 -0.03 -0.08 -0.93 0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.04           1.17  
Vegetables 0.04 -0.07 -0.19 0.10 -0.78 -0.09 -0.01 -0.10 0.11 -0.04 -0.02           0.88  
Fruits 0.00 -0.02 -0.11 -0.02 -0.06 -0.80 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.11 0.10           0.81  
Dairy products and egg 0.03 -0.08 -0.17 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 -0.74 -0.07 0.02 0.04 0.01           0.81  
Sugar, etc… -0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.03 0.07 -0.02 -0.71 -0.12 0.16 0.07           1.08  
Tea and Coffee 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.90 0.03 0.02           0.77  
Non-alcoholic beverages -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.02 -1.09 -0.06           0.76  
Other food products 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.80           0.90  
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CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX 
Table A2.1: Monthly cost of the Hacettepe Basket for four-person family 
Food Groups 
Monthly 
Quantities 
(kg) 
Urban, 
TL 
Rural, 
TL 
Self-provisioning 
rural, TL 
rural 
other, TL 
Meat, eggs, beans          
Meat, poultry, fish, edible offal 6 31.9 31.5 30.7 31.9 
Dried bean, lentil, chickpeas 5 5.4 5.4 5.2 5.6 
Eggs 80 units 10.4 10.5 10.5 10.5 
Dairy products       
Milk, yogurt 28 23.6 17.5 16.1 20.9 
Cheese 3 12.3 11.1 9.6 12.5 
Vegetables and Fruits       
Vegetables, leafy greens 12 9.7 9.1 8.8 10.2 
Potatoes 12 5.1 5.3 5.1 6.0 
Onion 4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Other vegetables 6 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 
Fresh fruit 16 12.4 12.3 11.7 12.7 
Cereals       
Bread 12 13.1 13.3 12.9 13.4 
Boiled wheat 2 2.1 2.0 0.8 2.6 
Rice 2 2.8 3.0 2.9 3.0 
Macaroni, vermicelli 2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Flour 2 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.6 
Oils and Sugar       
Edible oil 2 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.4 
Margarine and butter 2 6.4 6.3 6.4 6.4 
Olive 2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.2 
Sugar 4 7.0 7.1 7.1 7.1 
Jam, honey, syrup 2 10.6 10.0 9.6 10.0 
Tea, Spice and nuts       
Tomato paste 2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.2 
Salt 2 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.4 
Tea 0.4 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.2 
Walnut, hazelnut in shell 0.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 
Monthly Total food budget, TL  180.3 171.5 164.3 180.1 
Observed mean food budget for four 
person household, TL  226 210 213 208 
The average exchange rate for 2003 is 1.5 TL for $1 at current prices, and 0.732 TL for $1 at PPP. 
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Table A2.2: Food Poverty according to welfare method (Table 3.1 food bundle) 
 
urban-rural poverty line  
 
 
Urban, self-provisioning and 
other rural poverty lines 
  Headcount Rate(P0) 
Poverty 
Gap(P1) 
Squared 
Poverty 
Gap(P2) 
Headcount 
Rate(P0) 
Poverty 
Gap(P1) 
Squared 
Poverty 
Gap(P2) 
Urban 0.47 0.14 0.06 0.47 0.14 0.06 
Rural 0.37 0.10 0.04 0.38 0.11 0.05 
rural self-provisioning            0.36            0.10            0.04            0.30            0.08            0.03 
rural other            0.37            0.11            0.05            0.45            0.14            0.06 
Total 0.43 0.13 0.05 0.44 0.13 0.06 
 
 
Table A2.3: Vulnerability to undernutrition according to welfare method 
  all sample 
 criterion poor non-poor 
poor and 
non-poor 
moderately vulnerable 0.5 >= vh 0.16 0.44 0.60 
highly vulnerable vh > 0.5 0.28 0.13 0.40 
All groups   0.44 0.56 1.00 
  Urban 
 criterion poor non-poor 
poor and 
non-poor 
moderately vulnerable 0.5 >= vh 0.15 0.39 0.54 
highly vulnerable vh > 0.5 0.32 0.14 0.46 
Urban   0.47 0.53 1.00 
  rural self-provisioning  
 criterion poor non-poor 
poor and 
non-poor 
moderately vulnerable 0.5 >= vh 0.19 0.63 0.83 
highly vulnerable vh > 0.5 0.10 0.07 0.17 
rural self-provisioning 0.30 0.70 1.00 
  rural other 
 criterion poor non-poor 
poor and 
non-poor 
moderately vulnerable 0.5 >=  vh 0.18 0.41 0.59 
highly vulnerable vh > 0.5 0.27 0.14 0.41 
rural other   0.45 0.55 1.00 
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APPENDIX 3 
CHAPTER 4 APPPENDIX 
Table A3.1: Annual inflation rates for selected years and indices 
Year CPI Wholesale Agriculture 
1994        111.01         117.42             91.5  
1995          76.05           65.63             86.7  
1996          79.76           84.92             89.9  
1997          99.09           90.96             96.5  
1998          69.73           54.26             71.9  
1999          68.79           62.91             30.0  
2000          39.03           32.66             39.8  
2001          68.53           88.56             65.5  
2002          29.75           30.84             35.2  
2003          18.36           13.94             20.0  
2004            9.32           13.84             14.1  
2005          10.53             4.54               2.6  
2006            9.65           11.58               2.7  
 
Unit Root and Cointegration Analyses of Nominal Prices 
Here we present the unit root and cointegration analyses for log-nominal prices. 
The corollary tables for the inflation-adjusted prices are noted in parentheses. 
 
Table A3.2: Log-nominal farm-gate and UHT milk price and log-nominal labor 
productivity index (Table 4.4) 
Variable test 
structural 
break 
date 
trend  
variable lags test score conclusion 
DF  yes 0 lag -0.125 FTR Ho of unit root 
KPSS  yes 13 lags 1.8684 Reject Ho of stationarity 
log-nominal 
UHT milk 
price Structural break 1997 M10 yes 3 lags -0.5971 FTR Ho of unit root 
DF  yes 0 lag -0.6168 FTR Ho of unit root 
KPSS  yes 1 lag 1.715 Reject Ho of stationarity 
log-nominal 
farm-gate 
milk price Structural break 1994 M11 yes 1 lag -0.8078 FTR Ho of unit root 
ADF   yes 10 lags -1.5347 FTR Ho of unit root 
KPSS  yes 10 lags 0.2033 Reject Ho at 5% 
log-nominal 
productivity 
index Structural break 1997 M3 yes 10 lags -1.7531 FTR Ho of unit root 
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Figure A3.1: Log-nominal UHT milk price with shift dummy, break (1997.M10), 1 
lag  
 
 
Figure A3.2: Log-nominal Farm-gate milk price with shift dummy, break 
(1994.M11), 0 lag 
 
 
 
Figure A3.3: Log-nominal Productivity Index with shift dummy (1997.M3), 10 lags 
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The following TAR and M-TAR analysis considers only the cointegration of log-
nominal UHT price and log-nominal farm-gate price following the findings in Table A3.3 
which reveal that log-nominal prices are cointegrated (without taking into account the 
hourly labor productivity index). For simplicity, we consider only one structural break for 
October 1997. Table A3.4 shows the results for TAR and M-TAR models. For the TAR 
model, all coefficient estimates have the expected negative signs for zero and non-zero 
threshold. In the case of the TAR model, the threshold is less than zero, indicating that 
milk processors make quicker adjustments in prices when the actual wholesale prices are 
below the long-term equilibrium price. The absolute value of the coefficient estimate of 
ρ1 is larger than that of ρ2, suggesting faster convergence in response to positive 
deviations from equilibrium. t-Max values for the TAR model are -1.28 (zero threshold) 
and -0.91 (non-zero threshold); i.e. higher than the 10 percent critical values (-1.90 and    
-1.91). Hence, we fail to reject the no-cointegration hypothesis. Moreover, when we 
perform the joint hypothesis with the more powerful Φ test, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration at every significance level.  
For the M-TAR model the coefficient estimate for ρ1 is negative and the 
coefficient estimate for ρ2 is negative when the threshold is zero and positive when the 
threshold is non-zero (statistically insignificant in both cases). In this case, we cannot use 
t-Max because not all coefficient estimates are negative. The sample *  statistics are 
3.87 for zero threshold and 8.61 for non-zero threshold. The *  statistics is greater than 
the 5 percent significance value of 6.78 for the case of non-zero threshold, so only in this 
case the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected. Given this results for 
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cointegration, the next step is to test asymmetry. The usual F-test confirms that the 
coefficients of positive and negative deviations are asymmetric. 
Table A3.3: Cointegration tests for farm-gate, UHT milk prices and labor 
productivity index (Table 4.5) 
Johansen Trace test - Constant      
Variables structural break lags result 
Farm-gate and UHT no 1 1 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index no 8 1 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate and UHT 1997 M10 1 1 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index 1997 M10 5 2 cointegrating vectors 
Farm-gate and UHT 1994.M11 1997.M10 1 1 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index 1994.M11 1997.M10 5 2 cointegrating vectors 
Johansen Trace test - Constant & trend   
Farm-gate and UHT no 1 1 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index no 8 1 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate and UHT 1997 M10 1 1 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index 1997 M10 5 3 cointegrating vectors 
Farm-gate and UHT 1994.M11 1997.M10 1 1 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index 1994.M11 1997.M10 5 2 cointegrating vectors 
Johansen Trace test - orthogonal trend   
Farm-gate and UHT no 1 1 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index no 8 1 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate and UHT 1997 M10 1 1 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index 1997 M10 5 1 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate and UHT 1994.M11 1997.M10 1 1 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index 1994.M11 1997.M10 5 1 cointegrating vector 
Saikkonen & Lütkepohl test test type lags  
Farm-gate and UHT constant 1 1 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index constant 8 0 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate and UHT constant & trend 1 1 cointegrating vector at 10 % 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index constant & trend 8 0 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate and UHT orthogonal trend 1 1 cointegrating vector 
Farm-gate , UHT, productivity index orthogonal trend 8 2 cointegrating vectors 
 
When we deal with log-nominal prices, we find evidence for cointegration and 
asymmetry only in the M-TAR test. In the case of the M-TAR model, the threshold is less 
than zero, indicating that milk processors make quicker adjustments in prices when the 
deviations from long-term equilibrium are below the long-term for ‘momentum’. 
However, the absolute value of the coefficient estimate of 1 is larger than that of 2 , 
suggesting faster convergence in response to positive deviations from equilibrium. 
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Therefore, the farm-to-wholesale price transmission in Turkey is asymmetric, and 
adjustments are stronger when 1t   is greater than the threshold value of -0.032. That is, 
when actual wholesale prices are higher than the equilibrium prices, a more rapid 
adjustment back toward the equilibrium price occurs. This conclusion for log nominal 
prices is similar to inflation-adjusted prices. 
 
Table A3.4: Results of TAR and M-TAR for log-nominal UHT milk price (Table 
4.6) 
dependent 
variable threshold 1
a  t-value 2
b  t-value 
c  1 2
d   
p-
value 
TAR         
c=0   (0.117) -2.46  (0.059) -1.28 3.85   
C ≠ 0  (0.093) (0.128) -2.8  (0.043) -0.91 4.33   
         
M-TAR         
c=0   (0.112) -2.59  (0.052) -1.01 3.87   
C ≠ 0 (0.032)  (0.136)  -3.71 0.072 1.08 7.36 7.49 0.007 
a: Coefficients and t-statistics for the null hypothesis ρ1 = 0. 
b: Coefficients and t-statistics for the null hypothesis ρ2 = 0. t-Max critical values: 
when c=0: TAR: 1%: -2.55, 5%: -2.11, 10%: -1.90. M-TAR: 1%: -2.57, 5%: -2.14, 10%: -1.91. 
when 0c  : TAR: 1%: -2.35, 5%: -1.85, 10%: -1.61. M-TAR: 1%: -2.37, 5%: -1.90, 10%: -1.65. 
c: F statistics for the joint hypothesis ρ1= ρ2 = 0.  
when c= 0: TAR: 1%: 8.24, 5%: 5.98; 10%: 5.01; M-TAR: 1%: 8.78, 5%: 6.51, 10%: 5.45. 
when 0c  : TAR: 1%: 9.27, 5%: 6.95; 10%: 5.95; M-TAR: 1%: 9.14, 5%: 6.78, 10%: 5.73. 
d: F statistics for the joint hypothesis ρ1 =ρ2 to test for asymmetric price transmission. 
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